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# ***JPRS Report***


## **Soviet Union**

### ***Military Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

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### CONTENTS

4 May 1989

#### MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Flt Adm Sorokin Addresses Problems Of Political Reform of State Structure [KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 1, Jan 89] .....	1
Dep Min of Defense Sukhorukov Interview: Impact of Cuts on Personnel [V. Makhun; KOMMUNIST, 3 Mar 89] .....	7
Deputy Def Min Interviewed on Troop Cuts [D.S. Sukhorukov; AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA No 6, Mar 89] .....	8
Letter Calls for Open Public Discussion of Military Doctrine, Spending [R. Mavlyutov; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 11, 15 Mar 89] .....	9
Candidate Profile: Col Gen N.V. Chekov [Yu. Grachev; SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 5 Feb 89] .....	9
Candidate Profile: Gen Army P.G. Lushev [O. Sholmov; SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 15 Feb 89] .....	11
Col Gen Patrikeyev Chosen as Candidate [M. Guk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Feb 89] .....	13
Sukhoi Bureau General Designer Chosen As Candidate [I. Abarenkov; SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 26 Feb 89] .....	14
Military Supports Civilian Candidate Instead of Captain [A. Kosenko, et al; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Feb 89] .....	16
Col Gen Yermakov of Leningrad MD on Candidacy [V. Streltsov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Mar 89] .....	16
Discussion of Candidacy of Lt Gen Gromov [A. Polyakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Mar 89] .....	17
More on Rehabilitation of Kuznetsov [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Mar 89] .....	19
Maj Gen Kuznetsov Discusses Electoral Procedures [V. Kazakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Mar 89] .....	19
Election Results by Candidate of Veterans' Organization [TRUD, 19 Mar 89] .....	20
Lt Gen Ovchinnikov Evaluates Elections [V. Astafyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Apr 89] .....	23
Col Pisarenko Elected From Rural District [N. Fedoseyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Apr 89] .....	23

#### MILITARY SCIENCE

Reconnaissance in Defensive Battle [P. Popovskikh; VOYENNY VESTNIK No 12, Dec 88] .....	25
Col Gen Borsuk on Development of Aviation Tactics, Qualitative Parameters [V. Seledkin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Apr 89] .....	30

#### WARSAW PACT

First Soviet Tanks Prepare to Leave Hungary [A. Borovkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Apr 89] .....	33
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#### ARMED FORCES

Sorokin on Impact of New Political Thinking on Military [A. Sorokin; PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN No 3, Feb 89] .....	34
Moiseyev: Combined Arms Divisions Cut by Half [V. Voytenko; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 15, 15-21 Apr 89] .....	38
Interview With New Commander of Baltic MD [F.M. Kuzmin; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 29 Jan 89] ...	40
Problems of Improving Military-Political Officers' Education [A. A. Gaydukov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 3, Feb 89] .....	43
Conference to Resolve Problems of Units in Moscow MD [F. Semyanovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Feb 89] .....	48
Main Military Procurator on Procuracy's Role in Legal State, Restructuring [B. Popov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Feb 89] .....	48
Letters of Thanks for Military Disaster Aid to Tajikistan [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Feb 89] .....	51
Maj Gen Antoshkin On Negative Factors Retarding Restructuring Armed Forces [N. Antoshkin; SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 23 Feb 89] .....	52
Readers Express Fears of Results of Reduction in Force .....	53
Editorial Commentary [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Feb 89] .....	53

Reserve Officer Inequality	[V. Buyevich; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Feb 89]	53
Early Out for Students?	[O. Fadeyev, G. Fadeyeva; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Feb 89]	53
Those Discharged Deserve Benefits	[A. Tereshchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Feb 89]	53
Cut Military School Levy	[V. Novikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Feb 89]	54
Fears Civilian Life Ahead	[A. Kamaletdinov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Feb 89]	54
Discharged Officers Need Attention	[T. Ivanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Feb 89]	54
Housing Denied Deserving Family	[Ye. Khokhlova; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Feb 89]	54
FRG Christian Democrat Youth Group Visits Unit	[M. Zhiglov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Mar 89]	55
Subunits From Leningrad MD, MVD Exercise Together	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Mar 89]	56
Avoid Mistakes of 60's in Cutting Officers	[O. Pochinyuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Mar 89]	56
Dep Chair of USSR Education Committee: New Higher Education Deferments for Spring 1989		
	[G.F. Kutsev; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 30 Mar 89]	57
Changes in Law on Compulsory Service	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 Apr 89]	57

## GROUND FORCES

New Model Trainer for ATGM Operators	[A. Dolgikh; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Mar 89]	59
Computerized Trainer for ATGM Operators	[A. Dolgikh; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Mar 89]	59

## AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Problem of Coordination Between PVO Ground, Air Units Continues		
	[S. Levitskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Feb 89]	61
Cost Vs. Risk in Combat Aircraft Repair	[V. Vinogradov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Feb 89]	63
Flight Subunits Sacrifice Combat Training to Economic Work		
	[S. Prokopenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Apr 89]	65

## REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Defense Plant Director on Conversion Process	[Ya. Zhukovskiy; PRAVDA UKRAINY, 11 Feb 89]	67
Military Ration Allowances Discussed	[A. Plotnikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Mar 89]	69
Guidance Needed in Defense Industries Conversion	[P. Ishchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Mar 89]	70
Use of Military Air Transports For Civilian Economy		
	[L.M. Chervyakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Apr 89]	72
Favorable Credits for Defense Conversion	[V. Bukato; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 16, 22-28 Apr 89]	73

## MILITARY HISTORY

Role of Labor, Defense Council in 20's Military Reform Considered		
	[V. Maltsev; AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA No 4, Feb 89]	74
'Political' Aspect of Stalin's Military Leadership Criticized		
	[G. Klyucharev; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 8 Mar 89]	75
Access to Classified Archive Documents Widened	[N. Lutsev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Mar 89]	79

## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Growing French Involvement in NATO Deplored	[A. Balebanov; SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 7 Mar 89]	81
US Military Historian Interviewed on Visit	[V. Kicherov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Mar 89]	81
Increased British SSN Patrols in Barents Sea Reported	[E. Babenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Mar 89]	82
Western Optically Guided, Submarine-Launched Missile Noted	[Ye. Grishin; IZVESTIYA, 17 Mar 89]	82

## AFGHANISTAN

Status of MIAs, POWs Discussed	[V. Mariy; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 8, Feb-Mar 89]	84
BSSR Benefits for Afghan Vets Described	[V.A. Pechennikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Mar 89]	85

**Flt Adm Sorokin Addresses Problems Of Political Reform of State Structure**

18010407 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*  
*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian  
No 1, Jan 89 (Signed to press 20 Dec 89) pp 3-11

[Interview with Flt Adm Sorokin, by editorial staff of *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*; date, place not given: "Establishment of Government by the People"]

[Text] The results of the November (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the 12th Special Session, 11th Convocation, of the USSR Supreme Soviet continue to remain at the center of attention of the Soviet people and members of the armed forces. The editorial staff of the magazine *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* requested Flt Adm A.I. Sorokin, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, to answer a number of questions concerning problems of political reform in the area of state structure.

[Editor] Comrade Fleet Admiral! What are your impressions on the very course of the special session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the decisions made by it?

[Sorokin] I will immediately note that it is still too early to sum up the results of the session. Only time and state and public practice itself will be able to assess at true worth the correctness of the decisions and documents adopted. I can only say that very crucial and labor-intensive work was done. You would agree that one does not often have the opportunity to participate in such a matter.

And this is what is remembered—the sensation of that democratic spirit, the sharpness of the discussions that unfolded, which were so characteristic of the work of the 19th Party Conference. The deputies approached in a businesslike and very principled manner each formulation, each aspect of laws being discussed and made sure they corresponded to the interests of all nations and nationalities, all sections of the population. They stated their opinions boldly and frankly. True, there were both a lack of restraint and strong emotions in the absence of serious arguments, but this also demonstrated the sign of the times, so to speak—glasnost, pluralism of opinions....

But the report delivered by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on measures for implementation of political reforms in the area of state structure set the businesslike tone of the session. He convincingly proved that acceleration of our socio-economic development is impossible without improvement of political institutions. Restructuring of the economy and the social sphere and establishment of the principles of cost-accounting and cost-recovery made obvious the interdependence of the rates of economic and social development and, in a very

sharp manner, raised the question of the need for expansion of glasnost, democratization of management, and integral reform of the political system.

[Editor] The report stated the need "to breathe new life into the soviets"....

[Sorokin] Yes, this need cannot be put off. Let us face the truth. For a long time, workers have been gradually shunted aside from real participation in management of state affairs for a long time. Democratic slogans resounded loudly, but people's opinions were not always taken into account. The soviets were assigned the traditional role of formally approving and ratifying bodies, changing nothing in the decisions made in advance. What this led to is well-known. The working man stopped being the true master of his state. The political and social activeness of the masses, and along with it the labor activeness, gradually declined. The party's wisdom was required here to restore complete government by the people.

Let us look back at April 1985. The party advances the idea of perestroika. It attracts the masses. But we must yet convince people of the need for each and everyone's specific work in a new way. And this means from understanding of problems and deformations which accumulated by the mid-1980's through formation of the concept of the normalization of society and the improvement of peoples lives to shift to practical steps in all areas. It is clear that if we do not reinforce the economic, social and spiritual restructuring of political reform, all of the restructured processes will start slipping. That is why understanding of the urgency of establishing the working man as the true master of the country was consolidated in public opinion, beginning with preparations for the 19th Party Conference. Thus, the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" acquired its Leninist revolutionary significance.

From the radio and television broadcasts and press materials, including military, one could observe what a powerful impetus that the publication and nation-wide discussion of draft legislation gave the political activeness of the masses. Millions of Soviet people took part in it, and over 300,000 observations and suggestions were made during the course of "the nation-wide appraisal." At the session, amendments were made to more than half of the articles of laws discussed. This means that the planned program of political reform and the whole scope and nature of the impending transformations received complete public support.

[Editor] You have the experience of working in representative bodies of power. In light of the laws passed, what do you specifically see as ways of strengthening their positions and increasing their activeness?

[Sorokin] The new laws passed at the session are intended to ensure true government by the people. They need only to be strictly carried out. Revival of the soviets



must begin with reorganization of the central authority. You see, the effectiveness of the highest echelons is directly linked to the accomplishment of other tasks of economic and political reform. It must be said that the people understand perfectly this most important time for the destiny of the country. Therefore, we, too, the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, have decisively begun to make changes and additions to the USSR Constitution and the new electoral law.

Here I want to emphasize what was stated at the 19th Party Conference: Restoration of unlimited power of the soviets does not signify in any way the party's retreat from its role in the political system of socialism. Our party was the initiator of perestroika. Today, it is the driving force of renewal. It is renewing itself on Leninist principles. The party is the political initiator of all the complex and arduous work on restructuring public life.

If one were to draw the dynamics of our renewal schematically, it would, in my view, look like this: The Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, formed in accordance with the new laws, assume a great burden in perestroika. The soviets of all levels—republic, kray, oblast, rayon, etc.—are working, as a unified system of unlimited power of the people, energetically and efficiently to transform life and are resolving economic and social problems. The leadership of the representative system, its integrity, and unity are strengthened thanks to the introduction of such an important element as the Congresses of People's Deputies at the all-union and republic levels. What dictated this innovation? First of all, the task of precluding abuse of power at the highest stages of the state structure. The congresses guarantee what Lenin called "total democracy of the center."

Now about the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet. What is new in this plan? The Supreme Soviet has a right, within the system of legislative and monitoring activities, to review and decide any issues relating to the jurisdiction of the USSR, other than those which relate to the conduct of the Congress of People's Deputies. The new wording of this section of the constitution gives a list of such issues. A number of provisions formerly assigned to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet are being transferred to the Supreme Soviet. In particular, such issues as ratification and denunciation of international treaties, frequently associated with correcting the country's domestic legislation.

Important issues of a defense nature also are now under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet. It has been given the right to form a Defense Council and approve its staff, appoint and relieve the high command of the armed forces, and establish military ranks. For the first time, the activities of the USSR Supreme Soviet includes determining basic measures in the area of defense and ensuring state security, declaration of partial and total mobilization, and declaration of war in case of military attack or in fulfillment of international treaty obligations on mutual defense against an aggressor. The USSR

Supreme Soviet is also empowered to make decisions on using a contingent of the armed forces if necessary to fulfill international obligations to maintain peace and security. Important powers associated with national defense are entrusted to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet during intervals between sessions.

So, the people's deputies, their Congresses, and the Supreme Soviet are called on to elect and appoint the most worthy people to leadership and administrative posts, and will direct and control State structuring [obustroystvo]. The supreme bodies of power will also pass the necessary laws for this and guarantee their permanent leadership. This reform is being proposed, and I also voted for it without hesitation at the session.

Of course, passing laws is only the beginning of restoration of government by the people. And we should not set our hopes on the fact that, once a decree has been adopted, the matter will take care of itself. Without our active participation, and I mean every citizen of the USSR, real government by the people will not come about. Here it is appropriate to recall the behest of Vladimir Ilich Lenin: "A decree," he said, "is, first of all, instructions for the political action of the working masses."

[Editor] As is known, more than 13,000 servicemen are people's deputies, the majority, naturally, of local soviets. It is no secret that service requirements do not always permit many of them to participate full in public work. What possibilities are opening up in connection with the passage of the new laws to increase the activeness of a servicemember who is a people's deputy?

[Sorokin] Already the very revival of the soviets and the increase of their influence on resolving socio-economic problems in territories within their jurisdiction are increasing the role of the people's deputy. As for being busy with military duties, all of us deputies are invested with the people's trust not for "noble ancestry," but precisely because we are in crucial sectors in the struggle for the victory of our common cause, regardless of our rank or position. There is no place for "show-boat generals" in the soviets. One must work conscientiously.

Visiting the troops and the fleets, I take an interest in the kind of work our military people's deputies are involved in at the local soviets. It is pleasant when they say good words about them. For example, about Capt 2d Rank G. Gulko, who is serving in the Northern Fleet. This officer has a very demanding job, but he knows how to divide his time and efforts to champion the interests of his constituents and help them in solving urgent problems. It is no coincidence that he is respected in the garrison.

Incidentally, about those urgent problems. From both his own experience and from the experience of other deputies, one can single out the problem of housing. This is a "priority" issue of a deputy's correspondence with his constituents, their mandate to him, and their direct

appeals during meetings and receptions. Are the deputies' powers being fully used to resolve problems? Not always, perhaps. At times, deputies give in to the bureaucratic machine, are satisfied with flowery formal replies, and do not demonstrate the proper persistence.

For example, there is an official regulation on provision of living quarters to officers and their families at the servicemen's duty location and on allocation of living quarters to officers transferred to the reserve or retired; this regulation is carried out by the executive committees of the soviets of people's deputies under a procedure established by the USSR Council of Ministers. A decision of this same USSR Council of Ministers directs ispolkoms of local soviets to provide housing to a reserve or retired officer first of all, but not later than 3 months from his arrival at the place of residence.

There is no denying it, this is a good regulation. But I will tell you frankly that it is being carried out very poorly. Those officers who are transferred to the reserve and return to their permanent place of residence in Moscow, districts near Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Kharkov, and the capitals of a number of union republics find themselves in a particularly grave situation. A paradoxical situation develops: Soldiers after compulsory service, all workers of regions with severe working conditions, and also those who have been recruited under organized recruitment and individuals convicted only once for common misdemeanors can return to the call-up point. But officers transferred to the reserve cannot. I agree with PRAVDA's recent article on this problem. We must review decisions which were rashly made. Who better than military people's deputies can be spokesmen for the interests of the representatives of the armed forces and boldly raise such issues for discussion by the sessions of the soviets of the republics, oblasts, and cities.

The people's deputies have always had enough energy and opportunities for applying wise initiative. Is it not really a deputy's concern to improve the cultural facilities of inhabitants of a remote garrison, to establish normal working and recreational conditions for workers of a repair plant or military sovkhov, to struggle for the clean-up of the environment, and to provide assistance to the family of a soldier-internationalist or to the soldier himself in the form of job placement and medical service?

Generally, one must resolve the most varied problems. For example, just recently at a meeting with constituents in Dushanbe, the conversation turned to the need to accelerate construction of a soldiers club, completion of which was planned for the distant future. The problem of leisure in the garrison is quite serious; there is neither a gymnasium nor a stadium. On returning to Moscow, I appealed to Col Gen Nikolay Vasilyevich Chekov, deputy minister of defense for construction and troop quartering. After carefully considering the problem, he found a way to begin construction of the club. That is how one of the issues was solved.

I am sure the local soviets of people's deputies can play an active role in the restructuring of Army and Navy life. With concurrence of the appropriate staffs and political agencies, they could, enlisting the help of representatives of public and creative organizations, workers collectives, veterans of war and labor, help to raise the level of political training and patriotic, moral, and ethical education of soldiers and assist the command authority in solving administrative and living problems. Of course, deputies from among servicemen are urged to play "first fiddle" here.

The prestige of the people's deputy and the soviets is now being raised to a new height, and their efficiency, adherence to principle, and boldness of thoughts and actions must correspond to this height.

[Editor] Having touched upon the themes of "soviets—deputy—military collective," you, to some degree, broached the subject of democratization of Army and Navy life. In your opinion, how is this process being expressed today, and what are its directions and prospects?

[Sorokin] As you know, the armed forces are an integral part of our socialist public organism. And if the organism as a whole has begun to breathe that healthy and clean air, as democracy was called at the 27th Party Congress, then renewal is felt everywhere.

How is it manifested? First of all, in the increase of socio-political and job-related activeness of servicemen. An atmosphere of mutual respect, trust, and openness is being established in the collectives, and businesslike criticism and self-criticism are developing. The creative potential of party and Komsomol organizations is being more fully brought to light. This was most visibly demonstrated in the reports and elections that took place in local party organizations.

Nevertheless, this is only the beginning of that great work which we began on restructuring the armed forces. You see, a revealing atmosphere now mainly prevails in military units. Shortcomings are being revealed in military and political training, in the sphere of social security, and in the behavior of communists and leaders who are out of touch with the needs of personnel. All of this is undoubtedly necessary and useful. However, it is also time to introduce constructive suggestions and to implement perestroika in reality, in particular, in the democratization of life. Time, as they say, presses on.

I think we have an enormous reserve here in stepping up the work of all the democratic institutions existing in the armed forces. Just what are they? Meetings of servicemen, both general and by categories; various types of social formations; comrades' courts; people's control groups; soviets of clubs and Leninist rooms; editorial boards of wall and radio newspapers; soviets of workers collectives of enterprises; sports, cultural, and artistic groups; women's councils; etc. All of these, you will say,

have long existed. I agree. They exist. But they must work and actively operate. You see, perestroika, as the 19th All-Union Party Conference noted, is not at all manna from heaven, and we should not wait until they bring it to us from somewhere, but we should create it ourselves, in our own collectives. Besides, remember the main object of perestroika and democratization is the person. It is not devoting attention to some soldier or sailor from time to time, but to study him from his first day of service, to search for those "keys to the soul" in him that can be used to effectively influence the formation of the best moral qualities in a young man. Naturally, we are talking about individual work and about the closeness of commanders and supervisors to their people.

Here I would cite the experience that has been accumulated in the Belorussian Military District. It is precisely the painstaking study of individual peculiarities of young servicemen with the aid of uncomplicated but pedagogically and psychologically precisely designed tests that give commanders and political workers the opportunity to determine the professional and moral qualities of people, their potential capabilities in job-related and public activities, and to predict behavior in one or another collective. By the way, we were fascinated by the "machinations" of the education process. But even without them there is no democratization, for the formation of a serviceman's personality, the inclusion of his initiative, creativity, and capabilities, that is, all that we call the human factor in the process of perestroika, ensures in the final analysis a conscious, steady increase in the level of proficiency of the troops, their combat readiness, and military discipline.

[Editor] The education process within the military unit will obviously be more effective if each serviceman thoroughly understands that he has, just as a civilian does, not only obligations but also rights guaranteed by the constitution. In your view, what is the degree of social protection of servicemen?

[Sorokin] The full rights of servicemen as citizens of the USSR are legally guaranteed in our constitution. And the Law on Universal Military Obligation notes, permit me to recall: "Servicemen and men liable for call-up who are drafted enjoy the totality of socio-economic, political and individual rights and freedoms, and bear all the responsibilities of citizens of the USSR that are provided by the Constitution of the USSR."

I do not think that special commentary is required here. The law is the law, and it must be carried out. But this is not always done everywhere. And where the law is being violated, the rights of citizens are also being violated. That is why the need arose to establish the Constitutional Oversight Committee—an unbiased agency guarding the constitution and the underlying principles established by it. But, as they say, without respect of persons.

It is impossible to imagine the democratization of army life without the concern of commanders and political agencies about observing legality and law and order and implementing the principle of social justice. The military man, like every Soviet citizen, needs reliable social protection, protection from violation of army laws. Of course, one must know the laws well for this to occur. But we have problems here. Not only compulsory service soldiers but also certain officers sometimes amaze me by their ignorance of the laws under which they live and serve. What kind of legal protection can there be if a man does not know his rights?

Commanders must make many decisions on a daily basis connected with implementing legal norms which affect various questions of the life and activities of the troops, including the rights and interests of servicemen and other citizens. A high degree of legal competence is therefore necessary for every officer, especially commanders, chiefs of staff, and political workers. Who else besides them are to establish among the troops a spirit of irreconcilability toward violation of the law and create the atmosphere in military units in which each soldier would feel socially and legally protected and would know that his service would be objectively evaluated. Only with a sense of full fairness does a person strive to do more, better, and wholeheartedly give knowledge and strength.

I would especially like to talk about the role of the court as the main instrument of compliance with law and order. The current session marked the beginning of judicial and legal reform which should serve the aims of deepening people's self-government. Guarantees of judges' independence and inviolability were reinforced in the supplements to the constitution which were adopted: their election by higher soviets; the increase in their term of office; and others. At the same time, the accountability of judges to the soviets and of people's assessors to their constituents has been provided for, since the socialist legal state toward which we are moving is based not only on the supremacy of the law but also on the open and democratic control of the people. Hence, there is a need at future stages of judicial and legal reform to fundamentally renew all branches of our legislation, to improve the training and use of judicial personnel, and to increase the legal and political competence of all of society.

We must all remember that democratization has nothing at all in common with lack of discipline, self-will, and anarchy. At a meeting which took place on the eve of the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, an appeal resounded to all workers of the nation: Communists and non-party people, veterans and young people, wives, and the intelligentsia should demonstrate utmost responsibility and not allow anti-social and anti-perestroika elements to spread in the profound people's processes, including in inter-nationality relations.

[Editor] The session's work also coincided in time with the period when inter-nationality relations were strained in a number of places, particularly in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Naturally, the session of the Supreme Soviet could not ignore such acute problems. How was this reflected during discussion of draft legislation?

[Sorokin] The moods which were and are being manifested in certain of our republics cannot help but trouble the soul. Especially the events associated with Nagornyy Karabakh. This problem was exacerbated because the former Azerbaijan leadership retreated from Leninist traditions at some stage and did not pay proper attention to the population of Karabakh. Nationalist elements in the Baltic region, having taken democracy and glasnost for permissiveness, were revived. A logical step in this connection was the resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet which nullified the clearly anti-constitutional decision of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia which makes all-union laws subject to approval by a republic; you see, concurring with such a decision would really lead any state to disintegration.

Inconsistency during discussion of the Estonian issue by some of the speakers caused a feeling of dissatisfaction among the deputies. True concern for strengthening the unity and friendship among peoples of the USSR was shown during discussions among deputies and in their statements on radio, television, and in the press. I remember one of them in particular. USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Petr Kondratyevich Kolesnikov, a worker at the Rostov Agricultural Equipment Factory, Hero of Soviet Labor, participant in the Great Patriotic War, and a member of the 1st Baltic Front which freed the land of the fraternal republics from the fascists, recalled how in 1944 at sites of recent battles he saw pictures of the brutalities of the Hitlerites and local nationalists, and met with people who thanked the Soviet soldiers for delivering them from the fascist yoke. Afterward, the veteran also talked about the fraternal aid which Russia and other republics gave the Baltic people in restoring the economy. Then Petr Kondratyevich asked a question: Is it possible that among those who are walking on the streets of Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius holding provocative placards in their hands there are also those who met the soldiers-liberators with flowers in 1944? The veteran does not want to believe that. We all do not want to believe that.

The recent tragic event in Armenia tested the potential of the friendship of peoples and proved how powerful and strong it is. The misfortune which befell the Armenian people caused a deep pain in the hearts of the Soviet people. Aid for the victims is coming in from all sides. It is characteristic that Azerbaijan, also a victim of the natural disaster, but to a lesser degree, was one of the first to respond to its neighbor's misfortune. All of the innuendos and discord that poisoned the life of the two peoples are forgotten. Compassion, mercy, and sincere sympathy—these are what now fill the hearts of people living in the various corners of our enormous nation. As

they once did in Ashkhabad and Tashkent, today in Armenia builders from the RSFSR and Georgia, from the Ukraine and Belorussia, doctors from Estonia and Latvia, donors' blood and financial aid, equipment for rescue work, and construction materials from everywhere are going to the victims of the region. Thousands of volunteers responded to the call for aid from the party and the Soviet government to clean up after the natural disaster.

As always, the armed forces were among the first to come to the aid of the victims. More than 3,000 servicemen had already donated blood at donor stations the day after the earthquake. Officers and men dismantled rubble by hand before equipment arrived. For 7 hours, Pvt D. Vaneyev groped his way toward a child who was calling for help and saved him. Sgt N. Abbartsumyan saved 9 people, and Lt Yu. Surin saved 17. Aviators worked day and night evacuating the injured and homeless. Approximately 300 military transport aircraft are taking part in rendering assistance to the workers of Armenia. Military railroad workers restored the track between Kirovakan and Leninakan. On 15 December, 20,000 personnel, 770 pieces of engineering equipment, and 1,500 vehicles were taking part in rescue work. While clearing rubble, valuables valued at many hundreds of thousands of rubles were recovered by the servicemen. Paratrooper units of the Airborne Troops are rendering assistance to the authorities in restoring public order. I must also say that a voluntary collection of money and clothing intended for the victims is going on in regiments, on ships, and in headquarters, political agencies, and educational institutions. The Army is always with the people—both in happiness and in misfortune.

The elements have tested the strength of the Soviet peoples' friendship more than once. Yet one more test has confirmed: Inviolable brotherhood, mutual aid, and participation make us strong in spirit. Both nationalist ways and selfish interests retreat before friendship. A sense of family unity guides the thoughts and deeds of the Soviet people.

It is no coincidence that the idea of comprehensive development of all nations and peoples of our country runs through all the session's documents. Quite a number of amendments have been introduced into draft legislation which take the interests of the republics into account. But the guarantee of these interests is not only strong republics but also a strong USSR. And the overwhelming majority of deputies supported this truth with all their hearts. The deputies, having shown the example of how one can deliberately and responsibly listen and hear each other, must now go to their constituents and report to each man our common will to live, act, and build our common house in peace and harmony.

[Editor] One last question: What features of propaganda, explanation, and study of the materials of the November (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the special session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR are there among the personnel of the armed forces?



[Sorokin] The Main Political Directorate has elaborated and delivered recommendations on an in-depth study and understanding of these important documents in all forms of political training to Army and Navy propaganda activists. The efforts of oral propaganda activists and workers of cultural and educational institutions are directed to this end. The peculiarity of the work begun consists in the fact that, in clarifying the provisions of M.S. Gorbachev's report to the session, the resolutions and laws passed are closely linked with materials of the 19th Party Conference, the July (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and the tasks being carried out by units, ships, and subunits. It is important to enlist the services of as large a number of propaganda activists as possible in the explanatory work, which will give us the possibility of more fully taking the peculiarities of a given military unit into account, in particular, education level and national composition.

The following has been recommended: conduct an interview with officers and generals; hold three meetings each with warrant officers, soldiers, sailors, sergeants, senior noncommissioned officers, and employees of the Soviet Army and Navy; comprehensively and resourcefully explain the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet during instruction of social sciences at USSR Ministry of Defense military educational institutions, universities of Marxism-Leninism, and at party activist schools; involve in this work the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, party and soviet workers, members of lecturer and propaganda-agitation units and groups, and ideological activists of units and formations.

The results of the November (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the 12th Special Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, and the task of party organizations arising from the Central Committee Plenum resolution "On Measures for Implementing Political Reform in the Area of State Structure" were discussed at party conferences of large strategic formations, districts, groups of forces, and fleets, as well as at local party organizations.

I would also like to direct attention to the fact that we should also simultaneously organize thorough explanations of M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the United Nations on 7 December to all categories of servicemen, workers, and employees and to family members. It provides a profound and all-encompassing analysis of the present, sets forth a new understanding of the nature of international relations and new large-scale initiatives of the USSR, and announces the decision to make unilateral cuts in our armed forces.

Here we should also involve the command and political leadership, workers of personnel agencies, military lawyers, and party and ideological activists. We recommend conducting united political days, political information sessions, question and answer nights, and interviews. It

is also necessary to conduct an explanation of the basic provisions of M.S. Gorbachev's speech during classes in accordance with the political training plan.

As the first results of the study of the documents have shown, striving "to cover" as many people as possible in some locations lowers the effectiveness of explanatory work. I think that this is primarily the result of superficial training of propaganda activists and an attempt of certain political bodies to conduct the next campaign as quickly as possible and to report this following the correct procedure. The old disease of report-mania unfortunately has great vitality.

What is required today from organic and non-organic propagandists, agitators, and party and Komsomol activists? Creativity! Yes, creativity is of utmost importance in the publicizing and explaining the historical significance of the documents. Do not follow the beaten path, but find new interesting forms of work, and actively involve people's deputies, party and Soviet workers, and lawyers. We must widely use the method of discussions and free comparison of various points of view. It is extremely important to develop creative thinking, independence, and the ability to defend one's point of view among servicemen.

Propagandists and party activists today must be able to organically combine explanation of both domestic and international problems. This has to be done taking the actual situation into account. And it brings on reflection. Let us take these facts. The shuttle "Atlantis," a new reusable spacecraft with a secret military mission, was launched into orbit several days prior to the Soviet leader's visit to the United States. "Lacrosse," a new generation satellite which the UPI press agency proclaimed a "miracle of spy technology," is to help carry out this mission. This "miracle" will conduct observation of the Soviet Union under conditions of darkness and cloud cover. The recently tested "stealth" bomber is intended for purposes far from those of tourists. An intercontinental missile construction program has begun with warheads capable of destroying underground targets.

We must not forget such facts when we are explaining the essence and direction of the Soviet state's domestic and foreign policy. Our defensive military doctrine obliges us to maintain the defense capabilities of the nation at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency so that no one will be tempted to infringe on the security of the USSR and its allies.

There is still one more important direction in ideological and propaganda work. This is preparation for the USSR Supreme Soviet elections scheduled for 26 March 1989, since, as you know, the terms of the 11th Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet come to an end in March.

These elections will become one of the first practical steps in the implementing comprehensive reform of the political system. They will already be conducted in accordance with the law adopted "On Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR," which is a radical renewal of our electoral system in the full sense of the word.

Propagandists, agitators, party and Komsomol activists must emphasize in their statements to the voters and in conversations with them that the new law and all of the current atmosphere of political life in the country are guaranteeing the real implementation of those norms which have been officially proclaimed until now but often were not observed in practice.

During the pre-election campaign, it is necessary to try to see that each voter becomes acquainted with the candidate. We must make maximum use of radio, television, and the press here.

All agitation and propaganda work during the pre-election campaign must be directed at increasing the political and practical activeness of personnel.

As we can see, the tasks facing our ideological and propaganda activists are complex and very crucial. Their efforts must be directed at increasing the political and job-related activeness of soldiers and making sure each one of them becomes an active fighter for perestroyka, renewal of our society, and an increase in the economic and defensive might of the motherland.

In increasing the quality of combat training from day to day, the soldiers of the Army and Navy cannot forget, even for a minute, about vigilance, about the readiness of the regiment, ship, and their subunit for immediate and decisive action to repel any aggression no matter where it originates. Such is the requirement of life and the requirement of the times.

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**Dep Min of Defense Sukhorukov Interview:  
Impact of Cuts on Personnel**  
18010454 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian  
3 Mar 89 p 4

[Interview with USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel General of the Army Sukhorukov by NOVOSTI Press Agency Correspondent Vladimir Makhun, date, place unknown: "Reduction of the Armed Forces; The Social Aspect"]

[Text] The unilateral reduction of the USSR's Armed Forces by 500,000 men affects the fate of many professional servicemen. How do we plan the reduction with minimal costs in morale? USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel General of the Army Dmitriy Sukhorukov answered APN [NOVOSTI Press Agency] correspondent Vladimir Makhun's questions.

[Makhun] How do you assess the social aspect of the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces?

[Sukhorukov] This program provides for a 12 percent reduction in the Army and Navy. We are talking about the fate of hundreds of thousands of men. For those released from service, this means a change of profession, the need for job placement, and the resolution of life-style and many other problems. Our mission is to reduce these difficulties to a minimum.

As a result of the reduction of the administrative apparatus being conducted, definite experience will be obtained in the country's civilian sector. This experience will be taken into account in every way possible in the Armed Forces.

If we talk about half a million men being transferred into the reserve, then 80 percent of them will be rank and file. Young people will return to their accustomed civilian life [styles]. As for officers, this is a more complicated task and its resolution must be approached with maximum consideration. We already have the sad experience of the Armed Forces reductions of the 60's when we treated many officers without proper concern. This approach is intolerable. The overwhelming majority of military personnel are people who have devoted their whole lives to service to their country and they are justified in counting on society's concern and consideration.

[Makhun] A preference is being shown to young people for military service. Is the Ministry of Defense not taking a risk of depriving itself of the most experienced personnel?

[Sukhorukov] The Army needs both constant rejuvenation and mature personnel with experience and knowledge. Therefore, the transfer of each officer into the reserve will be reviewed on an individual basis. Emphasis on the unit, glasnost, adherence to principle, and good will—these are the principles of our work during the course of the recommendation period which will occur this year.

Recommendations will allow us to determine the degree of each individual's professional suitability and also to rid military units of people who find themselves in a military environment by accident. As a whole, the reduction will promote improved quality of the officer corps. The creative potential of each individual will be taken into account during reduction of personnel at scientific and pedagogical institutions.

[Makhun] Officer training is a lengthy and expensive process. Is there not the risk of losing more than we gain?

[Sukhorukov] The training of a future officer is undoubtedly a lengthy process requiring large material expenditures. For example, more than a million rubles is expended to train a pilot. Of course, transferring an officer to the reserve who has both an engineering degree



and a shortage skill is a loss for the Army. But, on the other hand, a highly qualified specialist is a gain for the national economy. In the near future, a number of defense enterprises are being transferred to the civilian production sector. A former military specialist working at a former military enterprise is sort of a double conversion. The process of reducing the Army is also simultaneously returning significant labor and material resources to the civilian material production sector.

[Makhun] Certain Western circles are attempting to portray the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces as a purely propagandistic act. What is your opinion?

[Sukhorukov] Unfortunately, the notion of the Soviet Union as a sort of "Evil Empire" still persists in some places. We are proceeding from the fact that gradual progress toward a world without weapons must begin with a reduction of Armed Forces to a level of defensive sufficiency. Of course, such unilateral reductions are limited.

[Makhun] If the Armed Forces and weapons reduction trends you have pointed out take on an irreversible and reciprocal character, then will military personnel not be left without work?

[Sukhorukov] Well, this question has a right to exist. But I think that today it is premature to talk about the disappearance of the military. Despite the stereotype which presents military personnel as conservatives, I would like to point out that as both a general and a father, I am for transforming such a trend into conformity with firmly established law. Unfortunately, not everyone in the world is so idealistic. That is why our profession, which is called on to protect the Motherland, also exists.

The positive progress noted in the international arena also gives us hope. The unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces and military arsenals of the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty [Organization] is a concrete step on the path to a more secure world. Today we are witnesses and direct participants in this process.

**Deputy Def Min Interviewed on Troop Cuts**  
*18010555 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 6, Mar 89 pp 10-11*

[Interview with Army Gen D.S. Sukhorukov, deputy USSR minister of defense for personnel, by "Novosti" Press Agency correspondent V. Borisenko, under the rubric "Reduction of the Armed Forces of the USSR": "The Social Aspect"]

[Text] Army Gen D.S. Sukhorukov, deputy USSR minister of defense for personnel, gave this interview to APN correspondent V. Borisenko.

[Borisenko] How do you assess the social aspect of the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed forces?

[Sukhorukov] The program of unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces of the USSR announced by M.S. Gorbachev at the UN calls for a significant reduction, 12%, in the numerical strength of the army and navy. It involves the fate of hundreds of thousands of people. The reduction therefore inevitably touches upon the human factor. For those to be discharged into the reserve it means a change of occupation and the need to find a job, the establishment of a new life and many other problems. Our task is to reduce the difficulties to a minimum.

Speaking of the half-million servicemen to be discharged into the reserve, 80% of them are NCOs, petty officers and lower-ranking personnel. The young people will return to their accustomed life. When it comes to the officers, the task is more complicated, and maximum attention must be given to its resolution.

[Borisenko] Preference is being given to young people in the military service. Is the Ministry of Defense not taking the risk of being deprived of its more experienced cadres following the reduction?

[Sukhorukov] The military needs to be constantly rejuvenated and also needs experienced, skilled cadres. Each officer's discharge into the reserve will therefore be considered on an individual basis, without red tape or urgency. Reliance on the collective, glasnost, principle and kindly concern are the principles underlying our work during the certification, which will take place this year.

Certification will make it possible to determine the degree of each person's professional usefulness and to rid the military collectives of those who do not really belong in the military.

[Borisenko] The training of an officer is a long and expensive process. Is there not a risk that we shall lose more than we gain?

[Sukhorukov] The training of a future officer is indeed a lengthy process involving large material outlays. The discharge of an officer with training as an engineer, of which there is a shortage, would be a loss to the military. On the other hand, however, a highly skilled specialist is an acquisition for our national economy. a number of defense industry enterprises are presently being converted to civilian production. The process of reducing the military is at the same time a process of returning considerable labor and material resources to the civilian area.

[Borisenko] Certain circles in the West are trying to depict the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces as purely an act of propaganda. What is your opinion?

[Sukhorukov] Unfortunately, the concept of the USSR as the "evil empire" has still not been eliminated everywhere. We proceed from the premise, however, that the staged advance toward a world without weapons has to be started by reducing the armed forces to the level of defense adequacy. Such reductions cannot be unlimited on a unilateral basis, of course. With respect to the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces, only the elimination of a large number of organic officer positions will make the process irreversible. What do I mean by this? A quantitative reduction of officer positions will automatically reduce the numbers entering military schools and academies, and this will entail a "chain reaction" of reorganization and even the closing of a number of military schools. It is planned to reduce the draft term for reserve officers by 2 years. Officers are the backbone of the military, as we know. And no army which is preparing for aggression would take such steps.

[Borisenko] If the trend of reducing troops and weapons which has taken shape becomes irreversible and reciprocal, will the regular military personnel not find themselves without a job?

[Sukhorukov] The question is valid, but I believe that it is premature to talk about the disappearance of military occupations. Contrary to the stereotype of military conservatives, however, I would like to say that as a general and as a father I am in favor of turning this trend into a stable pattern. Unfortunately, everything is not so ideal in the world. That is why our profession exists, to protect the homeland.

The positive advances which have taken shape in the international arena are encouraging. The unilateral reduction of armed forces and arsenals by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies is a concrete step on the path toward a safer world. We are witnesses to and direct participants in this process today. COPYRIGHT: "Agitator armii i flota", 1989

#### **Letter Calls for Open Public Discussion of Military Doctrine, Spending**

18010442 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in Russian No 11, 15 Mar 89 p 12

[Letter from R. Mavlyutov, Professor and Doctor of Military Sciences: "Our Common Interest"]

[Text] I am convinced that questions about the country's foreign policy and defense must be decided through the participation of the general public and in some cases, through a general referendum. I will give you some issues in this area which, in my opinion, are of common interest.

First there are the State's military doctrine, the structure and scope of the Armed Forces and the defense expenditures that are associated with this.

We know that such issues are openly discussed in legislative and executive agencies in the leading capitalist countries and are extensively covered by the mass media. The Soviet people know less about this information than others do because the military department has monopolized preparations for suitable decisions. Who guarantees that these decisions are the best? Why do we have to think that during the entire post-war peaceful decades the sizes of the Armed Forces and the expenditures for defense could not have been lower than the obviously very high level at which they were maintained?

Second, what are the priorities used to allocate expenditures for the issuance of military equipment and for basic applied research to develop new types of weapons during peacetime?

If we stress maintaining large force contingents and massively issuing types of weapons that are quickly obsolete, then, with the total expenditures that have been established for defense, technical progress will suffer. It is obvious that major units that are very numerous, but that have outdated equipment, will hardly make the required impression on a potential enemy. Their experts will be happy to note (judging from press reports, they are already doing this) that we are thus driving ourselves to colossal expenditures while aggravating our own people's standard of living, a standard that is already low enough.

In stating my opinion, I am naturally making no pretenses toward truth in this last point. And I am also not sure that I have expressed the most urgent issues in the area under review. Nonetheless I would be interested in finding out the point of view held by those military experts who most of all are concerned not about the honor of their uniform, but rather about the honor and well-being of the country.

#### **Candidate Profile: Col Gen N.V. Chekov**

18010432c Moscow, *SOVETSKIY PATRIOT* in Russian 5 Feb 89 p 1

[Interview of Col Gen N.V. Chekov conducted by Yu. Grachev: "The Peaceful Profession of the Military"]

[Text] [Biographical data: "Visiting Card"]

Last name, First Name, Patronymic: Chekov, Nikolay Vasilyevich

Date of birth: 1931

Nationality: Russian

Education: Higher

Party: CPSU member

Position: Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for Construction and Troop Billeting

Residence: Moscow

[Grachev] Nikolay Vasilyevich, at the 3rd Plenary Session of the CC, USSR DOSAAF, you were nominated as a candidate to the Peoples' Deputies. You are known as

a man of great experience in military and sociopolitical work. You devote serious attention to strengthening the Defense Society and expanding the beginning perestroika in its work.

Thanks to your initiative, DOSAAF facilities continue to be improved. For example, a number of installations previously counted in the lists of "never-ending construction" ["*dolgostroy*"] have now been activated. The printing plant of DOSAAF Publishing has been built in Moscow and is now reaching nominal capacity, and training complexes are operating in Siberia and in the Far East, in the center of Russia and in the allied republics. In short, you have justified your honorary title of "Honored Builder of the RSFSR".

Nevertheless the election platform of the Defense Society is putting forward new demands.

[Chekov] I consider myself obligated, both by service and duty, to further the expansion of defense-mass work. That which has been done is only the start. I do not say this to be flowery. A different time has come, perestroika has come, and the word should not be different from the deed.

[Grachev] Comrade Colonel General, I brought with me some letters from our readers. For example, Voronezh resident A. Akhtyrtsev writes: "When I read in the paper that the Deputy Defense Minister for Construction and Troop Billeting, Comrade Chekov had been nominated as a Deputies' candidate, I wondered: what do construction personnel do? What sort of missions do they have?" Please answer the author of this letter.

[Chekov] This is a complex question. You cannot answer it unequivocally. In the 70 years of its existence, the construction units have done a great deal, both for the defense of the country and for the domestic economy. For example, we built Baykonur, and participated in the construction of Olympic facilities. Our soldiers distinguished themselves in eliminating the consequences of earthquakes in Tashkent, and now in Armenia. In general, you could not list everything.

The construction forces are a huge economic mechanism which is now undergoing perestroika. High-efficiency production is being created, a construction industry is being developed, without which it would be hard to plan on quick growth of new branches of the domestic economy, the reconstruction of operating enterprises, or the implementation of tasks pertaining to the qualitative change of the Armed Forces.

[Grachev] To what extent has perestroika in the Army and Navy affected the military construction forces?

[Chekov] Perestroika in the Armed Forces is directed first of all toward improving quality parameters. There is one requirement here—Soviet military construction should guarantee reliable defense of the country and our

allies, but be carried out economically, with possible reduction in expenditures, and in strict accord with the defensive tendency the military doctrine.

Since 1 January 1989, military construction personnel have been working under conditions of complete cost accounting and self-financing. The main thing for us now is to raise the profitability of our organizations. We are learning diligent management, which makes it possible to find the necessary means to develop small-scale mechanization of construction personnel, and to put the latest electrical tools in their hands.

We widely use a collective contract for our building projects. We are significantly developing our own production base. The organizational structure of capital construction of the USSR Defense Ministry is being revised.

We attach special importance to construction of housing and social-cultural facilities, for which we allocate more than 30 percent of the total volume of capital investments. At present the USSR Ministry of Defense has concluded development of a housing construction program, the implementation of which is directed toward realizing the goal of the CPSU Central Committee, to provide every family with a separate apartment by the year 2000.

In connection with the upcoming reduction of the Armed Forces, the tasks of the DOSAAF organizations for quality training of conscript youth have increased substantially and grown more complex. We understand and acknowledge the responsibility placed on us for participation in developing the facilities of the training organizations of the Defense Society, and we will take exhaustive measures to execute planned assignments.

[Grachev] Let's examine that in more detail, Nikolay Vasilyevich.

[Chekov] In 1986-1988 military builders built and activated four automotive and technical schools, seven zones of service-technical construction at airfields, two Houses of military-technical training, five residential buildings and dormitory facilities, two dining halls, and a number of other buildings and structures, on a contract basis and using DOSAAF assets.

At the same time, the construction of DOSAAF installations is often carried out slowly, and implementation of the plan generally does not exceed 70-80 percent. A typical confirmation of this is the construction of the airfield training complex in the village of Volosovo, started back in 1975 and still not finished.

Indisputably there are also objective reasons for this, first of all the chronic shortage of labor resources, and the failure to supply materials and structures. Deficiencies inherent not only to military construction personnel, but also to the entire construction complex, which have accumulated for many years, also have their effect.

But if we fundamentally assess the state of affairs, from the Party standpoint—and that is the only way we should operate today—then we must acknowledge that the main cause of the unsatisfactory status of construction of DOSAAF installations is first of all insufficient attention to these questions, beginning with me. Certain DOSAAF organization do not always promptly resolve questions of earth removal, and financing and issuance of documents are started late.

In accordance with the approved five year plan, in 1989-1990 military construction organizations are supposed to carry out construction-assembly tasks worth a total of around 30 million rubles on DOSAAF facilities. A significant part of that will be directed toward service-technical construction of training airfields. We will continue construction of naval, technical, and automotive schools, as well as other installations.

[Grachev] At the 3rd plenary session of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee you said you will consider the construction of installations of the Defense Society one of the most important tasks of military construction.

[Chekov] For purposes of cardinal improvements in the state of affairs of facilities construction, we and the leadership of the CC, USSR DOSAAF are jointly taking steps to introduce order in the planning of allocated assets, and timely provision of preliminary estimates to construction projects, along with equipment and cables.

A number of most important DOSAAF building projects are being shifted to the control of the ATC facility of the Deputy Defense Minister for Construction. In the summary of results of production-economic activity of military-construction organizations, and determining the winners of socialist competition, the results of execution of tasks to activate DOSAAF installations will be taken into account equally with state-ordered installations.

The leaders of construction organizations have been given the task of providing DOSAAF installations with all materials and labor, allotting permanent engineer-technical personnel, and not allowing them to be pulled away to other construction projects.

I will check the progress of tasks and execution of the plan for DOSAAF installations with the leaders of the central construction boards and chiefs of the capital construction administration of the CC, USSR DOSAAF every month.

[Grachev] In the DOSAAF organizations, there is an urgent question of providing housing to staff employees, especially flight-technical staff of flying clubs. To what extent do you plan to participate in housing construction?

[Chekov] In the current five-year plan, in accordance with the entitlement lists, by contract DOSAAF military construction personnel must activate more than twenty social-cultural facilities, including housing. There is no doubt that the tasks established for housing for the five year plan will be implemented. It is hard for me to say when all DOSAAF employees needing them will be provided with separate apartments. This depends first of all on the volume of housing construction determined for DOSAAF for the next and following five year plans, and how much housing will be acquired from the executive committees of the Peoples' Deputies.

Military construction organizations are ready to increase the volume of housing in the twelfth five-year plan.

**Candidate Profile: Gen Army P.G. Lushev**  
*18010432b Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian*  
*15 Feb 89 p 1*

[Gen Army P.G. Lushev interviewed by O. Sholmov:  
"Today We Cannot Do Otherwise"]

[Text] [Biographical data: "Visiting Card"]  
Last Name, First Name, Patronymic: Lushev Petr  
Georgiyevich  
Date of Birth: 1923  
Nationality: Russian  
Education: Higher  
Party: CPSU member  
Position: First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR,  
Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the  
Warsaw Pact Member Nations  
Residence: Moscow

[Sholmov] The Armed Forces, like the entire country, is living today according to the ideas of perestroika. Many unresolved problems have accumulated in all spheres of life of society. As experience shows, they are not easy to solve. It is under these conditions that you have been nominated as a candidate to the USSR Peoples' Deputies. What is of primary concern to you at present?

[Lushev] Well, there's quite a bit to think about. Truly, there is a great deal of work, many concerns. Changes of a revolutionary nature are occurring in the country and in the Armed Forces. And each person must find his due place in these processes.

For almost a half century, my life has been associated with the cause of defending the socialist Fatherland. I followed in its footsteps, together with the army. The army developed, and along with it I was formed and grew as a military man.

Today we are witnesses to how seriously our views have changed regarding the problems of military development. The new political thinking and the positive processes that have taken place in the world have called to life not only a disarmament philosophy, but also real steps in this area. Following the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, the GDR, and others Warsaw Pact allies have decided on a unilateral reduction in their armed forces. The structure of the armies of socialist states is changing, and they are being given an even more consistent defensive nature.

Confirming our resolve to promote a most rapid start of negotiations to reduce armed forces and conventional arms in Europe and the renewal of work of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security, and Disarmament in Europe, the nations of the Warsaw Pact have published data on the correlation of strength of the armed forces and arms of the OWP [Organization of the Warsaw Pact] and NATO on the continent and the adjacent waters.

It is obvious that these are very important steps. I fully concur with them. I understand that they demand profound comprehension and a weighed approach by us military men. Unfortunately, in past years we have often been tardy in analyzing new phenomena and trends in military affairs. We must draw conclusions from these lessons.

Under present-day conditions, we to whom the leadership of the Armed Forces has been entrusted cannot but think also of how to conduct military organizational development as economically as possible, by reducing expenditures. Thus to promote most rapid resolution of socioeconomic problems in our society.

Of course as all Soviet persons I am interested in the fate of perestroika, and guarantees against a repetition of past errors. I recognize clearly that the voters today legitimately tie hopes for a better life to the future activity of the newly-created corps of deputies. To justify their trust means to develop a specific election platform and to do everything possible to implement it.

[Sholmov] Petr Georgiyevich, as a candidate to the USSR Deputies from the USSR DOSAAF, what can you say about the unresolved problems of defense-mass work?

[Lushev] The 10th All-Union Congress of DOSAAF, in which I had occasion to participate, quite fully illuminated these problems and determined ways to resolve them. There is much to do.

I will mention a problem of particular concern to me. I believe that by our common efforts we should breathe new life into the cause of military-patriotic indoctrination of young people. Recently we have also encountered

negative attitudes toward this important work. Some go so far as to say that military-patriotic indoctrination is outmoded, and does not correspond to the spirit of perestroika.

Taking advantage of this occasion, I would like to caution against unconsidered evaluations and actions. Unfortunately, the positive processes occurring in the world have still not become irreversible. And imperialist militarism has not abandoned its plans to achieve military superiority. There are more than enough facts in this regard. Calls are sounded for the "modernization" of NATO weapons, and to accelerate the use of the "significant technological advantages" of the U.S. and the West for military goals.

Against this background, statements that military-patriotic work with young people conducted in our country supposedly contradicts the new political thinking cannot be convincing. It would be an error to underestimate this work.

But meanwhile, what do we see? In the mass media now we encounter many incompetent conversations on the prospects of military development. Some say that we could switch to the formation of an army on the territorial-military principle, others favor a paid army, and still others, national formations.

But you see, the question is not so simple that we can speak of it casually. Of course it is necessary to improve the existing system of military development. We must abandon what has become outmoded. However if we do not stray from reality, there can be only one conclusion—we will continue to need a strong cadre army, capable of being the guarantor of peace and the attainments of socialism, and the happy lives of Soviet people. And for this the country will always need reliable defenders.

Their education is not a simple process. Clearly we need the combination and coordination of efforts of all interested parties—the family, school, Komsomol, DOSAAF organizations, and the Armed Forces. We all must overcome the alienation of military-patriotic propaganda from the real task, affirm an active dialogue in dealings with youth, and vital forms of military patriotic indoctrination.

[Sholmov] What practical steps do you intend to implement in order to raise DOSAAF work to a new level?

[Lushev] The election platform of the USSR DOSAAF provides a great opportunity for choosing such tasks. I see my primary duty as actively helping the Defense Society to improve the training facilities of the training and athletic organizations.

I understand that the quality of the training of specialists for the Army and Navy will greatly depend on the readiness of the DOSAAF schools to shift rapidly to the



study of new models of equipment arriving in the line units and ships, on the degree to which they are equipped with modern visual training aids, trainers, calculators and computers.

That is why I set myself the task of helping to overcome departmentalization in training young men for the military service. For example, take the questions of the makeup of DOSAAF schools and the use of their graduates in line units. Recently we have often heard that they are not sent to the Army and Navy in the specialty acquired in the Defense Society. This inflicts a great moral and material loss. Clearly this cannot be called a state approach, and the state of affairs must be urgently corrected.

This also applies to the sponsorship ties of DOSAAF organizations with units and ships of the Army and Navy. Current effectiveness cannot satisfy us. Here we see discontinuity and lack of coordination.

And of course, commanders, political organs, party and komсомol organizations of military units and formations should show much more interest in the work of the territorial organizations of the Defense Society. It is important to vary and specify their sponsorship assistance, including material assistance. After all, it is precisely in DOSAAF organizations that the reserve for the country's Armed Forces is forged.

My new assignment, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member Nations, also obliges me to talk of strengthening our attention to the internationalist indoctrination of youth. The combat community of our fraternal peoples and armies has been and remains a solid base for the formation of internationalist consciousness and feelings of friendship and solidarity in the cause of defending socialism.

In the Armed Forces and the Defense Society we have accumulated a good deal of experience in internationalist indoctrination. But still, I must say bluntly that it is not enough today. Here also we must search for new solutions, approaches, and forms. Our common task is creatively to develop experience and strengthen our comradeship of arms in word and deed.

These are only some of the practical tasks, in the resolution of which I believe I will have occasion to take part directly, in the event that I am elected a Peoples' Deputy of the USSR.

**Col Gen Patrikeyev Chosen as Candidate**  
*18010402a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*21 Feb 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Lt Col M. Guk, presenting a candidate for USSR people's deputy: "Such is the Mission"]

[Text] The outcome of the pre-election campaign largely depends on the people presenting candidates for deputy. Today we are giving the floor to a person presenting Col Gen V. Patrikeyev, commander of the Volga Military District, as candidate for USSR people's deputy.

The emotional temperature of the discussion at the district pre-election meeting had reached its high point, and right up to the start of voting it was hard to determine which of the eight competitors the delegates would give preference to for the right to run for the highest organ of state power. Would Col Gen Valeriy Anisimovich Patrikeyev be among them? This question did not let me rest for a minute. Judging by the pre-election platform of the Volga Military District commander, the scales would have to tip in his favor. The state thinking of the candidate, the timeliness and specificity of his program, and the boldly emphasized ways and means of resolving urgent problems "worked" for him. But the voters expressed doubts as to whether or not he would remain in his current position for the next 5 years and, if elected, be able to divide his time between work on leading the troops of the district and activities in the nation's parliament.

After the meeting, returning again and again to its unexpected troubles, I attempted to imagine what the future struggle for voters' sympathies between the remaining three candidates would be like, in which anything but a minor part was assigned to me as the person presenting Col Gen V. Patrikeyev.

What do I know about him? He was born in the prewar year of 1938 in Tambovshchin. He has a son who is an officer, and a daughter who is a student. He served in the Far East Military District.... I thought: How little we know about our leaders. Why is that so? Why are their lives, job position, and public activities surrounded by an unseen curtain of secrecy? We should learn from their lives as an example, but we?... Well, we really have rumors at our disposal. Just recently I heard that Valeriy Anisimovich is of working class stock. He does not remember his father. His mother was a teacher, and she raised three children alone. He began service as an officer candidate and graduated from the combined-arms command school with distinction. He passed through all positions of responsibility from platoon commander to military district commander, without skipping even one. And I somehow became more aware of his full work-days of caring. Time and again, I was convinced that they were precisely that.

The commander arrives to visit, let us say, the troops, and immediately goes to field, the range, the combat vehicle motor pool, where the current requirement of establishing qualitative parameters in combat training finds specific embodiment in practice. I remember that he visited the subordinates of Lt Gen A. Arsenyev. They were conducting a class on tank driving. After several rounds, when the crews were returning from the course and the tank crewmen were hiding their eyes in disappointment over their mistakes, the commander silently walked over to one of the vehicles, dashing jumped up on the tank, and disappeared down the driver's hatch. Soon the tank, having surrendered itself to his skillful hands, was rushing along the rough ground to meet the insurmountable obstacles.



Having covered the difficult course, the combat vehicle returned to the starting point with an excellent time.

"Get to work," the commander said in his usual way and, having given the tank crewmen some practical advice, rushed over to their neighbors.

No matter what he does, no matter what he gets involved in, he tries to be an example for subordinates in everything, especially when it comes to caring about people. A cold December night when Col Gen Patrikeyev was conducting office hours on personal problems is firmly engraved in my memory.

"May I come in?," asked a frail elderly woman, frozen indecisively on the threshold of his office.

"Please, come in," the gentle voice and kind smile drove away any indecisiveness. The visitor approached the desk, sat in the courteously offered chair, and placed her work-weary hands on her knees.

"My name is Klavdiya Grigoryevna Mezina. I have come regarding housing...."

Having heard the visitor, the commander concluded, "Well then, Klavdiya Grigoryevna, we will try to help you immediately, and we will not leave you without a roof over your head."

The woman, expecting to hear "it's not authorized" one more time, looked at the general gratefully. And he is a man of his word.

My memory draws up episodes of service work-days of the candidate for people's deputy in a well-organized manner, and I think that I must say something about them to the voters. I must tell all there is so that people know just what kind of candidate he is.

Before, it was much simpler for a person presenting a candidate. He gave the candidate's biography, and that was it—vote. It is a different time now, and pondering my mission, I increasingly ask myself: "Will I be able to help my candidate build bridges to the voters? Will I be able to convince them of the need to vote for him?"

Questions, questions.... There is still one more. What is the main thing for a person presenting a candidate? I think that he has to have fighting qualities. By this I mean both firmness and the ability to conduct agitation work, as well as the ability to find a common language with the voters. It is a pity that no one teaches that. It would really be good to conduct a seminar with people presenting candidates and develop methods recommendations....

I am writing these notes with the district meeting in mind. It is as if I am now located in that hall which is hot with passion. Though with difficulty, our candidate for deputy won the pre-election battle. There is still a more crucial test ahead at the next stage of the election campaign.

### **Sukhoy Bureau General Designer Chosen As Candidate**

*18010432a Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian  
26 Feb 89 p 1*

[Article by I. Abarenkov, Chairman of the DOSAAF Committee of the Machine-Building Plant imeni P.O. Sukhoy: "A Gain of Altitude"]

[Text] [Biographical information: "Visiting Card"]

Last Name, First Name, Patronymic: Simonov, Mikhail Petrovich

Year of Birth: 1929

Nationality: Russian

Education: Higher, Mechanical Engineer in Aircraft Construction

Party: Communist Party member

Work in DOSAAF: 1957 TO 1968, chief of flying club

Position: General designer of design bureau, the Moscow Machine-Building Plant imeni P.O. Sukhoy

Residence: Moscow

From the windows of the office in which Mikhail Petrovich Simonov works you can see a part of a large flat field. Several times a week sailplanes and a winch turn up here: the boys and girls from the youth gliding school hold their training sessions and get acquainted with the sky. Sometimes, when he has some free minutes, Mikhail Petrovich goes down and chats with the children, tells them of the difficult art of gliding, or may even sit in the cockpit himself at the controls of a glider, a long-time passion.

...When did all this start? Probably when I was little boy, and would run off after school with friends to a nearby Osoaviakhim airfield where for hours I would delightedly observe the life of the airfield, never tearing my eyes away. Aircraft took off and landed, sailplanes soared through the sky, sky divers descended.

His father left for the front in the first months of the war. He was a Communist working in one of the institutes of the Academy of Sciences. A year later, in November forty-two, the bitter news reached Alma-Ata: in a pitched battle at the approaches to Stalingrad his father, the deputy chief of the political department of the 66th Army, had died the death of the brave...

The boy never lost his dream of the skies. He enjoyed building model airplanes, and luckily he found a good mentor: to this day he often recalls his first instructor, Aleksey Li. And the first job for which he got paid also

seems to have been directly related to aviation. It sounded imposing for a 15 year-old, manager of the model airplane office of the Palace of Pioneers...

However, after the war Simonov entered the Mechanical Engineering Department of the Novocherkassk Polytechnical Institute, majoring in automotive design. He was a brilliant student, and received an honorary increased scholarship. Then suddenly, after passing his fourth-year examinations, the almost-finished engineer realized he was going the wrong way. His longtime dream, it appeared, was calling again... He submitted applications for transfer to two aviation institutes at once: Moscow and Kazan. Moscow did not respond, but Kazan sent him an invitation.

So for almost two decades fate associated Simonov with Kazan. There he developed as a mechanical engineer in aircraft construction; even as a student, the talent of the aviation designer was born and flourished. There, in Kazan, he became a Communist. Much remains in his memory, both happy moments of creative discoveries, and bitter failures.

An outstanding organizational streak was manifested early in Mikhail Petrovich. While still a student he helped to create a social student design bureau for sports aviation within the DOSAAF system, and subsequently was its head and main designer for five years. So students began to design sailplanes: in those years our sports gliding was falling into decay. But the boys wanted very much to somehow help restore its former prestige. Six types of sailplanes were developed by the students in their design bureau in three years. And Simonov participated most directly in all this. They included the KAI-12 two-seater metallic training sailplane, which proved very successful and went into serial production almost at once. All DOSAAF flying clubs were equipped with them.

In the KAI-14, Soviet sailplane pilots participated in the world championships in England, and four world records were set in the KAI-19 sailplane.

Soon afterwards, again at Simonov's initiative, a DOSAAF aviation sports technical club was created in Kazan, which he also headed. There he alternated between being an instructor and a tow pilot, and was able to combine all that with his design work. His credo was probably born at that time, to which even now, years later, he remains true. A designer who designs aircraft should "feel" the air; he must fly himself.

Mikhail Petrovich came to the design bureau of the enterprise when it was run by the outstanding aircraft designer, twice Hero of Socialist Labor P. Sukhoy, who made an enormous contribution to the development of Soviet aircraft construction. Participating under his leadership in the design of new equipment, resolving complex scientific-technical problems, the young assistant chief designer studied at a true creative school, and

six years later became the general designer of the company. Mikhail Petrovich worthily continues its glorious traditions in the work of creating aircraft of great state significance. Incidentally, this is eloquently testified to by his lofty title of Laureate of the Lenin Prize.

The general designer of the company... Figuratively speaking, he is the master generator in the development and adoption into production of extremely complex modern equipment. But Mikhail Petrovich has always stressed that everything done to develop new aircraft is first of all the joint result of the interested labor of a cohesive collective of designers, engineers, workers, and pilots...

And here is confirmation—the history of development of the SU-26 aircraft. In the early 80s our aviation athlete-pilots began to lose ground. The YaK-55 which they flew already lagged behind foreign models in terms of parameters. At this point the young collective of the design bureau decided to design and develop for DOSAAF athletes an aircraft that met the high demands and would be sufficiently powerful, light, strong, and maneuverable.

The general designer immediately and warmly supported the young people's idea and provided them with the most favorable conditions for creativity. But he also put strict demands on them. The result is well known. Now the SU-26 light aerobatic plane has undergone state testing and a serious examination at the world championships in Europe, demonstrating its excellent qualities.

The designers were also concerned for the pilot, arranging his cockpit in such a way that a significant part of the stresses were removed. I believe that the capabilities of the SU-26 have still not been fully revealed. And already a new two-engine jet training and aerobatic aircraft, the SU-28, has been proposed for the DOSAAF flying clubs. The young designers are continuing to design, and in 1989 will build a light training and aerobatic plane with a piston engine, the SU-29 dual trainer.

Much could be said of the purely human qualities of Mikhail Petrovich Simonov, of the constant dissatisfaction with his own achievements that lives within him, the daily unending cares heaped on the general designer. But again I would like to dwell on one of Simonov's remarkable character traits, his attention to young people. It is no accident that Mikhail Petrovich, as a member of the party committee of the enterprise, was entrusted with some of the youth work.

How much M.P. Simonov did for the young people of the plant, the sponsored schools and PTU [professional technical school], the children's home, and the boys and girls of the local microrayons, when he became the general designer! ... You see, it was basically at his initiative that the YuPSh—the Youth Gliding School—and the aviation technical sports club were formed and continue to operate at the enterprise, equipped with the

help of the CC, USSR DOSAAF at the highest up-to-date level, along with the defense sports camp for adolescents. And take the experimental technical youth association "Gidraer", where hundreds of young boys and girls in more than ten sections participate in all kinds of sports.

Should he be elected a Peoples' Deputy of the USSR, of course his burden will be heavy. But I am certain that M.P. Simonov not only will actively and responsibly defend his program, but will also implement it with all his strength.

### **Military Supports Civilian Candidate Instead of Captain**

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Feb 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Col A. Kosenko, Sgt O. Osipov, and A. Yagolnikov, chief economist of the air detachment, and others (seven signatures in all): "Why Were We Against?"]

[Text] The participation of servicemen in the election campaign for USSR people's deputies can only be welcomed. Even let the military candidate, or so he is called, withdraw at some stage of the campaign.

Unfortunately, not all servicemen used the election campaign for increasing the prestige of the Army. We were amazed by the platform of Capt I. Plaksin, candidate of the Khabarovsk Rural Voting District No 111. He is the deputy battery commander for political affairs and therefore knows many of the problems firsthand. What is more, we think that he encounters them everyday. But in his speech at the district pre-election meeting....

However, we will not hurry these events. Plaksin urged more rapid implementation of perestroika in the Army, public discussion of the military budget, and review of problems for determining monetary compensation for individual categories of servicemen. But then people began asking questions, and gradually the reaction of the hall began to acquire the opposite nature.

"What have you personally done for perestroika in the Army?"

No specific answer was given. It was too bad that everything from then on went on in the same style. Complaints and references to objective and subjective circumstances. Can one carry on this way?

We must say that Capt Plaksin was nominated as a candidate not by a military unit, but by the residents of a village. But the officer could not even defend their interests. Representatives of his activist group, servicemen, arrived at the meeting...in jeans and jackets. If they think that they can "get closer" to the people in this

fashion, that is their business, of course. Nevertheless, a reasonable program is more important. But for some reason, that is precisely what they did not prepare for their leader.

A pre-election campaign is a very serious matter. Everything must be considered here, and many circumstances must be taken into account. It is even possible to turn to economic calculations. Here Plaksin is striving to make a professional army a reality in our country. Is it really not clear: in order to serve in remote uninhabited regions, like ours, a soldier (let us put it this way, a mercenary) would have to be given monetary compensation not less than the salary of a highly paid worker. All of this, naturally, will place a heavy burden on the shoulders of the nation and the people for whom the candidate cares so much.

This is precisely why we voted against Capt Plaksin and supported others, civilian candidates.

### **Col Gen Yermakov of Leningrad MD on Candidacy**

*18010422 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Mar 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Col. V. Streltsov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Why a Mandate to the Commanding General?"]

[Text] More than once the candidate for Peoples' Deputies of the USSR from Leningrad national territorial district No. 20, Col. Gen. V. Yermakov, the commanding general of the forces of the Leningrad Military District, has started his conversation with the voters on precisely this question.

I believe he first asked himself this question long before that memorable election meeting, at which three hundred and sixty-three of four hundred and nine delegates from labor and military collectives unanimously voted for him.

"A graduate of two academies: the Frunze Academy and the Academy of the General Staff, he prepared brilliantly for the election 'battle'. The rural delegates particularly liked the fact that the Afghanistan war veteran argues for democratization of agriculture, and is also so passionately concerned for the development of unit welfare farms in the forces"—this was the approving comment of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in its account of the speech by the Peoples' Deputies Candidate V. Yermakov at the election meeting.

I believe that my journalist colleague was not quite accurate in his judgement. Of course, Viktor Fedorovich prepared thoroughly for the election meeting. But it would be more correct to say that life itself prepared him for this important step. The life of a man from a working family. Viktor Fedorovich climbed all the rungs of the service ladder, not missing one, from military school

cadet to commanding general of the district. Perhaps the most difficult was the post of commander of the limited continent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. There were higher posts later on, deputy district commander, CGF [Central Group of Forces] commander. But as Viktor Fedorovich acknowledges, nowhere was his responsibility for decisions as high as on the soil of Afghanistan. For there any error entailed tragic consequences.

"Why the mandate of Deputy to me? So that there would be even more rights to defend the interests of people, and this is a great responsibility to the people", said Col. Gen. V. Yermakov.

He perceives the various problems of the region, and of the territory in which it is located, as they say, not only with his mind but with his heart.

And in his visits to remote garrisons, when he encounters the leaders of oblasts and rayons, when he goes to labor collectives near the military units, he delves with his inherent thoroughness both into the questions of local life and the facilities and vital activities of the troops. And he strives to do this in such a way that problems that arise are resolved by joint efforts.

The whole course of the meeting with the voters of the Vsevolozhsk rayon of the Leningrad oblast demonstrated how close and understandable to the General are the needs of the rayon workers. One of the notes submitted said: "More than 20 thousand residents of the community of Sertolovo have no "First Aid" service, medical service is in an unsatisfactory state. How do you intend to help us?"

At once, in the meeting, Viktor Fedorovich turned to the First Secretary of the Vsevolozhsk raykom [rayon committee] of the Party, Ye. Glebov, and the Chairman of the municipal executive committee, S. Kovalev:

You give your staff of doctors. We will provide our equipment. And in the time until a polyclinic is built we will eliminate this urgent problem.

Many letters come to the Deputies candidate on the housing problem. The ways to resolve it occupy an important place in the election program of Gen. Col. V. Yermakov. Its essence is again not in abstract generalizations, but in well-considered, weighed plans. Before bringing them to the voters, Viktor Fedorovich discussed them with local Party and council organs, and developed, one might say, a strategy for his actions. It consisted of using the joint efforts of civilian and military builders to create an energy base, an engineering network, communications, and purifications works, without which housing construction is no longer possible nowadays.

From the reaction of the hall, one could well sense the trust with which the people received the election program of the Deputies candidate.

In his speech Viktor Fedorovich said, "My platform, whatever it deals with, is only the outline for our forward progress, to be supplemented by your orders. Together we will bring these plans to life."

In meeting with the voters, General Colonel V. Yermakov makes the fundamental point that strengthening defense capability is the work of all the people, and will always be understood.

Participants of the meeting who delivered speeches, Community Council deputy, retiree Ye. Sidorovich, member of the Vsevolozhsk Party Municipal Committee R. Notov, veteran of war and labor V. Orlov, and many other voters expressed complete confidence in the candidate to the USSR Peoples' Deputies and called on their fellow villagers, to unanimously vote for Viktor Fedorovich Yermakov on election day.

**Discussion of Candidacy of Lt Gen Gromov**  
*18010448 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*18 Mar 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Col A. Polyakov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Kiev Military District, under the rubric "Candidate for Deputy: Brush Strokes in a Portrait": "Lt Gen B. Gromov: There Are No Boundaries Between the Army and the People"]

[Text] I would not venture to say when Lt Gen Gromov was busier: in the final phase of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan or right now, during the first days of his command of the military district. Whether it be visiting the military units, getting to know the party and soviet officials of the republic and the oblast or holding service conferences, everything is scheduled down to the minute. At precisely the designated these days he sets out to meet with labor collectives, with the electors.

Naturally, there is no particular need for proxies to introduce Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Gen Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov as a candidate for people's deputy of the USSR from Priluki Electoral District No. 542. The name of the former commander of the 40th Army, which fought in Afghanistan, is known to everyone and is on everyone's lips. I believe that this is precisely why not a single club or cultural center can accommodate all those who want to attend his meetings. The unlucky ones gather around loud speakers and carefully study the program of their deputy from posted leaflets.

It is Gromov's custom to make every meeting a dialog, an enthusiastic discussion, sincere, responsible and candid. The electors express their wishes, share their concerns, try to direct his attention to regional problems and talk openly about problems which have been awaiting resolution for years. Most of those who have the opportunity to talk with him after these meetings are convinced that the candidate in the military uniform understands and will firmly keep his word.

It should be noted that Gromov himself, even during the preelection phase, has tried whenever possible not to put off the implementation of mandates until later, but finds answers at once to questions troubling the people. It is not always easy or simple to do this, but he has plenty of determination and principle, and his character and combat experience make themselves felt. And to tell the truth, there are situations in which the military can help.

The most important thing today, however, he believes, is to activate to full capacity the initiative of the labor collectives and the people themselves. Each of them—from the director to the worker, from the soldier to the general—must understand and have an inner awareness that matters can only be advanced with his own labor, his own energy.

The electors do not miss an opportunity to expand the framework of the discussion in the meetings, of course, to hear from their candidate a true account both of events in Afghanistan, with his personal views, and of the restructuring underway in the Armed Forces of the USSR. They are also interested in the character of an individual for whom they will soon be voting.

His father, a general who served as a private in the Great Patriotic War, died in '48, the same year Boris Vsevolodovich was born. The son never knew his father. Gromov studied first at a Suvorov, then a military school and completed two academies, entering the General Staff Academy upon returning from Afghanistan. He actually served three times in the limited contingent of Soviet forces. Fate dealt him many difficulties and trials. His wife Natalya Nikolayevna died several years ago in an air accident. Since then all of the work of bringing up his sons has been borne by Boris Vsevolodovich. Maksim, the eldest (the one who met his father at the Soviet-Afghan border), is now in the 8th grade, and Andrey, the youngest, is in the 2nd grade. The whole family is together; his boys are at his side. They are both rightly proud of their father, strong, reliable and wise.

Gromov is being asked a lot of questions lately. One of the most frequent is how he plans to combat "the outmoded ways."

"Only together, all together, as they used to say, can we overcome this social evil," the general answers. "Beginning with the school, developing in the youth respect for themselves and for their comrades, reinforcing a sense of personal dignity and honor in every citizen of our nation. And, it goes without saying, doing everything possible to see that the strictest of discipline is maintained in the army."

Here is just one note out of the pile of notes which Lt Gen Gromov took away from his last meeting: "What are you, a general or a politician?"

Boris Vsevolodovich smiles and says:

"I try to explain that the present times are such that everyone who is not indifferent to the fate of his homeland must be a politician. The engineer, the worker and the soldier all. There are no boundaries between the army and the people...." There are some questions which are cheap shots in his notes. With the permission of participants in the meeting, L. Palazhchenko, first secretary of the Chernigov party obkom (oblast committee), answered one of them: "How could you, a general, agree to be a candidate, when you know nothing about civilian life"?

"Boris Vsevolodovich grew up in a worker's family," he noted. "Upon becoming an officer, he encountered and experienced every day the same problems as our children and brothers who served under his command. And they trusted him not just with their joys and their bitter experiences, but sometimes, it happened, with their lives. How could he have taught and indoctrinated them, led them into battle and been victorious without knowing life"?

One of the points in Lt Gen Gromov's preelection program involves providing all-around assistance to reserve soldiers, particularly those who served in the Republic of Afghanistan. The candidate believes that these are the elite of our youth. They have gained a knowledge and an awareness of a feeling for the homeland not from words and not from books or school lessons. They have been tested by fire. They are not afraid of difficulties or deprivations and are prepared to protect the interests of our society, of our system, with hard work, in heated discussions and in the daily work.

During every meeting with the electors he tries to set aside at least a half hour to talk with the internationalists, to ask them about their lives, to help them in some way, to hear their mandates. And he has more than once recognized among his electors those with whom fate brought him together in a combat situation. Just recently, the lieutenant general and Private (reserve) A. Fedorenko, former signalman, firmly shook hands. Another "Afghaner," Private (reserve) O. Chizhevskiy, will long remember the moment when he received the "For Valor" medal from the hands of Gromov himself in the presence of his fellow countrymen.

Naturally, his concerns as a candidate are only a part of what occupies the district commander. One's first days in a new position are a time of anxiety and responsibility. The electors, particularly the servicemen and their families, will judge their new commander from the way things go in the units and formations under his command. They will judge him as a person, as a Communist and as a candidate for people's deputy of the USSR.



### More on Rehabilitation of Kuznetsov

18010530 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Mar 89 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Naval Training Department: "Follow-up to a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Article: 'Ship Named For the People's Commissar'"]

[Text] On Jan 25 of this year, a regular block of news contained a report about the fact that the name of Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov had been conferred on a ship under construction. The same report cited a response from Rear Admiral V. Lyakin, director of an administration of the Main Naval Staff, that the editors had received following publication in the newspaper on Sept 1, 1988, of a letter from a group of navy veterans that contained proposals for perpetuating the memory of the legendary people's commissar ("Perpetuate the Memory In a Fitting Manner"). The response said, in part: "As for other proposals for perpetuating the memory of N. G. Kuznetsov, a decision has been taken to refrain from considering them at the present time." On behalf of their readers, the editors expressed doubt that such a formulation would satisfy anyone, for we had all expected more specific explanations.

Now the editors have received a response signed by Rear Admiral V. Zakhartsev and Rear Admiral V. Lyakin. The letter follows in its entirety.

"In an article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA entitled 'Ship Named for the People's Commissar,' the editors pose to the Main Naval Staff the question of implementing the proposals of a group of navy veterans for perpetuating the memory of Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov. In raising this subject, the author of the dispatch proceeds from the erroneous assumption that the conferring of N. G. Kuznetsov's name on a ship under construction for the Navy was the result of the veterans' letter. This is not the case.

"Efforts to perpetuate the memory of N. G. Kuznetsov have been under way in the Navy for many years. On the initiative of the Military Council of the Navy, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a decree restoring to Vice Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov the military rank of Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union, and the USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution to confer his name on a ship. A decision has been taken to petition that a memorial plaque be mounted on the building in which he worked.

"The Naval Command has adopted a decision to make a full-length (five-part) film about N. G. Kuznetsov's life and career and has placed orders with the Ministry of Defense Film Studio and with the Central Popular Science and Education Film Studio.

"On Jan 24, 1989, the Central Naval Museum opened a new exhibit devoted to N. G. Kuznetsov's life and career. Kuznetsov's widow, Vera Nikolayevna, attended the opening and donated Nikolay Gerasimovich's personal effects to the museum.

"Efforts to perpetuate the memory of Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov are continuing, and the veterans' proposals will be taken into consideration in the course of these efforts."

This latest response adds some clarity, of course, but questions have not become fewer with its receipt. For example, the attempt to portray matters in such a way that credit for N. G. Kuznetsov's rehabilitation rests wholly with the Military Council of the Navy cannot but evoke bewilderment. For immediately following Nikolay Gerasimovich's dismissal from the fleet and his demotion, broad public circles rose to his defense. This is evidenced by the numerous letters to the most varied authorities, up to and including central bodies, letters that, incidentally, continue to arrive to this day.

Nor is apportioning credit the most important thing right now. For readers, the primary concern is to find what concrete steps have been taken to implement the proposals of the veterans and of a large group of people from all walks of life who have taken to heart the renowned military leader's fate, and specifically to find out how the question is being resolved of renaming the Naval Academy that, in the notorious times of stagnation, was given the name of a person who is very far removed from the fleet, its problems, and glory. This is what readers would like to know most of all today.

### Maj Gen Kuznetsov Discusses Electoral Procedures

18010471 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
25 Mar 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Maj Gen D. Kuznetsov, member of the Central Election Commission, by Maj V. Kazakov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Tomorrow in the Polling Place"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] In their letters and telephone calls to the editor's office, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers have been requesting information on the voting process, as determined by the new law. Will a secret ballot and glasnost in counting the votes be guaranteed?

Our correspondent met with Major General D. Kuznetsov, a member of the Central Election Commission, and asked him to reply to these and other questions.

[Kuznetsov] First of all about the voting procedure. On election day, each of us will present a passport or some other identification document at the polling place. Members of the precinct election commission will give each of us two ballots on the basis of a list of voters or a voting



certificate: one blue ballot (bearing the names of peoples deputy candidates for the national and territorial election districts of the union republic) and one white ballot (for elections for the territorial election district). And voters residing in autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs will be issued a third ballot—pink (for elections for the national and territorial district of the given autonomous republic, oblast or okrug). In this case the precinct election commission, which will have ballots in several languages, will provide a ballot in the language requested by the voter. Issue of the ballot is noted appropriately in the list of voters.

On receiving a ballot the voter must enter the stall or room for secret ballot and fill out the ballots, leaving unmarked only the name of the candidate for which he votes on each ballot, and crossing out all other names. If the voter crosses out the names of all candidates, such a ballot is also recognized to be valid, and it is assumed that the voter has voted against all suggested candidates. The same procedure will be carried out when counting votes on ballots bearing the name of one peoples deputy candidate. If the name is not crossed out, the voter voted "for", and if it is crossed out, he voted "against."

I would also like to note that ballots of the wrong format or those with more than one candidate name not crossed out will be invalidated. If the names of persons not registered as peoples deputy candidates for the given election district are written on the ballot, they will not be taken into account when counting up the votes.

[Kazakov] Dmitriy Nikolayevich, could you please make it clear as to whether it would be possible, as in former elections, for let us say the wife to present her husband's passport and vote for him?

[Kuznetsov] No, this is categorically prohibited by the law. According to Article 52, every voter votes personally, and voting by proxy is not permitted. This same article does make the qualification, however, that in order to guarantee the universal right to vote, if for example a voter is unable to come to the polling place due to health or some other legitimate reason, members of the election commission may at his request organize voting at the voter's location—for example in his home, in the hospital and so on.

[Kazakov] Many readers are interested in knowing how secrecy of voting will be observed.

[Kuznetsov] Special stalls or rooms for secret ballot have been set up in the needed quantity in the polling places. As I mentioned above, every voter will have to enter one of these mandatorily to fill out his ballot. During this time no one but the voter may be present in the stall. However, the law does foresee that if a voter is unable to personally fill out his ballot, he may invite any person other than a member of the election commission into the stall, at his discretion.

Now about counting the votes and the presence of representatives of the public and the mass media. Such presence is foreseen by Article 7 of the law, but the qualification should be made that it must not hinder the work of members of the precinct election commission. Representatives are chosen at meetings of the corresponding labor and military collectives, social organizations and public independent action organs, and voter representatives are chosen at meetings of voters. All of them must possess documents confirming their authority as elected representatives of the people.

#### **Election Results by Candidate of Veterans' Organization**

*18010447 Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Mar 89 p 2*

[Report of Election Commission on Elections of People's Deputies: "On the Results of Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR From the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans"]

[Text] Elections of people's deputies of the USSR from the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans were held on 14 March 1989.

A total of 443 participants in an expanded plenum of the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans voted in the elections.

The following were elected people's deputies of the USSR from the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans:

[Information presented in following order]: last name, first name, patronymic of candidate, position held, place of work and of residence; election results; number of votes for, number of votes against:

Azarov, Viktor Yakovlevich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Moscow Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Moscow, 440-3

Azarov, Sergey Ignatyevich, CPSU member, assistant to general director of Vinitaenergo Production Power Association, 439-4

Angapov, Semen Vasilyevich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Buryat ASSR Council of War and Labor Veterans, Ulan-Ude, 438-5

Andreyev, Anatoliy Yevgenyevich, CPSU member, chairman of Commission for Affairs of Former Partisans and Underground Workers of Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, Minsk, 441-2

Astafyev, Vasilii Mikhaylovich, CPSU member, pensioner, Perm, 442-1

Atayev, Seyitkiyaz, CPSU member, deputy chairman of the Turkmen Committee for Solidarity of Nations of Asia and Africa, Ashkhabad, 434-9

Baranov, Aleksandr Yefimovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Kirov Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Kirov, 443-none

Baranovskiy, Vasily Vasilyevich, CPSU member, chairman of Crimean Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Simferopol, 434-9

Bachinskiy, Dmitriy Grigoryevich, CPSU member, senior engineer at Lvov Polytechnic Institute, Lvov, 422-21

Begeldinov, Talgat Yakubekovich, CPSU member, pensioner, Alma-Ata, 436-7

Bobadzhanov, Mirzo, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of the Tajik Republic Council of War and Labor Veterans, Dushanbe, 439-4

Bobyleva, Yevdokiya Fedorovna, CPSU member, director of Odoyev Secondary School, settlement of Odoyev, Tula Oblast, 441-2

Bosenko, Nikolay Vasilyevich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of All-Russian Council of War and Labor Veterans, Moscow, 428-15

Vare, Vello Iosifovich, CPSU member, chief scientific associate at Institute of History of Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences, 403-40

Vasilyev, Ivan Valisyeovich, CPSU member, assistant chief of staff for Pskov Oblast Civil Defense, Pskov, 440-3

Golyakov, Aleksandr Ivanovich, CPSU member, first deputy chairman of All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans, Moscow, 427-16

Gorinov, Trofim Iosifovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Council of War and Labor Veterans of Mary ASSR, Yoshkar-Ola, 436-7

Gorlov, Grigoriy Kirillovich, CPSU member, deputy director of training combine of Stavropolvodmelioratsiya, Stavropol, 439-4

Gromov, Boris Fedorovich, CPSU member, mechanic at locomotive depot at Vologda station, Vologda, 442-1

Gulamov, Rasul, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Uzbek Republic Council of War and Labor Veterans, Tashkent, 437-6

Dmitriyeva, Valentina Dmitriyevna, CPSU member, milker on the Motor Kolkhoz, village of Ashkva, Kanashskiy Rayon, Chuvash ASSR, 425-18

Druz, Petr Antonovich, CPSU member, pensioner, Belovo, Kemerovo Oblast, 432-11

Dygay, Gleb Grigoryevich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Moldavian Council of War and Labor Veterans, Kishinev, 430-13

Yefimov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, CPSU member, commander of Air Forces, deputy USSR minister of defense, Moscow, 423-20

Zhanybekov, Shangerey Zhanybekovich, CPSU member, first deputy chairman of Kazakh Republic Society for Cultural Ties With Compatriots Abroad, Alma-Ata, 432-11

Zubov, Ilya Ivanovich, CPSU member, deputy chief of finance administration of ispolkom of Omsk Oblast Council of People's Deputies, Omsk, 434-9

Inochnik, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, CPSU member, lathe operator at Saratov Aircraft Plant, Saratov, 439-4

Kiknadze, Shalva Davidovich, CPSU member, senior advisor for Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, Tbilisi, 436-7

Klokov, Vsevolod Ivanovich, CPSU member, chief scientific associate at Institute of History of Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Kiev, 432-11

Klochkov, Ivan Frolovich, CPSU member, section head at Leningrad State History Museum, Leningrad, 442-1

Konkov, Pavel Ivanovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Krasnoyarsk Kray Council of War and Labor Veterans, Krasnoyarsk, 441-2

Korobtsev, Viktor Pavlovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Tambov Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Tambov, 437-6

Kravchenko, Konstantin Fedorovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Maritime Kray Council of War and Labor Veterans, Vladivostok, 441-2

Krumin, Viktor Mikhaylovich, CPSU member, advisor to Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, Riga, 422-21

Kuliyev, Adil Guseynovich, CPSU member, deputy section chief of Azerbaydzhan Union of Consumers' Societies, Baku, 407-36

Kulikov, Yakov Pavlovich, CPSU member, scientific associate and advisor for branch of Central Scientific Research Institute of Information and Technical Economic Research in Ferrous Metallurgy, Dnepropetrovsk, 438-5

Kulikov, Viktor Georgiyevich, CPSU member, chief inspector of Group of Chief Inspectors of USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow, 401-42

Lebedev, Aleksandr Timofeyevich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Ivanovo Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Ivanovo, 438-5

Leksin, Nikolay Sergeyevich, CPSU member, pensioner, Raychikhinsk, Amursk Oblast, 442-1

Litvinov, Ivan Aleksandrovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Vologograd Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Volgograd, 439-4

Mazurov, Kirill Trofimovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans, Moscow, 430-13

Maltsev, Innokentiy Ivanovich, CPSU member, planer at Moscow's Krasnyy Proletariy imeni Yefremov Machine-Tool Plant, Moscow, 443-none

Maresyev, Aleksey Petrovich, CPSU member, first deputy chairman of Soviet Committee of War Veterans, Moscow, 436-7

Mezhelaytis, Eduardas Benyaminovich, CPSU member, poet, Vilnyus, 415-28

Mekheda, Mikhail Ilich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Khmel'nitskiy Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Khmel'nitskiy, 440-3

Mylnikov, Vladimir Vasilyevich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Ternopol Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Ternopol, 441-2

Obraz, Vasilii Sidorovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Poltava Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Poltava, 439-4

Pavliy, Aleksandr Andreyevich, CPSU member, senior consultant with the ispolkom of the Donetsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, Donetsk, 441-2

Panchenko, Emiliya Andreyevna, CPSU member, pensioner, Kiev, 430-13

Pegarkov, Nikolay Grigoryevich, CPSU member, chairman of Velikiy Oktyabr Kolkhoz, Khokholskiy Rayon, Voronezh Oblast, 441-2

Petrukovich, Aleksey Stepanovich, CPSU member, lathe operator at Izyum Instrument Plant, Izyum, Kharkov Oblast, 440-3

Pometun, Grigoriy Konstantinovich, CPSU member, master instructor at Zaporozhye City Vocational and Technical Institute No. 35, Zaporozhye, 442-1

Popova, Nadezhda Vasilyevna, CPSU member, pensioner, Moscow, 431-12

Rakhimov, Azim, CPSU member, deputy director of Bukharaagropromstroy Association No. 2, Bukhara, 439-4

Sidorov, Aleksey Anatolyevich, CPSU member, military inspector and advisor for USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow, 438-5

Silant'yev, Aleksandr Petrovich, CPSU member, pensioner, Rostov-on-Don, 415-28

Sitnikov, Aleksandr Porkofyevich, CPSU member, Rostov-on Don, 434-9

Sorokin Aleksey Ivanovich, CPSU member, first deputy chief of Main Political Directorate of Army and Navy, 372-71

Starovoytov, Vasilii Konstantinovich, CPSU member, chairman of Rassvet Kolkhoz imeni Orlovskiy, Kirovskiy Rayon, Mogilev Oblast, 439-4

Stefanenko, Ivan Denisovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Gorkiy Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Gorkiy, 442-1

Sychev, Nikolay Yakovlevich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Moscow City Council of War and Labor Veterans, Moscow, 434-9

Temnogradova, Zinaida Sergeyevna, not member of party, doctor at Oblast Hospital No. 4, Penza, 439-4

Timashova, Nadezhda Ivanovna, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Tatar ASSR Council of War and Labor Veterans, Kazan, 435-8

Tretyak, Ivan Moiseyevich, CPSU member, commander of Air Defense Forces, deputy USSR minister of defense, Moscow, 426-17

Troitskiy, Andrey Yakovlevich, CPSU member, office chief at Kalinin Oblast Institute for Advanced Teacher Training, Kalinin, 437-6

Usenbekov, Kaliynur Usenbekovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Kirghiz Republic Council of War and Labor Veterans, Frunze, 433-10

Falin, Mikhail Ivanovich, CPSU member, pensioner, Leningrad, 436-5

Khalilov, Salikh Khalilovich, CPSU member, senior instructor at Dagestan Agricultural Institute, Makhachkala, 438-5

Chayenkov, Vladimir Afanasyevich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Yaroslavl Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Yaroslavl, 437-6

Chayka, Kalistrat Fedorovich, CPSU member, deputy chairman of Cherkassy Oblast Division of Organization for Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, Cherkassy, 418-25

Shaydulin, Midkhat Idiyatovich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Bashkir ASSR Council of War and Labor Veterans, Ufa, 435-8

Shishov, Aleksey Alekseyevich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Krasnodar Kray Council of War and Labor Veterans, Krasnodar, 441-2

Shlifer, Leonid Iosifovich, CPSU member, chairman of Zarya Kommunizma Kolkhoz, village of Nadlak, Novoarkhangelskiy Rayon, Kirovograd Oblast, 437-6

Shubin, Veniamin Ilich, CPSU member, pensioner, chairman of Arkhangelsk Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans, Arkhangelsk, 441-2

Shubin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, CPSU member, brigade instructor at Chita Machine-Building Plant, Chita, 420-23

**Lt Gen Ovchinnikov Evaluates Elections**  
*18010494a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*4 Apr 89 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Lt Gen A. Ovchinnikov, chief of district political district, by Lt Col V. Astafyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Turkestan Military District, under the rubric "A Word to People's Deputies of the USSR": "Lt Gen A. Ovchinnikov: One Has to Be a Realist"]

[Text] Out of six candidates for people's deputies of the USSR representing the Armed Forces and nominated by the collectives of military units of the Turkestan Military District and labor collectives of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, and registered by district electoral commissions, five received the required number of votes on election day. They were Col Gen V. Omalichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Lt Gen I. Fuzhenko, commander of the Turkestan Military District, Lt Gen A. Ovchinnikov, chief of the district political directorate, Lt Gen Avn V. Shkanakin, commander of Turkestan Military District Air Forces, and Maj V. Zolotukhin, correspondent for the district newspaper FRUNZEVETS.

Our correspondent interviewed Lt Gen A. Ovchinnikov.

[Astafyev] How do you assess the election results? In your opinion, what has been achieved by the election of five out of six military candidates for people's deputies?

[Ovchinnikov] That is a victory, of course. But it was not easily won. Frankly speaking, we were clearly losing at the beginning. The agitation and propaganda machinery certainly did not pick up speed at once.

I want to point out that staffs, political organs, agitation teams, military legal experts and journalists took an active part in the election campaign. Also in the development of programs for the military candidates and—I stress the fact—in exposing the public to them. We also received a great deal of invaluable help—and this also has to be mentioned—from our proxies, who included many thoroughly civilian people. However, much depended upon the candidates themselves, of course. Where they met constantly with the people, did not skip over a village, an enterprise or a cultural center, where the electors could see their concern and their readiness to work for specific decisions and measures, they gained thousands of backers.

The work load was enormous, it should be mentioned. While it was formerly limited to 5-6 meetings with electors, there were around 30 official meetings alone in the current campaign. In addition, I took part in such activities—unconventional, to be frank—as the celebration of (kavruz?) in Bostanlykskiy Rayon, at which around 25,000 people gathered.

[Astafyev] What can you tell us about your plans? What issues concern you most today?

[Ovchinnikov] It is difficult to give a simple answer. Much will depend upon the congress of people's deputies and upon the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Before then I plan to gain a better understanding of the mandates from the electors, which have supplemented and made more specific the 14 planks in my preelection platform. The main thing now is to determine what can be done without delay, what can be done within the near future, within the current 5-year period, and what has to be postponed until the next 5-year plan. One needs to be a realist. Empty promises produce far more disappointments than do sober and considered calculations. The mandates cannot be put off indefinitely, however, and many things in the area of social and economic problems can be done right now. One needs to set about the accomplishment of certain matters himself and to monitor the accomplishment of others which are under the jurisdiction of the local soviets. Some things are already being done in this area. The matter of transferring several officers to other stations for family reasons has already been efficiently resolved, for example. By working jointly with the ispolkoms of local soviets and the district housing operation directorate, for example, it has been possible to improve housing and living conditions for a number of comrades. Requests from the collectives of a number of kolkhozes and sovkhozes to purchase military equipment have been satisfied. More than 50 motor vehicles of various makes have already been delivered to them.

**Col Pisarenko Elected From Rural District**  
*18010494b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*4 Apr 89 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Col V. Pisarenko, deputy chief of the political section of the Siberian Military District Air Forces, by Lt Col N. Fedoseyev, Siberian Military District, under the rubric "A Word to People's Deputies of the USSR": "Serve the People Honorably"]

[Text] Electors of the Kamenskiy 69th Territorial District

**gave their preference to Col V. Pisarenko of the three candidates for people's deputies of the USSR. He is deputy chief of the political section of the Siberian Military District Air Forces. Around 71.5% of the electors voted for him.**

**A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent met with him for a brief interview.**

[Fedoseyev] Viktor Andreyevich, our electoral district is an agricultural district, one might say, while you are a military man. Why do you think the people elected precisely you and not one who by occupation is closer to the problems of the rural area?

[Pisarenko] It seems that the question would best be addressed to the electors. I believe that the people trusted me, and I am grateful to them for that. For my part, I shall make every effort to serve them honorably, with trust and truthfulness.

I was born in a peasant family and graduated from an agricultural tekhnikum after I finished school. I have worked as a kolkhoz livestock specialist and a brigade leader. It is more than just that, though. The work of a people's deputy of the USSR should not be confined exclusively to problems of the district from which he was

elected. We have many acute problems. Take rural road construction, housing, social, cultural and personal service facilities, the economy of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, the development of personal plots, and so forth. These are problems not just of the 30 Altay rayons which make up my district. They are general state problems, and they were discussed very specifically at the recent plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

[Fedoseyev] Will your new obligations not prevent you from fully carrying out your service duties?

[Pisarenko] In my opinion, a people's deputy has the highest and most responsible of duties. One has to give his all to it. Otherwise, we will once again have something of a public burden. A people's deputy must take his work as a deputy seriously.

[Fedoseyev] Viktor Andreyevich, you had 106 meetings with electors during the preelection campaign. You probably received many questions, mandates, suggestions and requests, did you not?

[Pisarenko] A great many. My first task is to study, understand and systematize everything well in order not to go to Moscow empty-handed.



### Reconnaissance in Defensive Battle

18010493 Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian  
No 12, Dec 88 pp 33-38

[Article by Col P. Popovskikh: "Visual Reconnaissance in Defensive Battle (Based on Exercise Experience)"]

[Text] Reconnaissance is a very important form of combat support conducted continuously in any situation with the objective of collecting information on the enemy and terrain needed to accomplish missions successfully in all forms of battle. Soviet Army experience convincingly attests that units and subunits in which reconnaissance was organized skillfully had minimum losses in battles.

Recalling the Great Patriotic War, Lieutenant Gen A. Peregudin, full Cavalier of the Order of Glory who fought in the 2d Ukrainian Front, writes: "The success of the regiment, division and army begins with the success of scouts."

Observation is one of the basic methods of conducting reconnaissance. Surprise in enemy operations is precluded and his prompt and effective engagement is ensured where observation is organized properly. For example, in early July 1943 observers of the 51st and 52d Guards Rifle Divisions uncovered preparations by German forces for an offensive. Our command element immediately took appropriate steps: a preemptive fire strike (counterpreparation) was delivered against the targets detected, and the defense was reinforced in the threatened sectors. As a result the fascist offensive which had begun failed.

Many instructive examples can be cited from the experience of combat operations in the Republic of Afghanistan. For example, terrain surveillance was organized in Kabul Province, especially at night, to prevent bombardment of the capital and its airfield with rockets and to keep aircraft from being fired on by portable SAM systems. Observers of Guards Captain A. Serkov's subunit pinpointed 23 dushman groups over a period of several weeks using radar and night vision devices. Thirty-three rebels were killed, two were captured, and 170 rockets, two portable SAM systems and other arms and materiel were seized as a result of fire strikes and operations by airborne personnel carried out based on results only of this post's reconnaissance.

It should be remembered that underestimating the role of reconnaissance and organizing surveillance poorly always led to unjustified losses and often also to defeat. For example, an offensive the enemy launched in January 1945 surprised the 331st Rifle Division. The enemy immediately managed to take the first position and widen the breach to 3 km laterally and up to 6 km in depth. Analyzing the reasons for what occurred, the commanding general noted in an order to 3d Belorussian Front, dated 9 January 1945: "Visual reconnaissance in the 331st Rifle Division was at a low level; commander's

observation and observation post [OP] surveillance was poorly organized; observers did not know their sectors or duties, and what they noticed they reported late; observation results for the day were not summed up and conclusions were not drawn from them. Observation logs were not kept or were kept extremely carelessly. As a result the approach and deployment of new enemy forces from the depth were not picked up and the enemy attack was a total surprise for the 331st Rifle Division."

Mobility of the troops and their ability to deliver powerful surprise attacks have grown with the development of technology, armament and methods of combat operations. The role of reconnaissance grows even more under such conditions. To defeat the enemy in modern battle it is necessary to be the first to detect him and preempt him in operations. This condition is of special importance for an airborne assault force performing a mission behind the front line. On his own territory the enemy has great freedom of maneuver and the opportunity to outflank the force and impose his own initiative on it. Under such conditions the primary mission of reconnaissance is to uncover the enemy's makeup and the nature of his operations, not allow unexpectedness or surprise in his operations, and ensure effective engagement on approaches to the defense.

OP teams outfitted with modern equipment are capable not only of detecting the enemy and enemy targets at a great depth, but also of designating targets to artillery and mortar subunits and adjusting their fire. This is especially important when an assault force is conducting a defensive battle, since it is difficult to encompass the entire vast area in which the enemy's appearance is expected using other methods and forms of reconnaissance.

Unfortunately, it should be admitted that frequently the capabilities of observation are not fully used. There are several reasons for this. In my view, the primary one lies in the inertia of thinking of some commanders, who still are oriented on those times when binoculars were the scouts' sole means of observation. The second reason is that getting carried away with active methods of reconnaissance occasioned a drop in the level of observer training. Many officers forgot that any scout above all must be able to observe, detect targets, and determine their position on the terrain. This led to a situation where artillery subunit commanders rightly stopped trusting the accuracy of position-finding and the target designation being given by scouts. In addition, coordination between reconnaissance and artillery subunits is not always precisely organized for now and frequently scouts work "for themselves," which does not permit prompt use of the results of their reconnaissance or delivery of fire for effect on detected targets.

The leading units and subunits of the airborne troops are constantly seeking ways to eliminate such deficiencies, trying to make the most effective use of available reconnaissance personnel and equipment, and seeking new

methods of employing them. For example, in one exercise an assault force which had successfully destroyed targets in the landing area was assigned the mission of capturing and holding a favorable line until the main body approached. Forward subunits had taken the designated line and had begun organizing a defense by 1130 hours on 10 April. At this time the "enemy" applied fire pressure in an attempt to immobilize main body of the assault force, to deny it the opportunity to organize a stable defense, and to support the deployment of "enemy" reserves, whose forward movement had been reported by separate reconnaissance patrols.

The situation demanded organizing reconnaissance of oncoming "enemy" reserves on the approaches to the defensive area in the shortest possible time. Major G. Kobozev summoned Lieutenant A. Dadyko (whose platoon was in reserve) and ordered him to set up observation by 1230 hours in the zone Hill 163.0—field camp and lone house—railroad bridge with the mission of discovering the "enemy's" approach, force composition, the direction of the concentration of his main efforts, and the deployment and disposition on the terrain of his command and observation posts and weapons. Kobozev pointed out the locations of OP teams on the map in assigning the mission to the platoon commander.

Platoon personnel were near the command post 2 km from the designated line; their materiel included moving ground target acquisition radars, laser rangefinders, binoculars and communications equipment (radios).

After estimating the situation, Lieutenant Dadyko decided to move the platoon up to the designated line, perform commander's reconnaissance, organize observation, occupy OP's<sup>1</sup> undetected and begin executing the mission simultaneously with their preparation. During forward movement Dadyko made a breakdown of personnel and of reconnaissance and communications equipment by post teams and appointed persons to be in charge. On arriving in the designated area, Dadyko reported to the subunit commander in whose combat formations the platoon was to perform the mission, went over with him questions of the disposition and preparation of OP's, and received information on the "enemy" in immediate contact with the assault force's forward subunits. In studying the terrain in the area of observation the platoon commander saw that it could be viewed to a depth of up to 5-6 km from the given line, but a sector of terrain 1-1.5 km in depth beyond the crest of a hill 2 km from the forward edge could not be fully viewed. Therefore Dadyko requested and received permission from Major Kobozev to prepare one OP to the left of the zone given him, on the edge of Redkaya Grove, from which there was an opportunity to observe the road, bridge and Chekay River valley. The platoon commander decided to locate the other OP's in the places specified by Kobozev in such a way that there was a clear view of terrain in the "enemy" disposition, necessary conditions for camouflage, and cover against fire.

In evaluating the enemy, based on his operating tactics and the nature of the terrain, the platoon commander concluded that mortar subunit positions should be sought beyond the reverse slopes of the hill in the Chekay River valley, battalion command and observation posts on the line of the field camp and trigonometric point, and the regimental command post in the vicinity of the obelisk, church and ruins. Here is where the forward movement of "enemy" columns and the deployment of his motorized rifle and tank subunits were possible. Artillery positions were most likely in the vicinity of the barnyards, Vinogradovka and Dalnyaya Grove. Dadyko decided to concentrate the platoon's main efforts on observing these areas.

The platoon prepared thoroughly for the exercise: map boards for observers and observation logs were made ahead of time. Each scout had a compass and individual camouflage cape or net made from the authorized camouflage kit.

Taking into account that it was easiest for the enemy to detect observers at the time they were occupying and preparing their shelters, Dadyko assigned missions to persons in charge of the post teams not in those places from which they were to conduct observation, but from the vicinity of Hill 163.0, from which there was a clear view of the terrain throughout the reconnaissance zone. At the same time he designated reference points and pointed out information about the enemy: "Reference points: 1st—little blue house, 2d—Kruglyy Barrow, 3d—lone tree, 4th—sand pit, 5th—windmill, 6th—field camp, 7th—water tower, 8th—obelisk, 9th—rockpile, 10th—railroad bridge, 11th—church, 12th—demolished house.

"'The enemy' has dug in on the line of the field camp and sand pit. His forward edge runs 100-200 m beyond the line of reference points 1, 2, 3 and 4 along the east slopes of the hill in front. Reference point No 3, right 0-15, up 200 m—machinegun in emplacement; reference point 6 down 150 m—ATGM launcher. Forward subunits of advancing reserves may appear in 50-60 minutes from the direction of Vinogradovka."

Then Dadyko assigned missions to each OP team. For example, "Post No 2 prepare OP in the bushes 100 m north of the bend in the road. Observe in the sector to the right of the trigonometric point and left of reference point 9. Uncover 'enemy' weapons and command and observation posts. Pay special attention to the terrain sector in the vicinity of reference points 8, 11 and 12. Immediately report the appearance of the 'enemy' in this area from the direction of Vinogradovka. My callsign is 'Korona' and yours is '2d'." After this, having organized and checked communications with all post teams, the platoon commander reminded the personnel of the visual recognition signs of targets. For example, the positions of mortars, the disposition of which is likely in the hollow viewed from OP Numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4, can


be detected when they fire from the flashes and from streams and rings of smoke rising above the positions, and the distance to them can be calculated from the speed of sound.

Taking advantage of terrain irregularities and local terrain features, persons in charge of posts led personnel to the designated places undetected and immediately set up observation in their assigned sectors. At the same time some of the personnel began preparing and camouflaging the OP's. Natural cover—craters, pits, gullies, bushes—as well as available individual camouflage resources were used for this.

Dadyko himself decided to conduct observation and process reconnaissance results while at Post No 4. On a 1:25,000 map he prepared an observer's diagram (see diagram), on which he plotted OP locations, their sectors

of observation, reference points, the "enemy" position and areas of special emphasis. Using a laser device Dadyko performed an accurate topographic survey of OP's having radars, rangefinders and other precision reconnaissance equipment. Subsequently this permitted him to plot targets on his own map with a high degree of accuracy based on the grid azimuth and distance to target determined from the OP's. Persons in charge of posts, which did not have precision reconnaissance instruments and used binoculars, reported the location of targets relative to reference points. If terrain permitted, the platoon commander clarified the position of the targets detected, using the laser reconnaissance devices of Post No 4. For example, Junior Sergeant S. Taramanov, the person in charge of Post No 3, reported at 1535 hours: "This is '3d'! Bearing 16-05, range 4380—command and staff vehicle in emplacement with antenna deployed."

3d Reconnaissance Platoon observer's diagram



The platoon commander marked that position on the map, inspected it on the terrain through binoculars and determined that an "enemy" regimental command and observation post was located there. After determining the rectangular coordinates of the detected target, he immediately transmitted the data to Maj Kobozev. Here is another example: Sergeant S. Chus reported: "This is '2d.' Reference point 3, right 0-40, range 2100—OP, rangefinder sighted." Lieutenant Dadyko laid the laser rangefinder on the designated spot and determined the distance and grid azimuth to the target from Post No 4, then plotted the target on his own map. The platoon demonstrated high reconnaissance results by operating in that manner.

By 1400 hours the "enemy" had moved forward subunits of the approaching reserve up into close contact with the defending assault force and reinforced fire pressure; under its cover, artillery and mortar subunits and command posts advanced and deployed at positions from 1500 to 1600 hours. At 1600 hours the "enemy" began intensive preparatory fire and began moving motorized rifle and tank subunits up to the final coordination line. His [the enemy's] operations were not unexpected by the airborne personnel, however, since reconnaissance managed to promptly discover the "enemy's" effective combat strength, the direction of his main attack and the location of command and control facilities and weapons. The assault force command element took prompt countermeasures and the opposing side's assault failed. Great credit for this went to the personnel of Lieutenant Dadyko's platoon.

It was later in the critique that the exercise director took note of the nonstandard nature of the approach itself to organizing observation. The complicated situation and acute shortage of time forced Maj Kobozev to reject the conventional operating procedure where he was supposed to personally assign the mission to each OP team and organize command and control of them and the collection of reconnaissance data. The decision he made to assign the observation mission to the platoon commander and make him responsible for organizing and directing the system of observation was the only correct one in the given situation, as confirmed by the further development of events.

The exercise director took note of Lieutenant Dadyko's competent actions of initiative. He focused attention on the fact that the platoon commander did not (as provided by manuals and instructions) begin demanding that the persons in charge of OP's draw up a terrain diagram and plot reconnaissance results on it. In the situation which took shape in the exercise, and considering that the persons in charge of OP's had no large-scale maps, such terrain diagrams could not provide the necessary degree of accuracy in determining coordinates of the targets, they would have diverted the persons in charge from observation and, essentially, would have forced the posts to work "for themselves" at a time when prompt information about detected targets was required

from them. Lieutenant Dadyko did all the work of plotting targets on the map and determining their coordinates himself while confidently controlling the duties of the OP teams. Persons in charge of posts recorded reconnaissance results only in the observation logs, immediately reporting to the platoon commander what was detected and where. Only the most basic diagrams were prepared at the posts for orienting personnel.

The imaginative, non-stereotyped approach to fulfilling requirements of regulations and manuals permitted organizing a system of observation in the exercise in very compressed time periods which ensured execution of the mission assigned to the scouts.

On the whole, however, the effectiveness of observation could have been considerably higher had its results been taken into account promptly and used directly in the interests of delivering fire for effect on the targets detected, but this did not occur. OP data was not used in preparing artillery fire, and if it was, again it was only after a check and clarification by artillery observers. This reaffirms the fact that the present multistage transmission of data from reconnaissance entities through a number of command echelons to a number of fire subunits has become obsolete and does not correspond to the nature of modern combat. It takes a great deal of time and requires bringing in additional personnel and equipment to process reports at each level, not to mention the fact that the degree of possible error in determining coordinates increases in passing through each stage. Eliminating such deficiencies would permit a substantial increase in the combat effectiveness of units and subunits without involving additional personnel and equipment. The problem is solvable by several methods.

First of all, scouts should study and apply methods of target designation used by the artillery when organizing observation. This will permit artillerymen to use the data of OP's having accurate reconnaissance equipment without additional processing or final reconnaissance.


Second, it is advisable to organize the training of reconnaissance subunit observers together with artillery subunit scouts at their training courses. The unit where officers S. Krylov and L. Kozlin serve has experience in such joint training. There is an unquestionable benefit for both parties: scouts learn to support artillerymen's fire, and the artillerymen's mistrust of tactical reconnaissance data disappears. In addition, there is a useful exchange of experience in preparing and camouflaging OP's and on other matters.

Thirdly, a more thoughtful approach should be taken to organizing coordination. As an example let us refer once more to the experience of operations by airborne personnel in the Republic of Afghanistan. In carrying out

operations, reconnaissance entities, which included artillerymen and forward air controllers with the necessary reconnaissance and communications equipment, would be the first to land. Immediately after landing they would occupy commanding heights and set up observation of the enemy. It was in performing such a mission in Kunar

for this they also must be told the base line of fire, be given common reference points and have the procedure for reporting targets defined. In other words, coordination again must be thoroughly organized. That procedure has been tested in practice among the troops and is providing the most positive results.

Diagram of coordination of reconnaissance entities with artillery



Key:

- a. Through chain of command
- b. Used in the exercise by Major G. Kobozev (one of the modified methods of chain of command coordination)
- c. Used by airborne personnel during combat operations in the Republic of Afghanistan
- d. Directly with fire subunits (used in the unit where officers S. Krylov and L. Kozlin serve)

Province that Sr Lieutenant V. Zadorozhny performed an exploit on 28 May 1986 for which he posthumously received the title, Hero of the Soviet Union. Targets detected would be reported immediately to the commander, who sent out observers. A target designation would be given, and if necessary artillery fire and air strikes would be adjusted. Such a combination of tactical, artillery and aerial reconnaissance and their consolidation in a single entity essentially fully justified itself and can serve as an example of coordination, but even this is not the only way to solve the problem.

Fourth, it is advisable to give some reconnaissance entities, including OP's capable of supporting artillery fire based on their materiel and training level, the right to give a target designation directly over the artillery battalion radio net (see diagram). Like the artillerymen,

The above methods for improving the effectiveness and results of reconnaissance and the combat effectiveness of subunits of course do not encompass all ways of solving the problem. It is possible that some of them may generate objections from readers, and so I suggest discussing this topic more widely in the pages of VOYEN-  
NYY VESTNIK.

Footnotes

1. Here and further it should be understood that an observation post [nablyudatelnyy punkt] is a place from which observation is conducted; an observation post team [nablyudatelnyy post] is a reconnaissance entity assigned to conduct visual reconnaissance.

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**Col Gen Borsuk on Development of Aviation  
Tactics, Qualitative Parameters**

*18010602a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Apr 89 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Colonel General of Aviation A. Borsuk, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces for Combat Training, by V. Seledkin: "Who Creates Tactics?"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Following two paragraphs are editorial introduction] **The development of the Armed Forces in accord with the new military doctrine is oriented toward improving the quality parameters of combat training.** Lt Gen V. Khazinov ("Recreate as an Art," 7 January) and Vice Adm A. Kuzmin ("Creators Are Needed Not Artisans," 17 January) on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA have described the development of tactics as the most important component of military art.

Today we are continuing the discussion of the timely problem with the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces for Combat Training, Col Gen Avn A. Borsuk.

[Seledkin] Comrade Colonel General, many readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in their letters published in the newspapers have actively raised the questions of further improving the tactical skills of the aviators. How do you view these letters?

[Borsuk] First of all, I would like to point out that the Air Force Directorate for Combat Training shares the concern of the aviators who are endeavoring to increase the level of their tactical skill. I emphasize this because the authors of certain articles have voiced the notion that they are aware of the importance of the task only on the spot while the central apparatus of the Air Forces has missed this.

Quite the contrary, here the problem has been reviewed in all its scope and complexity. And there is a natural desire to set out the primary areas which should raise the tactical skills of the aviators to a new level.

At present, as is known, a number of organizational, procedural and technical measures are being carried out in the Armed Forces making it possible to disclose and utilize reserves in fundamentally improving the combat readiness of the troops under the condition of implementing our state's defensive doctrine.

The measures have assumed particular significance for the Air Forces, since a significant number of combat aircraft are to be eliminated. This obliges us to seek out rational ways for improving the combat readiness of aviation and for increasing the combat capability and the quality of combat training for the air crews, subunits, units and formations. This is a difficult task and it cannot be solved merely by appeals and orders, but

rather careful, effective work is required by all categories of the personnel. This work is to be aimed at a high end result in the area of tactical flight training.

Here there have been definite shifts for the better, however I should say frankly that precisely in this area during the years of stagnation a great deal of formalism, sham, ostentation and deception built up. For instance, what is the value of just a slogan such as "each missile, bomb and each shell on target!" With good reason even now the force of inertia continues to beset many aviation commanders. For this reason the results of combat training at times do not correspond to the demands made on us, the aviators, by the USSR minister of defense.

Presently, the time has come when we must accurately determine the further direction in the fundamental restructuring [perestroyka] of tactical flight training and act energetically and tenaciously in implementing what we have planned.

[Seledkin] What, in your view, are the most effective ways for solving this problem?

[Borsuk] Here I would like to make a point that it would be an issue of the frontal and army aviation, which are the most numerous in the Air Forces. This aviation operates in the interests primarily of the Ground Forces and so must work together with them. For this reason, the training of highly skilled flight personnel on the tactical level should be a matter of concern not only for the aviation commanders but also the combined-arms ones.

[Seledkin] It might be argued that the combat training of flight crews is a question for Air Forces specialists.

[Borsuk] Undoubtedly, the question of training pilots as professionals is a problem of the Air Forces. However, here it is essential to bear in mind the following. When large-scale exercises or maneuvers are conducted, the participation of aviation is planned under the overall leadership of the combined-arms commander. Here an entire system for the organization and conduct of combined-arms battle is worked out. But in combat training exercises for the aviators, a majority of the tactical flight exercises for the regiments and divisions are planned by aviation commanders using "their own" operational-tactical background, without coordination with the operations of the ground troops. Here, as they say, there is not even a whiff of tactics, rather these are ordinary flights along customary routes ending with field firing on familiar ranges with a long-familiar target set-up.

In a word, we go for an inspection, participating in major combined-arms exercises, without proper training and coordination. For this reason in such a situation, it is difficult for everyone, including the aviators, to show their skill and win a good evaluation.

To eliminate this flaw, in my view, it is essential to have a unified plan for organizing and conducting exercises for all the forces of the various Armed Services which are carrying out the tasks in the interests of the district troops. It is perfectly obvious that this plan should be worked out under the leadership of the Military District command.

Another area for resolving the problem is the more active introduction of two-sided exercises into combat training practices. Experience has shown that just one-sided actions, without the real involvement of "enemy" forces, do not provide a proper effect. In such a situation, when the enemy exists solely on the map, the aviators get used to a standard routine. And hence the oversimplification in tactics, an inclination for rote decisions, sham, ostentation and other shortcomings in tactical training which are repeated year after year.

Moreover, as the practice of recent years has shown, only in two-sided, combined-arms exercises can aviation fully work out the questions of conducting aerial reconnaissance, providing the concerned staffs with its results as well as cooperation with the other forces. The necessity of this was shown with particular clarity by the exercise Osen-88 [Autumn-88] the experience of which requires a thorough study and introduction into troop training practices.

Of course, there is not always an opportunity to conduct two-sided troop exercises. At the same time, one cannot help but point out that not all the commanders endeavor to conduct them, as this requires additional efforts with the definite difficulty of their organization. But still the conduct of two-sided exercises should be a matter for our constant concern.

[Seledkin] But what about the working out of combat application questions in the course of the tactical flight exercises?

[Borsuk] In all one-sided exercises or in the course of carrying out tactical flight exercises with small subunits, such as a two-plane element or a flight, the actual use of ammunition can be organized both at aviation ranges as well as at the ranges of the Ground Troops with the setting up of the appropriate target situation there. But in these instances the opportunities are sharply reduced for the aviators to choose the tactical procedures in the target area due to the limitations on employing aviation weapons and involving the security of the troops, population points and other facilities. There must be a reasonable combination of one-sided and two-sided exercises the number of which should be adjusted depending upon the troop training level and the main questions to be worked out in the exercises.

Since I have raised the question of ranges, I would like to point out the following. A majority of them was established many years ago considering the capabilities of aviation in those times. At present, they in many

instances merely do not satisfy the increased demands. In particular, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written about this more than once. But, let me honestly admit, the development of new ranges which would meet modern requirements involves a number of difficulties, as ecological questions are assuming a particularly acute nature in our times. This we cannot help but consider. To modernize the already existing ones is also a difficult task, as the carrying out of this would require significant material outlays and a great expenditure of forces. Unfortunately, the capabilities of the Air Forces are limited here. The problem cannot be resolved by the efforts of the aviators alone. And the problem of the ranges must be solved. Certainly, definite work is being done in this area.

[Seledkin] Is there a place for the combined-arms commanders in further improving tactical flight training for the aviators of front and army aviation?

[Borsuk] Undoubtedly. But first of all, they themselves should have a good knowledge of the combat capabilities of aviation subunits and units, the conditions and methods for employing aircraft and helicopter weapons and correctly understand the purpose of the front aviation arms. This will provide an opportunity for the more efficient employment of aviation and to correctly define its tasks. Certainly, it is no secret that here there are flaws. For example, instances are known when the crews of front bomber aviation have been given missions to strike "enemy" troops in the area of the direct contact of the opposing sides, although this is the job of only the army and ground attack aviation. At times, the destruction of "enemy" facilities is planned with clearly too small forces.

At times, there is a desire to employ aviation under meteorological conditions in which the use of air weapons against ground objectives is excluded due to limited visibility. It must be admitted that the aviators themselves are also to blame here as during the recent times of stagnation they proposed the slogan of "all weather capability" of aviation operations. However, all-weather capability is one thing for a take-off and landing while for locating the targets and aiming, that is, in employing the weapons, there are definite tolerances both for the aviation equipment and for the pilots themselves. Of course, we do have all-weather aircraft in this sense, but for now this is far from all of them.

[Seledkin] In the letters from aviators and in their comments at reader conferences, complaints are often encountered on the various limitations which fetter their initiative, creativity and search in tactics....

[Borsuk] I have already brought up this subject on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. But since the questions have arisen again, let me repeat: the Air Forces High Command does not create any artificial obstacles for

improving the air, weapons and tactical skills of the aviators. All the fundamental documents provide a broad field of activity for all levels of commanders.

The question is rather something else, that is, how prepared are the commanders for the independence granted to them? Inspections show that the notorious references to the harshness and unbendingness of the superior staffs are nothing more than an attempt to cover up a fear of taking bold decisions.

What happens? On the eve of the exercises, the commander approves the overall plan which abounds in tactical innovations. But when the time approaches for conducting the exercises, all the challenging procedures remain on the map. As a result, instead of an attack with difficult types of maneuvering, the aviators perform the simplest version which has been worked on many times; instead of the planned group there are individual aircraft; instead of approaching the target at an altitude of 500 m, the pilots rise to 200. The list of such simplifications which do not correspond to the overall plan could be continued. The reason is that the commanders have still not overcome their fondness for protecting themselves against possible difficulties and the principle is still alive of why make problems. Such shortcomings, in particular, were disclosed in the course of an inspection in the air regiment, where Lieutenant Colonel A. Golovin is the deputy commander.

Of course, no one intends to abolish the flight safety requirements, but it is equally shortsighted to solve this problem by simplifying the tactical flight training of the aviators. In the finest aviation units they proceed in a different manner: in the process of training the flight crews in combat skill, in a well-planned and consistent manner the difficulty of the tasks to be carried out is increased from the simple to the complex. Such crews are capable of carrying out any difficult tasks which must be carried out in a combat situation. In this instance, safety is ensured by high combat skill and not by weaknesses and oversimplification.

[Seledkin] Very frequently one hears complaints from aviators that the combat experience gained in the Afghan skies is poorly used. Is this the case?

[Borsuk] The question at the same time is both simple and complex. The problem is that there is experience "on paper" as set out in the service literature and in the corresponding procedural aids for the pilots and crews. There is also another "living" experience of the individuals who carried out their international duty in Afghanistan.

Both these types of experience should be introduced into practice under the leadership of a commander. But at times the valuable "living" experience, due to the indifference of commanders escapes their control and as a result the "Afghaners" pilots, in still living by that work

pace, with a fighting spirit and employing combat tactics, fall into the category of the "undisciplined." And hence their legitimate dissatisfaction. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the Afghan experience is very specific for daily introduction into combat training practice. And not only because there were unique geographic conditions in Afghanistan but also due to the nature of the actions of the Afghan opposition which basically used sabotage and ambushes. For this reason, there must be a balanced approach to the Afghan experience, and we must carefully assess what should be taught the flight personnel now and what must be taken on advice. For example, under the conditions of Afghanistan, coming in for a landing was made, as a rule, following an abbreviated pattern. This circumstance was caused by the small size of the airfield security zone and the fact that the pilot had to operate the plane with sharp banks and vertical rate of descent. Such an approach for landing which involves a certain risk is not essential when the airfield is a sufficient distance away from the front line.

At the same time, the invaluable experience of employing mixed air groups in combat, attacking targets from great altitudes, the landing of airborne assault forces and reconnaissance groups, their support and so forth should be widely employed in the tactical flight training of the aviators.

[Seledkin] Anatoliy Fedorovich [Borsuk], who primarily creates and develops tactics in the Air Forces?

[Borsuk] In the Air Forces there are scientific personnel who, in using computers, work out models of new tactical procedures for the specific types of aircraft and helicopters. Such tactical procedures are then worked out in actual flight at the appropriate centers and are incorporated in the programs for advanced flight tactical training in the line units.

As is known, creative personalities also create tactics. And here much depends upon the commander who organizes the tactical flight training in the subunit, unit and formation, and who is able to create conditions for the flight personnel to show initiative and search and discover the tactical findings of subordinates. But certainly the main creators of tactics as before remain the pilots who are thinking, doubting, analyzing and proposing. But there are always fewer creators than executors and, as a rule, the most complicated tasks have always been entrusted to those who think creatively. For example, in the Great Patriotic War the squadron commanders who proved to be creators of tactics were entrusted with leading regiments into battle and they carried out this mission in the finest manner, that is, they defeated the enemy with the least losses and certainly this is the main purpose of tactics.

To put it briefly, it seems to me that although tactics is a collective art, however the "moving spirits" here are the bright individuals, regardless of the positions held by them. Among them are both prominent commanders as well as ordinary pilots.

**First Soviet Tanks Prepare to Leave Hungary**  
*18010643 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*26 Apr 89 First Edition p 3*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Lt Col A. Borovkov, Southern Group of Forces, entitled: "On the Road Home".]

[Text] Today a major event has come to this small, unprepossessing city—to Kishkunkhalashe [transliteration]—in the south of Hungary. Here the first Soviet tanks from among those being withdrawn from the Hungarian People's Republic are being loaded onto rail-road flatcars. The withdrawal is to take place in two stages.

The first [stage] has begun. Approximately 150 pieces of artillery sent from different garrisons of the SGF equipment have already been loaded onto flatcars. Now it is the tanks' turn. The first ones being moved onto flatcars are combat vehicles of the tank battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Zaytsev. The heavy equipment is securely fastened onto the flatcars. They await the return home.

The announced withdrawal of units of Soviet troops from the territory of fraternal Hungary has begun. It is being carried out in an organized fashion and within the established time.

**Sorokin on Impact of New Political Thinking on Military**

18010516 Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN  
No 3 Feb 89 pp 54-59

[Article by Fleet Admiral A. Sorokin: "Army of the Friendship of Peoples"]

[Text] Years and decades may pass, but in the peoples' memory one of the decisive turning points in the development of post-October events will never fade. Finding themselves in the fiery ring of the Civil War and the intervention by fourteen imperialist states, the workers and peasants of the young Soviet republic were forced to organize the defense of the newly acquired socialist Fatherland. And they convincingly proved their capacity to create the insuperable might of their own military organization.

The chief credit in elaborating questions related to the creation of the Workers and Peasants Red Army and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Navy rightly belongs to V.I. Lenin. For it was he who founded the radical propositions of party policy in the area of defense of the socialist Fatherland, the ideological and organizational principles of formation and development of an army of a new type. V.I. Lenin was not only a military theorist, but also the organizer of the defense of the world's first socialist state, not only the creator, but also the leader of its first military organization.

Born and strengthened in fierce battles with the White Guards and interventions, in defending the freedom and independence of the socialist Motherland in battles of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces have traveled a great and glorious path, have become the reliable bastion of the attainments of socialism, an important factor in preventing war and maintaining the peace. And at present, as was stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, "The Soviet Army and Navy possess modern arms and equipment, have well-trained personnel, and command and political cadres that are prepared and selflessly devoted to the people. They duly carry out their duty in a very difficult, at times severe situation."

Fascism attempted to implement its most monstrous plans against the Soviet people. At one meeting with his commanding generals, Hitler said that it was not enough for them just to defeat the Russian army and seize Leningrad, Moscow, and the Caucasus. They had to wipe this country from the face of the earth, to put an end to socialism.

An assault unprecedented in history battered the Soviet Union. The enemy grouping numbered 5.5 million soldiers and officers, in their armament were more than four thousand tanks, around five thousand combat aircraft, ten thousand guns and mortars, 192 warships. The mobilized fascist army, with technically superior equipment, with experience in combat action, and confident

of ending the "lightning war" in 6-8 weeks, counted on the crushing power of its surprise assault, on a swift advance to the vitally important centers of the Soviet country.

Today it is hard to imagine our army in such conditions, if the party did not take the measures to strengthen its cadre, regular foundation. However returning to those days, I should say that not all that was planned for strengthening the defense, for supplying the army with combat equipment, and for combat training if its personnel was able to be done. On the one hand, the time period allotted to the Soviet people and its army for this was too short, on the other, the negative consequences of Stalin's cult of personality, the unjustified repressions against the command cadres of the Red Army, including the highest echelon, had their effect.

Often, because of Stalin's individual position, a number of tenets of Soviet military science, new at the time, were underestimated. There were miscalculations in determining the moment of the enemy attack, and in placing the border districts in combat readiness.

But neither the temporary setbacks of the Soviet forces at the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, nor the grave losses of personnel, nor even the critical situations that developed in some periods of combat action could shake the faith of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in victory, faith in the party, and in the triumph of our just cause. The measured words of the party call "Our cause is just. The enemy will be beaten. Victory will be ours." expressed the morale of the Soviet people for the entire 1418 days and nights of the war.

The party itself was a genuine fighting one. To the army and navy, to the political organs were sent the best and most experienced party cadres, including 54 of 130 members and candidate members of the CC, CPSU. In just the initial period of the war, 500 Central Committee secretaries of the Communist Parties of allied republics, kraykoms [krai committees], obkoms [oblast committees], gorkoms [municipal committees], and raykoms [rayon committees], 270 important officials of the Central Committee apparatus went to the front. Overall in the war years, around 14 thousand leading party officials were mobilized into the Armed Forces. At the same time a significant number of Communists were sent to the army as political warriors.

The leadership of the Communist party, the stability of the social and state order, the just goals of the war and the very high patriotism of the popular masses, the unity of front and rear, the enormous capabilities of mobilization and the use of material and human resources, the bravery and heroism of the soldiers and all who opposed the fascist military machine with arms in hand, as well as other objective and subjective causes were the decisive factors in the victorious outcome. Nor can we fail to mention the assistance provided us by certain western countries in the battle against fascism.



The victory of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces strengthened the prestige and international positions of the USSR, opened up new and favorable opportunities for the growth of socialist forces, the national-liberation movement, and democracy and peace throughout the world. The Soviet Union needed peace in order to heal its grievous war wounds. The USSR Armed Forces was shifted to a peacetime status, sharply reducing its manning.

However as early as 1946, after the famous speech by W. Churchill in the American city of Fulton, imperialist quarters of England and the U.S. moved from cooperation in the anti-Hitler coalition to a policy of military resistance and the "cold war". They were again possessed by the delirious idea of destroying socialism as a social system and affirming their world domination. To achieve their goals, the imperialists instituted the arms race, and began to set up a network of military bases around the USSR and its allies, and to put together aggressive blocs.

Under present-day conditions, when as a result of the new political thinking conducted by our party, the real prospect of nuclear disarmament is in sight, some of those abroad and even in our own country are trying to place the burden of responsibility for the arms race equally on the USSR and the U.S., and even more, only on our country. Now and then voices are even raised calling into doubt the need for the existence of our Armed Forces.

However if we are guided not by emotions, but by reason, if we stand on positions of realism and historical truth and proceed from the facts of the postwar development of the world, then we must acknowledge that it has been precisely U.S. imperialism that has been the initiator of the arms race for the last four decades.

A world without wars, without weapons, is the ideal of socialism. In the whole historical path of development of our socialist state, the struggle for peace has occupied and occupies a leading place in the activities of the CPSU. We have not intended, we do not intend to fight anyone, but allowing for the rabid arms race of the imperialist countries, particularly the U.S., and the immediate nuclear threat, we were forced to strengthen the military power of our state and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces. And at a certain stage, under the influence of the massive western propaganda of the "Soviet threat", some in Europe in fact began to fear us. Therefore it is no accident that in contrast to the old military doctrine, which constituted a system of views on the preparation and conduct of war, we have adopted a new doctrine, the core of which is the tenet on the prevention of war and on defense strategy.

The basic, the starting principle of the new thinking is simple—nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political goals; there would be no victors in it. And this being so, the arms race also becomes pointless. Given the

potential for multiple nuclear destruction, only "reasonable sufficiency" opens up broad opportunities for safeguarding security. And security itself is transformed from a military problem to a political one, and it cannot be achieved at the expense of the other side, and to his detriment; it is indivisible, all mankind has an equal interest in it.

The large-scale foreign-policy initiatives of the USSR, aimed at eliminating the threat of war, the results of the Soviet-American meetings at Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow, which opened the way to the signing of the INF Treaty, the shift to the practical plane of the negotiations on nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons, bear convincing testimony to the ever-growing role of political means in strengthening security. The USSR's decision to withdraw all of its forces from Afghanistan on the basis of the Geneva agreements opened up new paths for the political settlement of regional conflicts.

The USSR initiative unilaterally to reduce the strength of the Armed Forces by 500 thousand men, and substantially to reduce the volume of conventional arms, including on the territory of our European allies was a decision of fundamental importance, intended to implement in practice the shift from the principle of super-armaments to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense.

The new political thinking and specific political actions of the USSR in the area of disarmament have enormous importance for the fate of the world, and increasingly they are finding proponents in the West. Now the understanding is manifested there with increasing clarity that politics from a position of strength is a dead end, that with the old approaches mankind cannot handle the terrible dangers arising on the threshold of the third millennium. In a speech on 7 December 1988 at the U.N., M.S. Gorbachev stressed that only the first steps had been taken. The heritage and inertia of the past continue to operate. Profound contradictions and the roots of many conflicts have not disappeared. To this day the arms race remains the chief component of the rivalry between the different socio-economic and political systems.

A "philosophy of strength" and unilateral approaches to the problems of security are still deeply ingrained in the consciousness of the ruling quarters of the West. At a regular session of the NATO regulatory organs held at the end of last year, there was new confirmation of the adherence of the North Atlantic Bloc to the strategy of flexible response and defense on forward lines, based on "an appropriate combination of necessary and effective nuclear and conventional forces".

Calls for different types of compensations for the destruction of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, for the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons, admitting the possibility of a limited nuclear war, have still not died away. The buildup of conventional arms

continues, and implementation of the "Star Wars" program. According to data of U.S. military experts themselves, in the eight years of R. Reagan's presidency, expenditures for so-called "defense" amounted to an astronomic figure, 1.83 trillion dollars, and budget spending for specific military programs also increased in the 1989 fiscal year, amounting to 283 billion dollars. G. Bush is a firm adherent of politics from a position of strength.

These examples say that the imperialist sources of aggression and wars, as was stressed in the 19th Party Conference, have not disappeared, and that the positive processes have still not become irreversible. And this is quite natural, since the transformation of a world in which security is achieved primarily by military means into a world where the decisive role will belong to political means, under the conditions of the existence of capitalism as a social system, is a difficult process and requires not one-time actions, but the creation of the relevant mechanism for blocking wars and conflicts.

But at present this process may develop only if the strategic balance of forces and reasonable sufficiency are retained. And the Soviet Union, while making various compromises and agreements, is taking all measures to keep from giving unilateral advantages to the West.

As the USSR Constitution states, safeguarding the security of the country today still remains "the most important function of the state, and the job of all the people". And it is hard to understand the authors of some articles that appear sometimes in our press, when they try under conditions of democratization and glasnost to call into doubt the party decisions in the field of military development and perestroika in the Armed Forces, to artificially distort those concepts sacred to all Soviet people, such as patriotism, military-patriotic education, military duty, and combat traditions. Naturally the might and security of our state should today and in the future depend on a reasonable combination of military potential, dynamism of the economy, and the essential priority of improving the living conditions of the people. Unfortunately, earlier this interrelation was not taken into account.

Proceeding from the new political thinking, the 19th Party Conference concludes the need to ensure the effectiveness of Soviet defensive development with regard to equipment and military science and the strength of the Armed Forces primarily through qualitative parameters. This means that they should be developed and be maintained in such a composition and at such a level that they would make it possible to repel an attack by any aggressor. Their technical equipment level, structure, and training are fully determined by the goals of defense.

Of course the stagnation phenomena in the development of our society, of which it is painful to speak, also exist today in the army. They are expressed in the shortcomings in training of army and navy forces, in military

discipline, in the backwardness of development of the social sphere, as was also justly pointed out at the October session of the CC, CPSU Politburo of last year. The party demanded basic efforts to be concentrated on eradicating those negative phenomena that are negatively reflected in the quality of the tasks performed by our Army and Navy, and in their combat readiness.

Hence the core of political work and all practical activity of the military cadres and of each soldier is the orientation toward high vigilance, training quality, and mobility of Army and Navy forces, their constant readiness to perform any task assigned by the party and people. Perestroika, the renewal of our society, the return of a truly Leninist aspect to socialism, are perceived by Communists and all categories of personnel of the Army and Navy with profound and genuine interest, with the burning desire to participate on a broad front in all revolutionary processes, as has always been the case at the sharpest turning points of our post-October history.

Today we have developed a concept of perestroika of the Army and Navy, and its mechanism has been created to provide for changes both in the organizational context and in political indoctrination work. Overall our positions have been defined, both of a strategic and of an operational nature, in connection with the defensive content of military doctrine. Work is under way to clarify the concepts of development of all branches of the Armed Forces, and to improve their organizational-staff structure. The process of reducing the central apparatus is proceeding. A number of new documents have been developed that should regulate the lives and service of the personnel of the Army and Navy in the near future.

Other approaches are also defining the perestroika of party political work. Soon new provisions on military councils and political organs will take effect, and instructions to organizations of the CPSU and VLKSM in the Soviet Army and Navy, which will more clearly define the role and place of the political organs, the party and Komsomol organizations in the one-man command system, and for the first time in postwar history all commanders-Communists will become accountable to their party organizations.

At the center of all political indoctrination work of military councils, commanders, party and Komsomol organizations will be the man, with his joys, aspirations, and needs, and much is being done to develop the creative activity of personnel. Ever more insistently, party principles are being affirmed in the work style of the managing cadres, and the process of democratization of party, Komsomol, and all Army and Navy life is expanding. Glasnost is gaining force, criticism and self-criticism are becoming more and more constructive, and the responsibility of cadres for the unity of word and deed, of decision and execution, is growing.

An earnest, constructive, and not always impartial conversation on the ways of deepening perestroika of party political work and increasing efforts to implement the goals of the 19th All-Union Party Conference was held recently at party conferences concluding the election campaign in the CPSU organizations of the Army and Navy.

The 19th Party Conference assigned a serious task to the Armed Forces—making military service the true school of internationalism. Basically all military collectives are multinational; representatives of more than 100 nations and nationalities of our country serve in them. But relations between them are not always smooth, and in some places there is a manifest underestimation of the role of international indoctrination, failure to allow for the national characteristics of a particular soldier, a lack of readiness on the part of a number of officers to work with this category of personnel.

All this is now being analyzed in the forces, and steps are being taken to activate international indoctrination. With this goal, commissions and groups of interethnic relations have been formed, a number of reference aids and methodological recommendations have been published containing information on the historical and national characteristics of the allied republics, ethnic distinctions, traditions, and everyday customs of their populations. In many subunits, a mechanism has been defined for maintaining the principle of social justice with regard to the soldiers of different nationalities, and an equal attitude toward each of them. This year subscriptions for newspapers and journals in different ethnic languages have been increased, ten-day festivals of allied republics are being organized, libraries in languages of USSR peoples are being formed, along with methods centers for the teaching the culture of international relations.

As before great importance is assigned to strengthening ties between the Army and people, for they are one of the most important sources of its strength and invincibility. The unity of the people and the socialist Army has strong historical roots. The life and work of the Army and Navy are the object of constant concern of local party and Soviet organs, social organizations, and all citizens of the USSR. Every Soviet family, every school, every labor collective makes its contribution to safeguarding the security of the country, the military-patriotic education of youth.

In directing the activity of state and social organizations and labor collectives toward strengthening ties with the Army and Navy, local party and Soviet organs and their representatives take an active part in the work of military councils, military party conferences, meetings, and conferences.

The Leninist Komsomol plays an important role in teaching high moral-political and combat qualities to the soldiers of the Armed Forces. For example, Komsomol

organizations of around 60 krays and oblasts of all allied republics sponsor just the Navy, and maintain close ties with ships and units. At present more than 70 ships in the Navy bear Komsomol names.

In turn the soldiers of the Armed Forces strengthen their ties with local party, Soviet, labor union, and Komsomol organizations, with organizations of veterans of war and labor, with collectives of industrial and agricultural enterprises, institutes, academic institutions, and schools, and perform great military patriotic work.

The sociopolitical activity of Soviet soldiers is high. They all participate in the national political campaigns, in discussion of the drafts of important legislative documents published in the press, and in many other mass political events.

At present in the Army and Navy, as throughout the country, the election campaign in preparation for the elections of Peoples' Deputies of the USSR is in full swing, and in connection with political reform is being held on a fundamentally new democratic basis. New experience is being born in practical deeds. The election campaign has demanded different approaches in party and political work, a maximum of responsibility and complete understanding of the situation on the part of military councils, commanders and political organs, and their readiness for effective non-standard actions in response to the processes of democratization. The election campaign is a good political school for each Communist, a school of active work in the masses and mastery of methods of conviction. It undoubtedly will help to raise the Armed Forces to a new qualitative level in combat readiness and discipline.

Perestroika in the Armed Forces and measures taken by military councils, commanders, and political organs to deepen it, promote the affirmation of a new political and moral situation in military collectives, a moral-psychological atmosphere corresponding to the ideological climate. The soldiers increasingly realize the concern of the party and our people at the deficiencies in the state of combat readiness and military discipline. Their activity, their interest and desire to achieve higher ultimate results in military development are growing.

Soviet soldiers display conscientious discipline, bravery, and staunchness in various extreme conditions. The heroism of Soviet service members in performing their international duty in Afghanistan is widely known. Every fourth soldier here has received orders and medals, and more than 60 of them were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Soviet soldiers received high marks from the commission of the CC, CPSU and inhabitants of the stricken regions of Armenia when they eliminated the consequences of the serious earthquake there. They were the first to come to the aid of people in trouble. Speaking on 17 December over republican radio, the First Secretary

of the Party Central Committee of Armenia, S.G. Arutyunyan assessed the actions of the Army with these words: "I cannot fail to say some heartfelt words of gratitude to the service members. Thousands of soldiers of the Soviet Army and internal troops, teams of military doctors, and a large quantity of military equipment are most actively involved in the rescue work. Aircraft and helicopters of the Armed Forces and civilian aviation are evacuating people and bringing in materials and equipment. Field kitchens have been set up and food services organized. Five days of hard, continuous labor were needed for the military road builders to make the Lenakan-Kirovakan railroad operational."

From the first day of their birth, Soviet Armed Forces were structured as armed forces of a new type, inseparably linked to the people, to their ideals and hopes, infused with the spirit of fraternal friendship of peoples of the USSR, socialist patriotism and internationalism, and infinitely devoted to their socialist Fatherland.

Created and reared by the great Lenin and the Communist Party for defense of the socialist attainments of the workers, even today, under new historical conditions, they fulfil their destiny, and in a single combat formation with the fraternal socialist armies, they stand reliably in the defense of socialism and peace.

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**Moiseyev: Combined Arms Divisions Cut by Half**  
*18070609 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 15, 15-21 Apr 89 pp 1-2*

[Interview with General of the Army M. A. Moiseyev by V. Voytenko: "On Positions of Real Disarmament". The first paragraph is an editorial introduction.]

**[Text] The decision of the USSR to reduce its armed forces unilaterally by 500,000 men in essence confirms the content of the new Soviet military doctrine. Along with a decrease in the number of troops, there is a change in their structure; the number of military districts and armies is being decreased, and the number of combined arms divisions will be cut almost in half.**

Our correspondent V. Voytenko interviewed Army Gen M. A. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Voytenko] How will the problem of verification [kontrol] of the withdrawal of our troops be resolved? Where is the guarantee, as is sometimes asserted in the West, that this is a real reduction, and not a redeployment of forces? How will verification over the deactivation of tank units be implemented?

[Moiseyev] The reduction of our armed forces is a unilateral action by the Soviet Union, and it should not be legally subject to any kind of verification. At the same

time, in demonstrating an act of goodwill, we decided that the reduction of troops, including their withdrawal from the GDR, CSSR, Hungarian People's Republic, Polish People's Republic, and the Mongolian People's Republic, and the deactivation of large units [soyedeniye] and units [chast], including tank units, would be conducted under conditions of maximum possible openness and glasnost. To ensure this, a decision was made to create a "group of public observers" which will consist of representatives of many public organizations.

Measures will be implemented and briefings and press conferences will be held on behalf of this group that are associated with drawing the attention of the Soviet and foreign public and mass media to the performance of the unilateral measures of the Soviet Union in reducing its armed forces.

As for the USSR Ministry of Defense, it will provide the group with active practical assistance in its activity.

[Voytenko] What kinds of tanks will be eliminated—old or new?

[Moiseyev] It depends on what is meant by "old" and "new." In the first place, of course, tanks of earlier models and years of manufacture will be eliminated.

[Voytenko] After the new reductions, will you have any kind of superiority in conventional weapons in Europe, about which so much is said in the West?

[Moiseyev] The fantasies that are being spread in the West about Soviet military superiority are intended to justify their own military programs and modernization plans, and to continue the arms race. But reality rejects these fantasies.

The Statement of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact Members-states, "On the Relative Strengths of the Armed Forces and Weapons of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe and Adjacent Water Areas" gives an objective picture of the relative military capabilities of the two alliances, and it concludes that an approximate military balance exists in Europe. Historically formed imbalances are shown: for example, the WTO has an advantage in tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers, and NATO has an advantage in tactical strike aircraft, combat helicopters, major surface ships, and armed forces numerical strength. These imbalances do not give one or the other side the possibility of counting on decisive military superiority.

The unilateral reduction of the armed forces of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, even though not fully, eliminates to a significant degree the existing superiority on our side in the indicated weapons. At the

same time, NATO's superiority is maintained. This arouses our concern, all the more so, because no desire can be seen on the part of the West to take steps that respond to our initiative.

[Voytenko] We began the reduction of our armed forces unilaterally. Where is the limit to such unilateral moves? Anxiety is expressed in the letters of some of our readers: will not the security of the USSR suffer as a result?

[Moiseyev] I think that the limit is determined by the maintenance of a reasonable sufficiency to ensure the reliable security of the country. It cannot be approached unilaterally; the existing situation has to be taken into account. I will give an example. We adhered to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing for a year and a half. This was the limit. A further continuation of the moratorium under conditions when the United States was speeding up nuclear testing could have damaged our security and defensive capability.

We carefully weighed our decision on the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men. In evaluating the factors that affect our security, we repeatedly considered: will this not affect the reliability of our defense against possible aggression against the USSR and its allies on the part of the NATO bloc? Thus, I can say with full responsibility: the Soviet Armed Forces are in constant readiness to defend their motherland and our allies reliably, and to repel any aggression no matter where it comes from.

We will not permit the defensive capability of our country to be damaged. We will maintain it at a level that ensures our freedom, independence, and the realization of our restructuring plans.

[Voytenko] How will the reduction of the armed forces by 500,000 men affect the nature of conscription?

[Moiseyev] Above all, and this is the main thing, there will be a substantial reduction in the size of the annual call-ups into the ranks of the armed forces. For it is precisely in this way that we plan to reduce the number of servicemen on compulsory terms of service—sergeants, master sergeants, and soldiers and sailors.

The qualitative makeup of conscripts will also change in a definitive way. Obviously, starting this year, we will no longer see students of day (full-time) higher educational institutions among those called into the army or navy. The resolution of this important problem, which has aroused broad strata of our society, simply would not have been possible without a reduction in the sizes of the annual call-ups.

As for the longer range prospects, by the middle of the 1990's, given an improved international climate and the general demographic situation in the country, there can be an examination of the question of extending the

practice of granting deferments from call-up to military service to various categories of citizens, for example, those working in the rural economy of the country or in construction.

[Voytenko] What are the proportions of reductions in command and in the ranks?

[Moiseyev] Of the 500,000 reduction in servicemen, about 100,000 are officers, and about 50,000 are warrant officers and petty officers. The rest are servicemen on compulsory terms of service.

[Voytenko] How will the question of job placement for servicemen be resolved in connection with the contemplated reductions?

[Moiseyev] Servicemen on compulsory terms of service will be able to return to their normal civilian life and continue their work or education. As for officer personnel, the majority of officers of the army and navy have a higher engineering education that is suitable for a large number of training programs at civilian VUZ's. Therefore, we expect that they will be able to apply their knowledge and experience at enterprises of the national economy.

At the same time, it is impossible not to see that for these years the Ministry of Defense, together with party and soviet organs and public organizations, will have to resolve a number of serious social questions, including those associated with job placement for discharged servicemen. Work is already being carried out in this direction. The Ministry of Defense jointly with the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] have developed a plan for retraining discharged servicemen and for members of their families. The Ministry of Defense and the Goskomtrud are also charged with the responsibility of monitoring their job placement.

These measures, however, are not enough to resolve all questions fully. The Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 21 March of this year "Concerning the Reduction of the USSR Armed Forces During the Years 1989-1990" speaks directly about the fact that the local Soviets of People's Deputies must adopt the necessary measures on job placement and the provision of dwelling space for officer personnel, warrant officers, petty officers and extended-term servicemen being transferred into the reserve or retired. On its part, the Ministry of Defense in the course of 2 years will build more than a hundred 60- to 80-apartment buildings in various regions of the country for servicemen who are transferred into the reserves after the reduction. At the same time, it becomes necessary to increase sharply the effectiveness of the work of special committees on job placement and housing arrangements, set up at all Ispolkoms of the Soviet's of People's Deputies, for those officers discharged from the armed forces and their families.



[Voytenko] It was announced almost 2 years ago that a real military budget of the Soviet Union will be published. When will this occur, and what kind of work is being conducted in this respect?

[Moiseyev] I think that information on the USSR defense budget will be published soon. We are by no means being delayed here by considerations of secrecy, but by real difficulties associated with the necessity for an objective comparison of our expenditures for defense with the military expenditures of the countries of the West. Work on these questions is still continuing.

[Voytenko] How are the negotiations in Vienna proceeding? What is delaying their progress?

[Moiseyev] The first session of the negotiations took place in a businesslike atmosphere. Some similar points surfaced in Warsaw Pact and NATO positions. Thus, both parties agree to reduce weapons in the first phase to equal "ceilings" which would be below the lower levels the parties have. The Warsaw Pact countries propose a reduction from the lower levels by 10-15 percent, but the NATO countries, by 5-10 percent. There appeared to be an attempt to avoid a numbers discussion and to concentrate on the coordination of the categories of armed forces and weapons that were subject to reductions, general criteria, and methods of calculating them. Views generally coincide on verification, including on-site inspection without the right of refusal.

At the same time, the principal disagreements that could delay the progress of the negotiations became apparent. The principal question is that the NATO countries included only tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers in the category of weapons to be reduced; that is, those weapons in which the Warsaw Pact countries have an advantage. Intentionally excluded were strike aircraft, combat helicopters, and also the numerical strength of the armed forces, in which the advantage lies on the NATO side.

The Western approach is characterized by an unrealistic inquiry calculated on a reduction of only those weapons in which the Warsaw Pact has superiority. The NATO members refuse to examine strike aircraft and combat helicopters only because they have an advantage in them. In our estimates, NATO surpasses the Warsaw Pact in strike aircraft by a factor of 1.5, combat helicopters by a factor of almost 2, and numbers of troops by almost 100,000 persons.

The Western proposal to divide the entire area from the Atlantic to the Urals into four regions is designed to lead the WTO to a unilateral weapons reduction and to disrupt their armed forces grouping in Europe, while the grouping of the NATO armed forces virtually will not change. Such an approach does not correspond to the statement of the Mandate that the reductions should not exert a negative influence on the security of any state.

The regional approach, obviously, deserves examination in principle, but on condition that if restrictions are to be applied simultaneously, for example in Central Europe and Southern Europe, then reserve weapons dumps will also be taken into account. Moreover, all destabilizing weapons should be subject to restrictions—tactical strike aircraft, combat helicopters, tanks, artillery, BTR's [armored personnel carrier], and also numerical troop strength.

I think that the position of the West needs to be adjusted on the side of bringing it closer to the position of the Warsaw Pact. The main thing that has to be overcome to achieve progress in the negotiation is that the NATO countries should abandon planned attempts to achieve military superiority, recognize what is happening in the world, and take a position of real disarmament.

**Interview With New Commander of Baltic MD**  
*18010543 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian*  
29 Jan 89 p 4

[Interview with Lt Gen F. M. Kuzmin conducted by B. Sebyakin, LATINFORM correspondent: "Commanding General Only a Job"]

[Text] Many people already know that the Red-Banner Baltic Military District has a new commanding general. People would like to know what sort of man occupies this post. This interest is by no means idle. In the context of present-day events, the Army and its related problems have begun to concern the broad public.

So I received an opportunity to meet with the new commander, Lt Gen F. M. Kuzmin. At the entrance to the headquarters, after looking at my credentials a husky soldier said in a characteristic Latvian accent: "Go on in. You are expected." I did not notice any changes in the spacious office. Except that instead of the customary folders with documents there was a pile of books on the commander's table: Jan Griva, Alberts Bels, Zigmund Skuins... After introducing myself, I inquire: does he really have time for fiction even in his first days in his new office?

[Kuzmin] How else to learn the spirit of the people, if not through an acquaintance with their culture, the General answered with a question. Of course I am quite familiar with the works of Vilis Latsis, and have also read Griva, but the books of these other writers, you might say, I've put hands on them for the first time. To this point I was acquainted only with the detective novels of Andris Kolbergs. I am reading authors new to me with interest, I "devour" a few dozen pages each in a day. I am "dipping" into the Russian-Latvian phrase book with no less intensity. Initially you have to learn to greet the other person in his language, at least.

[Sebyakin] Am I to understand that you intend to work here for a long time?

[Kuzmin] To tell the truth, back in December I was not even thinking of going anywhere from Leningrad, where I was the first deputy commander of the district. Especially since my wife, a blockade veteran, is from Leningrad, and both my sons were born there. Then all at once comes this new appointment. This is already my seventeenth transfer with Maya Vladimirovna. Where haven't we been! But as you know, two transfers are the equivalent of one fire. Now I am waiting for an apartment here, and she's packing our things and fussing about. Ever since I was lieutenant, all our things have fit into cardboard suitcases, but now that doesn't work.... Well, as far as plans for the future go, who can say? At least for the time being I will do everything to become a good commander. In the end, it is just a job.

[Sebyakin] But also a show of trust, an acknowledgment of your professional qualities...

[Kuzmin] Agreed. And as a Communist and a professional military man, I will make every effort to do my assigned tasks well. Our district is unusual, at one time it even held the title of "Special". Its main special feature is that it is a frontier district. I am also acquainted with the great traditions of the BMD. At different times it was commanded by such prominent military leaders as Col Gen A. D. Loktionov, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan, Generals of the Army P. I. Batov, I. I. Gusakovskiy, A. V. Gorbato, G. I. Khetagurov, V. L. Govorov, A. M. Mayorov, and others. I will try to ensure that these fine traditions, established before me, will continue to develop successfully.

[Sebyakin] I would like to hear your first impressions of what you have seen in Latvia.

[Kuzmin] My arrival here coincided with the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Latvia. So I was a guest at the festivities dedicated to that jubilee. I was able to introduce myself to the party and state leadership of all three republics of the Soviet Baltic, on whose territory the district is located.

I also visited a number of tactical formations and units of the district, and military enterprises. My visit to the Motorized Rifle Training Regiment imeni Latyshskie Strelki made a great impression on me: It is gratifying that in this order-bearing unit they honor the revolutionary and combat traditions of the warriors of Lenin's Guards. I find it appropriate that along with soldiers of other nationalities, the regiment's makeup also includes the best conscripts from Latvia. I share the opinion, recently expressed in the press, that there should also be more natives of this republic among the officers.

In general, in studying military history at the Suvorov school, and later at the VUZ and academy, I became well acquainted with the contribution of the Latvians to the cause of forming and developing the Soviet Armed Forces. A hero such as Jan Fabritsius is especially close

to me. At one time I had the good fortune to command the same tactical formation that he once led into battle. During my service in the Leningrad Military District, I happened to run the training regiment formed by Jan Fabritsius. Incidentally, the combat history of this unit ended with participation in the defeat of a fascist grouping in the Kurland. I think it advisable to send the boys conscripted from the motherland of Fabritsius to serve in that regiment.

[Sebyakin] Attempts to organize such a special recruitment have already been made, but each time they break against the wall of departmental barriers...

[Kuzmin] Well then, I will take responsibility for solving this problem.

[Sebyakin] Inhabitants of Latvia have repeatedly lodged complaints against the district for pollution of the environment. Are you familiar with this problem?

[Kuzmin] Naturally, one of the first things I did when I began to perform the duties of the commanding general was to acquaint myself with the prospective work of the district military council. In particular, I studied the specially developed plan of environmental protective measures. Even without looking into the substance of individual details, I must acknowledge that there are many complexities here, and most importantly, debts to be paid to the environment, society, and people. As the commanding general, as a citizen, and now also as a resident of Latvia and its ancient capital of Riga, I am quite aware of my personal responsibility to step up efforts to resolve this problem. It is my wish to require each of my subordinates to do the necessary nature conservancy work. At the same time, it was good to learn that purification facilities are now being constructed in many garrisons of the district. Naturally they will also be used by the civilian populace. And in general, more and more commanders are recognizing the need for a hard struggle against disruptors of the ecological balance.

[Sebyakin] What other problems are primary ones, in your view?

[Kuzmin] I arrived here on 13 January, but I know the content of questions and answers of the television show "Questions to the Military", broadcast the day before. The first thing that struck me was that the problem of housing is very urgent. And as I learned, the contribution of the district's military construction personnel to its resolution is tangible. In the last three years, they have built around 165 thousand square meters of living space in Latvia. Just in the past year, twenty social and cultural facilities were activated—schools, kindergartens, medical institutions. And not only in Riga. The speed they have developed is not bad. But it can no longer satisfy us today. We are planning to erect 39 residential buildings this year. And I do not believe that this is the limit of our capabilities. Here I want to stress that not only service members are living in the housing built by military

construction personnel. There are also civilians employed in the Soviet Army, as well as those with no connection to the Army whatsoever, for you see, we allocate some of the housing to the local organs of authority.

With each year the participation of the district in implementing the Food Program is also growing. A great deal of animal husbandry work is being done in the kitchen farms of our units and subunits: 15 kilograms of meat for each issue, as we call them. To put it more graphically, for three months out of the year our units do not receive a kilogram of meat to feed the personnel.

We have built many hothouses. This has allowed the forces to obtain 13 kilograms of greens and vegetables annually per soldier. And how many times have soldiers gone to kolkhoz and sovkhoz fields to help rural residents take in the harvest more quickly! To gather the harvest in 1988, the district allocated more than 2.5 thousand vehicles, and moved around one-and-a-half million tons of agricultural cargo. Here also, you know, no one relieves us of performing our [regular] service.

I will also point out one other source of food products and industrial goods for the republic. These are the stores, booths, shops, and mobile points of Voyentorg. Even though the employees of one of the military enterprises complained to me of the insufficient selection of products in their dining hall, one should not underestimate the contribution of our commercial workers. It is especially noteworthy in military garrisons.

Many problems have already accumulated that at one time were customarily counted as purely internal Army ones, but now also interest broad strata of the public. And when the sharp eye of the people notes disorder among the military, this at once provokes fair reprimands. We are obliged to listen to them attentively, and together with our civilian comrades find optimal ways to correct existing deficiencies.

I think that we will have another opportunity to talk about a number of timely problems concerning both civilians and the military. But believe me, I have still not had time to look into everything, nor have I decided my attitude toward all problems. It will take some time, and then I will have a greater moral right to speak of personal participation in their resolution.

[Sebyakin] Agreed. But for the time being, tell us a little more about yourself.

[Kuzmin] There's not much more to say. I was born near Astrakhan in the sadly famous year of 1937, to the family of a kolkhoz worker. In the first days of the war my father went to the front as a volunteer and died soon afterwards. As a thirteen-year-old boy I went to the Ordzhonikidze Suvorov School. Then to study at the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni S. M. Korov, twice recipient of the Red Banner.

After becoming an officer, I commanded various military subunits, units, and tactical formations. Twenty years ago I graduated from the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, later also the Military Academy of the General Staff.

I have two sons: one an officer, the other still in school. My wife has a philological education. Let us hope that in Riga she will be able to find work for herself in her beloved library science.

[Sebyakin] So you, Fedor Mikhailovich, have wanted to become a military man since childhood. What is your attitude toward the problems of service of youth in the Army?

[Kuzmin] Basically it does not differ from the constitutional precept, that service in the Armed Forces is the honorary duty and sacred obligation of every male Soviet citizen. However I fully share the concern of the public at inequities in the organization of basic military training and the military training of students. It is gratifying that they are now being eliminated. Thus the training program in the military departments of VUZ' has been reduced by one hundred hours, and military assemblies of students have been shortened to a month. In those VUZ where there are no military departments, after graduation from their studies the students will serve not for two, but for one-and-a-half years. And we will try to use such graduates according to their knowledge: in sergeant slots and in a job close to their specialty.

I know that today the question of location of the duty assignment of Latvian boys is being asked. I believe that the military council of the district has duly appreciated their noble desire to serve in those units under whose banners their fathers and grandfathers fought, and continue the glorious combat traditions of the older generations.

[Sebyakin] Today many are upset by the Afghan question. What can you add to the public position of the Soviet leadership?

[Kuzmin] The withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, under the condition of observance of the agreement by all sides, will be done in the designated deadlines. Conscripts are no longer being sent there. As all Soviet people, I am awaiting the final untying of the "Afghan knot" with great impatience. My son, named Mikhail in honor of his grandfather, served there. He was wounded in performance of his international duty and was awarded the Order of the Red Star and the Medal of Valor. After treatment in a hospital, he returned to duty. As any father, I fear for his life. But you see, we are soldiers.

[Sebyakin] The entire world has been stirred by the Soviet initiative of a unilateral reduction in the USSR Armed Forces. Could you share your personal attitude toward these proposals?

[Kuzmin] Recently we military men have been asked this question rather often. Sometimes as if it were a challenge: there you go, we got you—we're reducing the army. I want to say at the start that the military uniform does not hinder me, or indeed most of my colleagues, from seeing the need to break old stereotypes in the field of international relations and the problems of arms. We understand the profound need to put social values first. As any sensible person, I am for the announced reduction, and for all subsequent ones. The main thing is that this be in the interests of peace and security. The other thing is that under these conditions, we service people have a dual burden. We must raise the quality of service in order, as before, to safeguard the security of the nation, but now under conditions of defensive sufficiency.

As a man of duty, I believe that as long as the Motherland needs our work, we should do our jobs honorably. The profession of defending the Motherland is not outmoded yet.

#### **Problems of Improving Military-Political Officers' Education**

18010430 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*  
*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 3, Feb 89  
pp 75-80

[Interview with Maj Gen Aleksandr Andreyevich Gaydukov, chief of Leningrad Higher Military-Political School of Air Defense imeni Yu. V. Andropov, by *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* correspondent Lt Col A. Golda on problems of improving the quality of professional training of graduates of higher military-political schools, under rubric "The Higher Military School on Paths of Renewal": "Parameters of Quality: Realities and Illusions"; date and place not specified]

[Text]

[Golda] Comrade Major General, school graduates are putting their best foot forward on the job. Nevertheless, Aleksandr Andreyevich, let us begin perhaps with things that are not very pleasant. The latest comments on school graduates came in recently. I believe some of them did not please you.

[Gaydukov] I would not like to give the names of the political officers about whom comments were made to the effect that they have poor skills of organizational work and that, for example, they are not always able to tie tasks of political indoctrination in closely with combat training practice. We will hope that everything is still ahead for these officers. It is difficult to say specifically how the beginning of the career shaped up for them;

unfortunately, there is also much that is subjective here, but I would not like to lessen our blame either. It is disappointing that our graduates took an uncertain step. That means the higher educational institution also did incomplete work. Where specifically? We are analyzing the comments, visiting the units and subunits, and seeing that the existing deficiencies in our graduates' training are connected with a weak practical direction of training.

[Golda] But the fact is that in recent years steps have been taken, including of an organizational nature, aimed at increasing the quality of professional training of cadets of the VVPU [Higher Military-Political School] in connection with familiar party and government decisions about a restructuring of the higher school. In particular, new training curricula were developed.

[Gaydukov] In fact, certain steps were taken, but let us have a look at those same training curricula. In my view they are overloaded and the approach of making the training curriculum "of larger scale" is making itself felt. We "cram" as much training material as possible into it. At times a cadet cannot cope with it. He begins to maneuver between difficulties and bypass them.

A half-year ago we were seriously troubled by the following problem. Not all cadets were succeeding in mastering the skills of monitoring the functioning of equipment by the time of graduation. You yourself understand that this is important for a political officer. The fact is that he must be ready to enter into combat activities and perform alert duty.

The question arose: Just what should be done? Where could we find the time so that all cadets would be able to firmly master the skills of monitoring the functioning of equipment? We had to thoroughly "shake up" the military-technical training curriculum. We decided to reduce the number of lectures and laboratory projects for certain "global" topics. On the other hand, we added classes whose objective was to provide skills in mastering the surface-to-air missile system. And you know, the work only gained from this.

[Golda] It is common knowledge that the Minister of Defense also demands that the organization and content of training be made to conform with the combat role of military educational institution graduates.

[Gaydukov] That may be, but does one really always dare to change anything at all in the training curriculum? On the one hand, as head of a higher educational institution I am urged to be independent and take a creative approach. Of course, in the interests of quality training I can introduce changes to the training curriculum if I have an idea. In practice, however, it often turns out in the old way: you are reprimanded for your independence. The training curriculum, they say, is the law and not one step from it.

[Golda] But what if the training curriculum is imperfect?

[Gaydukov] There is the problem. For example, I am convinced that training curricula continue to be overloaded with verification kinds of classes. The state of affairs is aggravated by the significant number of laboratory projects. A cadet ends up in the "vise" of verification. Imagine the following picture: today he has to prepare not only for a seminar, but also for the next practical class. Or here is another situation: tomorrow there is an individual interview, but today there is a defense of laboratory projects. How can he arrange the time here? Where can he get the time? The cadet is confused! And so it begins: distributing questions at seminars, copying synopses of primary sources from classmates. The quality of studies suffers as a result.

Is there a solution here? I believe there is. In a number of cases it is probably possible to reduce the number of seminar classes. Independent productive work under a teacher's direction can fully replace the seminar and bring no less benefit.

Possibly it makes sense also to renounce the quiz when necessary. For example, last semester our party-political work chair did that when the third course was preparing for on-the-job training. The cadets used the time set aside for a quiz to prepare for the trip to the troops. Experience later showed that this measure justified itself.

In short, paradoxical as it may sound, I am for relaxing the "vise" of verification.

[Golda] I have also had occasion to hear in other higher military-political schools that even in the new training curricula there is much that has not been thought out and that there are various "discrepancies" and mismatches. For example, the thought is expressed that social sciences have a small role (a little over 40 percent of the general plan) in the existing structure of academic disciplines and that this is unwarranted for the Higher Military-Political School. In my opinion, the thought is fully reasonable.

[Gaydukov] I do not undertake to categorically judge the training curriculum plan and schedule, although it also seems to me that the priority for the Higher Military-Political School must belong specifically to social sciences. I believe that not everything here is so unequivocal and that a discussion of this problem would not hurt. But do you know how things also are for us with those same training curricula and why we continue to have mismatches and so on? It is above all because the Higher Military-Political School does not have a single "boss." The curriculum for social sciences is sent down by the Main Political Directorate, that for general military disciplines by the GUVUZ [Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions], and that for special military disciplines by the CIC of the branch of Armed Forces. How can there help but be "discrepancies" here?

Secondly, when training curricula are being put together, opinion "from below" essentially is not taken into account. Although formally they seem to be interested in our opinion and promise to consider it, most often it is not considered. Some believe that something new can originate only there "on top." A sample of such an approach is the combined-arms training introduced in higher educational institutions this year. Its model matured in offices and as a result even now, with all its merits, numerous deficiencies are apparent. For example, weapon training and drill training are "run through," but later no one even remembers them by year's end. An uneven load arises for the teachers as well. As practice shows, this has a negative effect on training quality.

[Golda] Aleksandr Andreyevich, many teachers emphasize in their letters that there is much in the training curricula that orients toward maximum "information saturation" of trainees. On the other hand, readers inform us that this orientation is not coupled with existing capabilities for mastering the training curricula. For a number of reasons, these capabilities are limited. The readers ask just how under those conditions can a cult of training be created and the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum resolution be realized?

[Gaydukov] Well, that is a legitimate question. How can we speak about a cult of training if it sometimes is not properly adjusted? Here we often are the captives of illusions and assume that it is possible to increase the sense of responsibility and solve problems of the individualization, intensification and quality of training by means of directive instructions. But what is the reality? Take our higher educational institution, for example. At first glance we have everything necessary to organize productive studies. We have a solid training facility which is gradually being built up, a faculty that is highly qualified on the whole, and intelligent subunit commanders and political officers.

But how, for example, can we fulfill that same demand for individualization if there is a lack of training space? There are 30-35 persons each in the auditoriums. Is this normal?

The installation in which we are located is old and many of the rooms, including living quarters, require major repairs. Over 20 km of utilities are in a sorry state and now and then first the heating line and then the water systems go out. We have to repair them by crash work. With whom? Of course we use the cadets. We remove some from classes and some from independent study. We unquestionably try to make up for lost time later, but as the saying goes, it is no longer the same.

There are a lot of concerns of which no one relieves us. For example, procuring vegetables traditionally has been the school's responsibility. Who does this? The cadets. Here before me is another paper from the rayon soviet of people's deputies, an extract from an ispolkom decision.



We are directed to repair a section of road, one that is outside the military installation. Who will do this? The cadets. Again it means separation from class.

[Golda] Aleksandr Andreyevich, all this also can be seen in other places. When one asks why this happens, many, including even party member leaders from the highest echelons, make a helpless gesture as if to say life is life. No one, they say, will perform that same housekeeping work for the school.

[Gaydukov] Well, I agree that the school itself can cope with some everyday concerns, but how can it repair those same utilities and roads without having either the personnel or the resources for it?

You probably noticed that our training rooms are rather well equipped. All this was done basically by the hands of instructors and cadets. The facility requires constant improvement, but who should do this? I already have long been posing the question, and at various levels, of the school's extreme need for production shops. It needs authorized specialists who would work both on outfitting the training facility and on making serious repairs. This would relieve us of the need to take cadets away from their principal job, training. Everyone agrees with me and promises to discuss the question, and everything remains as it was.

[Golda] I get the impression that the separation of cadets from training has become such a commonplace phenomenon that it evokes a feeling of protest in few people. People become reconciled with it, but there is damage of a moral nature here as well. The cadets develop a "dual" morality. They see that it is possible to proclaim one thing and in fact do another.

By the way, in discussions with people, statements crept through involving the traditional preparation for parades. It is a common opinion that this "eats away" an enormous amount of training time.

[Gaydukov] I will say this concerning preparation for parades. I have taken part in them myself and so am convinced that it is necessary. A cadet will take a great deal away from school. Some things will be forgotten later, but how he marched across Dvortsovaya Square in a cohesive, mass formation will remain all his life. A military person cannot be imagined without a feeling of pride in the Army and for belonging to the Armed Forces.

At the same time I cannot help but agree with those who believe that preparation for a parade is being done in the old way. It is too voluminous and so it is burdensome for the training process.

[Golda] I also have had occasion to hear complaints concerning training literature.

[Gaydukov] It is a fact that problems have come to a head here. Take for example the textbook on military pedagogics and psychology for higher educational institutions. It was published in 1973. Its content hardly meets today's tasks. They say that a new one will come out only in three years.

It would appear that the textbook on party-political work (also for higher educational institutions) also has "fallen behind life" somewhat; it is already 14 years old. True, to some extent we are finding a solution. The chairs replace training aids practically every two years. Nevertheless, one would like to count on greater promptness of the Main Political Directorate, on the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin as one of the primary scientific methods centers for the social sciences, and on Voenizdat.

By the way, it is often possible to address many complaints to the literature being published in Voenizdat. The content of some textbooks has little connection with life. Over the last two or three years probably only one book, "Prakticheskiye voprosy voyennoy psikhologii" [Practical Questions of Military Psychology] by Ya. Podolyak, generated interest in the cadets and instructors.

We are completely uninformed as to just what will be published for higher educational institutions. Insofar as I know, school teachers are hardly included at all in the publication of textbooks. Book manuscripts should at least be sent to us for review.

[Golda] But, Aleksandr Andreyevich, you probably will agree that it is possible to have a rather good training facility and reduce separation from classes to a minimum, but this still does not guarantee a high quality of training for future political officers. A theoretical exploration; the initiative of the chair, commanders and political officers; and the personality of the teacher play a major role in training and indoctrination.

[Gaydukov] Absolutely correct. It is extremely important to create appropriate conditions for studies. But if there is no initiative or creativeness on the part of the chairs and if proper attention is not given to a problem such as the teacher's personality, one can hardly count on success.

For example, I am impressed by the work of instructors in the party-political work chair directed by Col V. Mikhaylov. Responsible persons work here. Take a look: the second course now already is working under the new curriculum. But why must the third and fourth courses suffer, people in the chair reasoned, even though the upperclassmen also could have been "dragged through" under the old curriculum and the instructors would have had less trouble?

But the teachers decided to update this curriculum. They revised the lecture course, departing from general subjects and placing emphasis on practical questions of the work of the deputy subunit commander for political affairs. All this is an additional load and additional concerns, but people in the chair are thinking about the interests of the job above all.

CPSU history instructors display praiseworthy initiative. With consideration of the fact that cadet subunits are becoming more and more multinational in composition, they updated the lectures and began to show the party's work to accomplish particular tasks in those regions where the cadets were born.

Instructors of the military pedagogics and psychology chair, which is headed by Lt Col V. Beshentsev, also are in a constant search. I would like to take note especially of Lt Col S. Poperechnyy, through whose initiative elements of the system of well-known pedagogue V. Shatalov were introduced to a number of new methodologies. Chair party members now are working on a pedagogic model of a radar company political officer which makes it possible to precisely picture the most optimum paths for developing particular qualities.

Not long ago the experience of our best pedagogues Col A. Tsygankov and Col D. Derkach was generalized and disseminated at the initiative of the political department. I myself had more than one occasion to visit their classes. Do you know what strikes the eye right away? Their special disposition toward people and enthusiasm over the subject. When I hear about pedagogics of cooperation, I think that these teachers specifically confirm it by their closeness to trainees and by their professional attitude toward the job. Finally, they do so even by their external appearance, which is faultless, and by their manner of conversing with people—respectfully and benevolently.

We and the party organizations orient ourselves toward seeing that the organizations consider their principal task to be ensuring the personal example of the party member, whether he be an instructor or, for example, a subunit commander. There must be no gap between words about honor and responsibility and the exemplary performance of professional duties. We simply part company with whomever does not wish to learn this, and we do not intend to reduce exactingness here.

I am also convinced that we must constantly help the teacher. Give him more confidence. We managers, you know, often twist his arm as a check, as they say. If something has seemed to us not as it should be, we immediately straighten him out. If he suggests making certain corrections to the training and indoctrination process, we can scornfully brush it aside as if to say there is someone to think for you. With that attitude just how will he become an active, creative individual? How will he restructure the training and indoctrination process?

[Golda] Aleksandr Andreyevich, there has been an assertion that the teacher is the central figure in perestroika. That is correct but, it seems to me, not completely correct. Is the trainee's role in perestroika really less significant?

[Gaydukov] An important pedagogic idea lies at the foundation of a restructuring of the higher school: to achieve the trainee's awareness of responsibility for the quality of studies and turn him from a passive scholar into an active creator of himself as a specialist. We understandably strive to ensure that this idea is realized. True, for now not everything is successful here.

I recall a party meeting in one of the training groups. The talk was about how to increase cadets' sense of responsibility for quality mastery of the training curricula. It is of course an important and necessary conversation, but to what was it reduced? "Chairs must demand," "Subunit commanders must punish the negligent," "Party and Komsomol organizations must exact"...

Do you catch the drift in these proposals? It is a familiar one, the administrative pressure kind. Strange, as if a person can be forced to learn "under the stick." How strong old stereotypes are! Nevertheless, they are fading into the past. As proof I would like to refer to the cadet collective in the battery commanded by Maj S. Krasnoshchek.

I recall how officers of this subunit nursed—yes, nursed, I will not choose another word—first-year students. In addition to the fact that general school activities were held for novices (a short meeting, a theme night, meetings with the best teachers, meetings with cadets who were foremost in studies, and a film about the school), battery officers organized a visit to the Yu. V. Andropov Museum Room. Familiarization with museum exhibits and a story about this state figure produced an enormous impression on the first-year students.

But probably the high organization of service, regulation order in the subunit and the atmosphere of benevolence into which they were immersed had the strongest effect on the novices. Everything was done to see that cadets were attuned for productive studies from the first day. This was also facilitated by a meeting with recent school graduates—deputy company commanders for political affairs senior lieutenants V. Maystrenko, O. Khramtsov, D. Polonin, O. Ukhanov, S. Arayev and others. The young political officers told about themselves—how they themselves had studied, how they had headed for a set goal, and how they were now working.

The start is always difficult for first-year students. It is important here not to lose heart. Krasnoshchek was able (of course with the help of the instructors) to develop an effective algorithm of study and use it skillfully. They knew when to go to the library, when to go to the chair and how to organize independent study. Krasnoshchek taught the cadets to study.

[Golda] That is to say, he armed them with the ability to obtain knowledge?

[Gaydukov] That's it. And something else that seems valuable to me is that he made skillful use of the strength of collectivist principles. For example, in his company all training groups constantly resorted to the group training method, especially before seminars, quizzes and exams.

In addition, Krasnoshchek sums up training results daily. He does it for all to hear, both about the outstanding persons and about those who displayed laziness. He will invariably encourage the best. You know, I am speaking seemingly about trivial things known to everyone, but the trouble is that some commanders scorn them and the system crumbles. Krasnoshchek's system of taking a responsible attitude toward studies works.

[Golda] The capabilities of commanders to give cadets an incentive for outstanding or good studies now have expanded considerably. Obviously the significant increase in pay and allowances for persons who are foremost in training will play its role.

As you know, a number of schools have introduced the "Outstanding in Training" certificates, which give the right to free attendance at lectures and to a pass to the city.

But many instructors and commanders say that not all opportunities for stimulating cadet efforts in studies are being used. They often have in mind the procedure for assignment on completion of school.

[Gaydukov] Probably not everything is perfect in the assignment procedure. Facts also confirm that this is so. For example, a cadet studied in a very mediocre manner but was assigned to that region and that subunit where many would like to end up serving. But this does not depend on us; political entities decide everything! Unfortunately, there is often also an "unwarranted levelling." In principle it is possible to get rid of it, but this means additional concerns. Will the political entities agree to them?

[Golda] As our mail also attests, on-the-job training [OJT] has not yet become a way of genuinely accustoming the cadet to the profession.

[Gaydukov] Today the problem of OJT probably is one of the most acute in a cadet's professional training. In fact, it can become a pleasant revelation for him and a confident step toward understanding the profession, it can give him a charge of confidence in his abilities, and it can also disappoint and generate doubt.

I will not enumerate how we prepare upperclassmen for their meeting with the profession, but I will be bold to assure you that we officials of higher educational institutions attempt to do this conscientiously, although of

course there are oversimplifications. Sometimes, however, we do not see that striving on the part of some commanders and political officers of units and subunits.

For how does it happen at times? The OJT cadet arrives in a unit, he is introduced to the personnel, and then is told: Here is the reading room, your sphere of activity, be daring. And all his time is occupied with putting things in order. Well, in the best case he will conduct political classes and take part in preparing a party or Komsomol meeting, but he will not learn in practice just what his combat role is.

It also happens where the OJT cadet has to stew in his own juices when he is sent to a subunit with no political deputy. Just who will help him and prompt him?

Unfortunately, OJT cadets are not spoiled by attention. Instructors of the party-political work chair recently surveyed 50 cadets. To the question "How did commanders and political officers delve into the progress of your OJT?" only 13 persons answered yes, they went into it thoroughly. Eleven persons answered that they went into it little, and 26 persons (!) gave a negative answer, i.e., half of the cadets were left to their own devices.

But pay attention to how OJT cadets answered the question "Would you like to serve in the subunit where you performed OJT?" Fifty percent of those queried said no. It is impossible to absolutize these data, but they cannot help but place one on guard.

Other figures also are troubling. We analyzed just how the troops evaluated our OJT cadets. It turned out that all received outstanding or good marks. Only one comment was negative. Another figure appears strange next to this one: when comments come in on graduates, the number of negative comments already is around ten percent.

It is clear that a formal approach is taken to evaluating the work of an OJT cadet. Why? Well, because the troops essentially bear no responsibility for the OJT. If those in the unit knew that the OJT cadet would return, the attitude toward him also would be different.

[Golda] Then that probably is what has to be done? Just why doesn't the procedure for OJT and graduates' assignments change?

[Gaydukov] Changes are being made, but extremely slowly. For example, the geography of OJT now has been expanded somewhat, but in my view more decisive changes are needed in training Higher Military-Political School graduates, otherwise many of our intentions will just remain good wishes. But time does not stand still.

### **Conference to Resolve Problems of Units in Moscow MD**

18010366a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Feb 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Colonel (Res) F. Semyanovskiy: "Questions Are Answered"]

[Text] The officers' club of the Moscow Military District hosted a gathering of representatives of district units, military schools, organizations, and institutions, who heard reports read by Lieutenant General A. Makunin, chief of the Political Directorate; Lieutenant General V. Mirgorodskiy, district Rear Services chief and deputy commander for Rear Services; and Major General Ye. Kulagin, district deputy commander for construction and troop billeting.

Pressing problems of military life and activity discussed in service personnel meetings held on posts and in units included problems which they could not resolve with the resources available to them. Suggestions resulting from the meetings were submitted to district headquarters and directorates, where they were examined in detail.

One of the communications subunits does not have its own firing range. Major General A. Kirsanov stated that a decision has been made to assign to the communications personnel one of the training center firing ranges belonging to the Guards Taman Motorized Infantry Division imeni M. I. Kalinin.

Many questions that were put forth were fielded by Major General Ye. Kulagin. A problem which has long been unresolved is that of providing natural gas service to quarters housing families of officers and warrant officers stationed at the district training center. It was decided to allot 216,000 rubles this year to accelerate construction of a gas conduit. Communists participating in meetings held in the Guards Taman Motorized Infantry Division pointed out the particular need for repairing barracks, classrooms, and the sewer system in buildings housing servicemen's families and in other barracks. The sum of 1.75 million rubles will be allocated for these purposes in 1989.

### **Main Military Procurator on Procuracy's Role in Legal State, Restructuring**

18010366b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Feb 89 First Edition p 2

[Discussion held by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel L. Nechayuk and Lieutenant General B. Popov, main military procurator: "Law is Law - A Conversation with Main Military Procurator Lieutenant General B. Popov"]

[Text] "Law is law." This phrase, which has come down to us from remote antiquity, carries deep meaning if one is to ponder it. For we know that only by exercising strict

compliance with the law and actively protecting the rights of people and the interests of society can we assure, by judicial means, true social justice.

In the affirmation of the superiority and boundless triumph of the law and in the construction of a socialist law-abiding state, as envisioned by the party, a special role is played by the law-enforcement organs and, in particular, the military procuracy. What progress is being made in restructuring its work, and in the process what problems have arisen and how can they be resolved? This constitutes the topic of discussion between KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent, Colonel L. Nechayuk, and Lieutenant General B. Popov, the main military procurator.

[Nechayuk] Boris Sergeyevich, our readers are of course aware that, in accordance with the USSR Constitution, higher supervision over strict and uniform observance of laws in the Armed Forces is the responsibility of the main military procurator of the USSR and his subordinate procurators. This is so in theory, so to speak. But how is it in practice? Do not "social necessity" and "interests of the matter at hand" still prevail in the actions and thinking of procurators? In your opinion, what kind of supervision should the procuracy exercise at the present stage of perestroika?

[Popov] All the undertakings and actions which comprise perestroika have in the final analysis a common denominator—reorientation towards the person, towards his needs and demands. This in no way means that the interests of society are relegated to a position of secondary importance. On the contrary, only the conditions attending perestroika make it possible for them to start acquiring their true value. For social interest is the sum of interests of our citizens. And, of course, they cannot escape the attention and concern of the procurator.

During the stagnation period there was no scarcity of verbal approval of further strengthening of law and order. The time has come to make strengthening a reality. Here also is where importance attaches to a clear understanding of the role to be played by all links of the social and legal mechanism. The law-abiding state is not only a higher social value that supports the humanistic principles of socialism. It is also a practical instrument for assuring and protecting the freedom, honor, and dignity of the individual; a means for combatting bureaucracy, parochialism, and departmentalism; and a form of realizing socialist government by the people. This in its entirety applies to the Armed Forces, which are a part of our state system.

The law-abiding state is not yet a reality. It is a goal, the road to which, it seems, will be difficult. However, the first steps have been taken. The Extraordinary 12th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th Convocation, which was held at the end of last year, passed the Law on Changes and Addenda to the Constitution

(Fundamental Law) of the USSR and the Law on Election of People's Deputies of the USSR. Legal reform has been initiated. The court has been designated the principal instrument for maintaining law and order.

The problem of respect for the law has assumed a new urgency, with unconditional observance of law by all persons, regardless of their rank or position. The law cannot be violated under any circumstances. The sundry considerations of the "expediency" of applying a particular law or disregard for the interests and rights of people that existed in the past have been decisively condemned by the party and by state legislative organs. Concerning parochialism and departmentalism, there unfortunately remain cases where procurators themselves are held captive by these influences, having lost understanding of their duty. Also not changing their views are complacent people currying favor with local authorities. We never did become reconciled to that and we never will. In a word, the period of the country's revolutionary renewal requires restoration of the Leninist principles of supervision by the procuracy that have been lost in the past decades.

[Nechayuk] Does that mean that the procuracy gradually lost the role for which it was created?

[Popov] That is so to a certain extent. Especially if one is to look at the situation from the standpoint of supervising observance of the law and protecting the rights and interests of people. The situation is changing, but not as rapidly as we wish. Speaking of the practical program of actions being taken by the military procuracy, I can say that it is very broad.

Foremost on our agenda is supervising observance of the law and military regulations by all officials. We have a clear understanding that lawfulness in the activity of commanders, political workers, staffs, and all military command and control agencies lies at the basis of strengthening law and order in the Army and Navy. Our task is to institute responsibility on the part of officials; assure law and order; and render an influence on the economy and social sphere by activating the entire legal mechanism.

This is an opportune place to remind the readers that for many years the country was subjected to the one-sided concept of law as a coercive force. It was considered that the procurator's sole purpose was to prohibit, imprison, call to order, etc. Prohibitions, warnings, and punishments are still required, of course, but to see all this as the sole function of the procurator is extremely harmful, not only erroneous. On the contrary, the citizen should look upon the procurator as a protector, one who does not permit his rights and lawful interests to be violated by any person whatsoever. Not in word, but in deed. In other words, we must change from a prohibitory model to a permissive one, one which proceeds from life, from a creative role of law, from creativity in thinking and in action. It goes without saying that it is much more

difficult to assure people and entire collectives the possibility of free and full realization of that which is not prohibited, that which is permissible, rather than "holding back" all the time. The matter is rendered all the more difficult by the fact that in many areas of relations between citizens and the state there either is no legal basis, as in the service sphere, for example, or a basis cannot be readily employed to protect rights. Take abuses in distribution of housing, medical care, and commercial services, for example. In these cases the operative mechanism is sometimes an official's discretion rather than law. We know that granting him complete control would doom people to waging a hopeless struggle against bureaucracy.

It must be understood that the procuracy cannot serve as a substitute for an administrative system, legal service, or control organ. It is obligated to orient itself towards a qualitatively new approach to protecting state interests and the rights and dignity of the individual. We have a long road to travel to achieve this. I must openly admit that it is no simple thing for procuracy personnel to shatter an established stereotype and change the customary psychology. However, this is the only way to be granted authority by the Soviet people and gain their trust.

[Nechayuk] Judging by the letters received by the editors, Boris Sergeyevich, readers still do not trust procurators. This raises a question: Are the means available to procurators sufficient to eliminate lawlessness wherever it may appear, be it associated with departmental instructions, non-uniform application of the law, or arbitrary actions on the part of commanders? It is possible to cite many cases where military procurators lose their determination before a unit's command personnel or an organization's management. Why is this so?

[Popov] I do not believe that this kind of occurrence can be considered typical for military procurators. Look at the statistics. Every year procurators challenge 7,000 to 8,000 illegal orders and other legal acts issued by commanders and chiefs, and they submit 11,000 to 12,000 recommendations for rectifying violations of the law.

[Nechayuk] How effective is this activity?

[Popov] The state is compensated in the amount of millions of rubles as a result of prosecuting guilty officials, and legal rights and interests of thousands of servicemen and civilians are restored. Military procurators every year alone release more than a thousand servicemen illegally incarcerated in guardhouses. I believe that the thousands of men who have been illegally charged with material responsibility by commanders have a kind word to say about military procurators. The minister of defense has supported our requests for increasing the number of workers required to maintain supervision by the procuracy. This has not only had an immediate influence on effectiveness of the supervision, but a material justification as well. Suffice it to say that



actions taken by procurators last year resulted in finding twice as many service personnel, mostly officials, materially responsible, compared with 1987.

In a nutshell, the procuracy's power is entirely adequate to root out any violations of the law. At the heart of the matter is intelligent and skillful use of this power; selection of a priority course of action and concentration of forces. However, I can tell you openly that military procurators sometimes employ this authority timidly; they dissipate their power on trivia and take on matters that are not of their concern. There is a reason why this was addressed by M. S. Gorbachev at the 19th Party Conference. Also, we do make mistakes, of course.

Yes, in our work any mistake is repercussive and at times may be dangerous. But mistakes do occur. They probably will never be entirely excluded. This bitter truth cannot be ignored. And it should not be ignored. Covering up an omission invariably arouses suspicion, which leads to distrust.

[Nechayuk] I believe that lawfulness is not only a legal problem. It also includes glasnost and establishment of democracy as a life norm. This is the basis for changing and encouraging legal awareness in Soviet people. Highly useful here will be universal legal information instruction as a unified and integrated program involving all sections of the population. How do you think it will be organized in the Army and Navy?

[Popov] First, let me remind the readers that the legal information program for military personnel has been in effect for some time. The Interior Service Regulations charge commanders and chiefs with this responsibility to insure that personnel acquire the necessary knowledge of Soviet legislation and that they form the views leading to a proper understanding of the party's policy relative to strengthening the legal basis of state and social life. The means of the legal information program include instruction on the law, legal propaganda, judicial practice of military justice organs, and the activity of commanders and chiefs in their application of Soviet laws to the execution of their official duties.

We are creating a law-abiding state, carrying out reform of the political system, and introducing new management methods. All this requires restructuring in the dissemination of legal information. It is common knowledge that officers are subject to what is known as the Legal Minimum. We are of the opinion that an officer who has not mastered it cannot be assigned to independent work.

Observance of the law must become a conscious and habitual process. Ignorance of the law, or, what is worse, disregard for the law, exacts a heavy penalty to be paid by society and citizens. In my opinion, this problem cannot be resolved without involving the legal aktiv on a broad scale. The informed layman, military tribunal

juryman, comrades' court member, or people's controller who has been trained in theory by professional jurists is fully qualified to speak before a subunit's personnel on the subject of law. We know that such activists in every combined unit (soyedineniye) number in the hundreds and, in the district, in the thousands. This is where the reserves of universal legal information instruction are located.

Universal legal information should not bypass professional jurists, of course. Not only must we teach others, but we ourselves must learn democracy, glasnost, sensitivity and respect for people.

[Nechayuk] Boris Sergeyevich, lawfulness includes responsibility for permitting a violation. It can relate to criminal, administrative, or disciplinary responsibility, but should be applied without fail when a law is violated. Nevertheless, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers write that there has been an increase in frequency of cases where courts have absolved soldiers of all criminal responsibility for their neglect of duties in connection with their absenting themselves from their units without authorization, allegedly as a result of infringement on their personal rights. Have military procurators and tribunals "become kinder", or have they decided to move away from criminal prosecution in the struggle against crime?

[Popov] Neither one nor the other. Humanitarianism and love of man have nothing in common with connivance. Nor has the force of law weakened. On the contrary, we apply the full weight of the law in the struggle against violators of regulations governing relations. Almost 95 percent of persons who commit this category of violation have criminal responsibility charges brought against them. I must admit that not all such crimes are brought to the attention of military procurators. What perplexes us are frequent occurrences wherein a soldier subjected to violence does not make use of his legal right to defend himself, failing to protect himself or a comrade, and does not report the incident to his commander, political worker, or military procurator, instead choosing to absent himself from his unit without authorization, thus committing a crime. This troubles us.

Concerning the problem of release from criminal responsibility in the case of neglect of military duties, this is a complex, even debatable question. As such, I will express my personal opinion. The regulations do not make allowance for mitigating circumstances in cases of unauthorized absence from a unit or assignment. Therefore, this necessarily constitutes commission of a crime. However, the reasons behind a serviceman's unauthorized absence from his unit may be taken into account in the determination in the degree of punishment; they may even constitute a basis for terminating criminal proceedings and dispensing with the levying of punishment for the crime.

Speaking of the general state of military discipline and the struggle against crime, I would like to refer to the opinion issued by the CPSU Central Committee in October of last year, whereby it was noted that the Army has intensified its interest in problems of strengthening military discipline and redoubled its requirement for concrete results in work relating to maintaining regulation order in units and sub-units. All this has made it possible to effect some reduction in number of incidents, crimes, and major offenses.

However, in evaluating the work accomplished by command personnel, political organs, and military jurists as a whole, the CPSU Central Committee stressed that the main task—assuring fundamental strengthening of military discipline in the Army and Navy—is making only slow progress. The Central Committee decree points out that serious concern is being caused by incidents of dereliction in carrying out military duties, non-regulation relations between service personnel, cases of violations of rules governing military alertness, and accidents involving combat materiel. This gives rise to the tasks facing us.

[Nechayuk] Now the last question. This one deals with glasnost. How is it helping—or possibly hindering—the work of military procuracy organs?

[Popov] Glasnost, which is gaining strength, is of considerable assistance in the struggle against negative phenomena. The mass information media—including KRA-SNAYA ZVEZDA—regularly publish coverage of problems facing our Army and the causes hindering their solution. Surveys under the control of the main military procuracy were conducted covering all publications. The results indicated that 48 men were tried for disciplinary responsibility; 16, for material; 17, for party responsibility; and eight were removed from their positions. Such is the effectiveness of the printed word.

The procuracy, the same as other organs, is often the target of criticism levelled by the press, radio, and television. Some of it is aimed at us—military procurators. We look upon this criticism as assistance in our exposure of shortcomings. In expanding glasnost, however, it is important that we avoid being led astray by one-sidedness of complaints, keeping in mind that truth and law are superior to everything else. Law and discipline should permeate perestroika and engulf every Soviet person in their influence. Emphasis of proper aspects and responsibility of the printed word, as we know, are also building blocks of the legal edifice, without which our society cannot live and function normally.

#### **Letters of Thanks for Military Disaster Aid to Tajikistan**

18010403 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Feb 89 First Edition p 1

[Letters to the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in the column: "Thank You, Brothers!"]

[Text] The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy receives letters from people who wish to express their

heartfelt gratitude to members of the Armed Forces for the selfless labor they performed in the cleanup operations following the earthquake that occurred in Tajikistan.

In today's issue we are publishing letters addressed to Army General A. D. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The Ministry of Public Education of the Tajik SSR wishes to express its deepest gratitude to the personnel of the unit in which officers N. Zhinkin and Ye. Lukoyanov serve for their selfless labor in rescuing Gissarskiy rayon teachers and pupils who fell victim to the natural calamity.

Working under extremely difficult conditions, commanders, political workers, enlisted men, and noncommissioned officers displayed high moral qualities, persistence, and diligence as they went about rescuing victims, rebuilding damaged housing and school properties, and restoring school operations. They set up more than 150 large tents as replacements for the demolished schools.

The heroic work performed by the servicemen serves as a good model for us to follow in educating our schoolchildren in the spirit of unity of the party, people, and Armed Forces.

Respectfully,

T. Nazarov

Minister of Public Education, Tajik SSR

Dear Aleksey Dmitriyevich!

The Administration and parents' committee of Gissarskiy rayon Secondary School No 36 in the Tajik SSR wish to express our heartfelt gratitude for the skill and care that have gone into producing our dear servicemen.

Our republic has recently suffered a major disaster—a strong earthquake destroyed many schools and rendered them unusable. Among the first to respond to our misfortune were the officers and men of the Dushanbe garrison who labored steadily for several days in snow and rain, without sleep or rest, setting up tents and stoves for our children, doing all they could to help us resume our regular activities, to enable our children to quickly take their places at their desks and continue their schooling.

Words alone cannot express our praise and esteem for the servicemen's labor, which serves as a model to follow in bringing up our schoolchildren until they attain conscription age. We tell our children that this is the kind of behavior expected of real Soviet people.

Once again we want to thank you.

A. Isakova, School Principal

Z. Bukharova, Secretary, School Party Organization

A. Khakrizoyev, Chairman, Parents' Committee

**Maj Gen Antoshkin On Negative Factors  
Retarding Restructuring Armed Forces**  
*18010456b Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in  
Russian 23 Feb 89 p 4*

[Article by Air Force Maj Gen Antoshkin, Commander of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District and Hero of the Soviet Union: "[The Army] Borne by the Great October Revolution"]

[Text] The 23rd of February is a special date in the history of our Motherland. On this day 71 years ago, a new type of Army, a military organization which freed workers and peasants, and a reliable shield from encroachments on their revolutionary gains was created. Even today, the Soviet Armed Forces fulfill this distinguished historical mission with honor, vigilantly standing guard over the gains of socialism and peace on Earth. Unfailingly making good use of the love and support of the people, they have well-trained personnel and modern, reliable weapons.

The whole history of the Soviet State and its worldwide, historical victories gained in battle with the enemies of socialism vividly and convincingly demonstrated the vitality of the Leninist principle of Communist Party leadership of the Armed Forces. It remains unshakable even under contemporary conditions.

The new edition of the CPSU program states: "Communist Party leadership of military organizational development and the Armed Forces is the basis of the foundations for strengthening defense of the Socialist Motherland. Under the Party's leading role, the nation's defense and security policy and Soviet military doctrine, which has a purely defensive nature and is directed at protection from attack from without, are being developed and implemented."

This conclusion orients military personnel toward profound study of the military profession, the laws and appropriateness of war, and toward the art of commanding forces. Scientific character in solving military organizational development issues requires that commanders, staffs, and political organs comprehensively and objectively analyze the facts affecting the effectiveness of combat and political training and, in the process of making decisions diligently and comprehensively evaluating all elements of the situation and skillfully discovering the political, military-technical, and psychological capabilities of their subordinates and enemies.

On this holiday, I enjoy reporting to the newspaper's readers that many of their fellow-countrymen are fulfilling their constitutional obligation to defend the Motherland with honor. I will name just a few. They are: warrior-internationalist Captain Third Class Zh. Namazaliyev, submitted for award of the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR;" Lt Col B. Belmanov, graduate of the Military Political

Academy imeni V.I. Lenin; Sr Lt M. Chekirbayev, secretary of his unit's party organization; Lt B. Kuzybayev, flight navigator; and, Sr Lt's B. Matiyev and K. Omorov, political workers. Privates B. Musayev, M. Yermenov, N. Oshmanov, and others are appropriately increasing the military glory of their fathers and grandfathers.

I know from letters and personal encounters that those servicemen transferred to the reserve are not shedding their soldiers' honor. Having passed through the good vital school in the Army, they are in the first ranks of perestroika's supporters today.

Realism and a principled approach in appraising the level of combat readiness, discipline, and organization achieved have become a characteristic trait of perestroika of the style and work methods of command and political personnel which has occurred in the Army. Moreover, a trend toward objective determination of the real level of military skill, effectiveness of command, and mastery of modern equipment and weaponry is clearly being tracked.

Perestroika's complexity is being more completely discovered with each passing day and the scale of work is being more fully brought to light. It is becoming clearer that independent perceptions of the readiness of the Armed Defenders of the Motherland still lag behind today's missions. We must rid ourselves of the old, persistently search for creative solutions, and manifest an innovative approach to duty.

Objectively appraising the state of affairs, we must admit that, along with the positive trends which are developing and being firmly introduced into reality, negative factors are having a detrimental affect on the course of perestroika in the Army. Among them, I will point out the poor pre-conscription training of youth. Young people, who are physically weak, not morally tempered, and inclined toward violation of the rules, frequently come to us. And re-educating them in a two year period is a very complex task.

Unfortunately, there are enough negative aspects even in the Army itself. And they occur due to inertia, ingrained harmful habits, indifference, and formalism of individual officials in organizing personnel training and duty. That is why it is very important to profoundly and comprehensively look into the causes of errors and respond to and eliminate shortcomings allowed.

Under current conditions, the struggle for disarmament and for lessening international tensions is attaining special significance. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government are constantly advocating initiatives and specific proposals directed at solving important

problems for preserving peace and international security. An important place among these peace-loving acts is the agreement with the US leadership on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles, our government's decision on the unilateral reduction of personnel and weapons, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

But this hardly contradicts the Leninist provision that, while Imperialism exists, the threat of war remains. Consequently, The defensive mission of our Armed Forces also remains.

The servicemen of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District, like all other Armed Forces personnel, are fully resolved to take a huge step toward increasing unit and subunit combat readiness and the further improvement of military skill. They see their patriotic and internationalist duty as reliably and vigilantly preserving the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people and the great gains of socialism and to be in constant readiness which guarantees an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

#### **Readers Express Fears of Results of Reduction in Force**

##### **Editorial Commentary**

18010412 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
First Edition 28 Feb 89 p 1

[Editorial commentary under rubric "Letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "The Reader Reflects, Criticizes and Suggests"]

[Text] The editors continue to receive letters connected with the upcoming reduction in the Armed Forces. They indicate that the problems connected with this are drawing the attention not only of those who are to be discharged to the reserve in the near future, but also of Army and Navy veterans, parents of those who are serving, and our other readers. We are publishing some of the letters.

##### **Reserve Officer Inequality**

18010412 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
First Edition 28 Feb 89 p 1

[Letter by Col Justice V. Buyevich: "Rights Differ"]

[Text] It is gratifying that today a discussion of servicemen's legal and social protection finally has appeared in the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. This problem assumes special urgency with the upcoming reduction in the Armed Forces.

I will touch on what is in my view one issue of no small importance in this regard. In the years of aggravated international tension it is common knowledge that a large number of reserve officers—graduates of civilian universities—were called up for active military duty.

Having changed their profession and left their long-occupied places, they and their families experienced many difficulties and deprivations. And today, when the situation is changing, these people actually may be in an inequitable position with those with whom they served and lived side by side for long years.

I will explain my thinking. It is generally known that time served in the USSR Armed Forces is counted as length of work for civilians, but this law does not have retroactive force: length of work in production or in civilian establishments before call-up essentially is not taken into account. Because of this, officers called up from the reserve most often lag both in position and in military rank behind their contemporaries who graduated from military schools. It is more difficult for them to receive a higher military education and it is rare when any of them serve until they receive leave of greater duration or until maximum pension. Now, however, they are also troubled by the question: Will it not be that they may be recommended for discharge to the reserve without having achieved pension age? The thought that the interests of this category of officers must be taken into account was heard in a number of authoritative statements. I believe that in documents on this score the provision also should be stipulated that length of work before the Army should be counted in their term of service. This in itself will help remove a large number of problems which people will encounter in the present situation.

##### **Early Out for Students?**

18010412 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
First Edition 28 Feb 89 p 1

[Letter by O. and G. Fadeyev: "What Will Happen to the Students?"]

[Text] In connection with the reduction in the Armed Forces which will begin this year, will students called up from institutes after completing the first course be discharged to the reserve by the new academic year? This would appear to be fair because insofar as we know, except for certain specialties, students subsequently will be given a deferral from service in the Army until completion of a university.

The question is troubling because our son now is in that situation.

##### **Those Discharged Deserve Benefits**

18010412 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
First Edition 28 Feb 89 p 1

[Letter by A. Tereshchenko, labor veteran: "Exclude Protectionism"]

[Text] Even in peacetime our Soviet Army does much for the state. Where things are difficult, our soldiers are always there, whether it be an accident at an atomic

electric power station, an earthquake, a flood or, for example, the harvest. And I believe a responsible approach must be taken to a reduction in the Armed Forces.

Special commissions, and not just those in personnel entities, should determine candidates for discharge among officers and warrant officers. A lack of objectivity and protectionism must be totally excluded. Those being discharged must be granted benefits in getting housing and a job in the shortest time.

### **Cut Military School Levy**

*18010412 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
First Edition 28 Feb 89 p 1*

[Letter by Capt V. Novikov: "For Me This is a Drama"]

[Text] I am a captain. I am already almost 40 years old. I lack a few years in service to receive 80 percent of full pension. There has as yet been no housing, and there are a great many like me.

Is it really impossible to reduce the Armed Forces from the other end, as they say? Reduce the levy for schools this very year, and in a few years a reduction will occur of itself without personal dramas and destroyed careers. The fact is that servicemen discharged to the reserve will be able to receive housing somewhere at an enterprise only after 10-15 years, i.e., when they will be almost 60.

I know that you will not publish my letter since it does not fit in with an acceptable tone of conversation, but you yourselves understand full well that it reflects the sentiments of many officers and warrant officers for whom the upcoming discharge will be bitter, as it will be for me.

### **Fears Civilian Life Ahead**

*18010412 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
First Edition 28 Feb 89 p 1*

[Letter by Maj A. Kamaletdinov: "On a Sharp Turn"]

[Text] There are frequent instances where some commanders and personnel officials look first at age and education and not at officers' job and professional qualities. For example, I am going on 44. I began work at age 16. I myself came from a large family and grew up without a father. Counting study at the institute, I have a length of work of over ten years and am in my eighteenth year in the Armed Forces. I will have served the established period only at age 51.

I am very grateful to the Army for the fact that it imparted to me the concepts of duty and honor and gave me profound professional knowledge and an opportunity to see almost our entire country. I regard myself as a rather good specialist, but here is what troubles me: if I am discharged to the reserve now, how will I find a place for myself in civilian life?

Discharge to the reserve is a sharp turn in the life of an officer who is generally not a young person. How important it is not to complicate this with social and everyday problems and with the indifference of various bureaucrats.

### **Discharged Officers Need Attention**

*18010412 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
First Edition 28 Feb 89 p 1*

[Letter by Col (Ret) T. Ivanov: "Spare No Means or Attention"]

[Text] The Soviet government's decision on a unilateral reduction in our Armed Forces by a half-million persons is a very important political and state act assuring preservation of a world without wars and military danger. It is receiving the approval of all Soviet people, regular military, and those who already are in the reserve or are retired.

Officers' interests will be affected in one way or another in the upcoming reduction. No small number of them will be discharged to the reserve, and here it is important to avoid errors made previously in similar situations. In general, one wise military leader—I do not remember his name—once said: If you wish to have a strong, combat-effective army spare no means or attention for officers discharged to the reserve.

### **Housing Denied Deserving Family**

*18010412 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
First Edition 28 Feb 89 p 1*

[Letter by Ye. Khokhlova: "Since You are Being Discharged..."]

[Text] My husband already has served 14 years as an officer, and has been in the Leningrad Military District since September 1986. All this time we lived in houses without public utilities and with stove heating.

The entire family was happy when our turn for housing approached in August of last year, but then something happened. In short, inasmuch as my husband was on leave, the command element decided to give the apartment to another officer behind us in line. In response to the question of how that happened with the apartment, Lt Col I. Polekha responded: "Wait and you will receive an apartment that is even better. A new house will be turned over immediately after the New Year holidays."

He calmed and reassured us, and we parted on that. We decided at a family council that we had waited this long and we would wait some more.

But we were not given an apartment when living space was distributed on 18 January of this year. Now they say it is in connection with a reduction in the Armed Forces, even though prior to this it was said in newspapers and over television that steps would be taken to provide



housing to officers leaving for the reserve and that not one person must be offended or his rights infringed. But for our family all this turned out to be words, and words alone. The unit commander told my husband without beating about the bush: "Since you are being discharged, there will be no apartment. Even without you, housing is not that good for us."

And so I would like to ask: After 14 years of service and fussing about on military posts, have not my husband Capt Viktor Yevgenyevich Khokhlov and we the members of his family really not earned the right to live in an apartment with all conveniences? We are not demanding what is not authorized us. We are not asking for an apartment for ourselves out of turn.

### **FRG Christian Democrat Youth Group Visits Unit**

18010527 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Mar 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Capt M. Zheglov: "Openness Spawns Openness: Guests From the FRG Visit the Taman Motorized Infantry Division"]

[Text] Foreign speech is being heard more and more often at our military installations, on the decks of our fighting ships, at proving grounds, and in training classes. Representatives of Western political and military circles have obtained a real opportunity to see the Soviet Armed Forces from inside, to meet our soldiers and officers, and to find out what our army's concerns are today and what tasks it faces. Incidentally, the interest in these meetings is mutual. They also give our servicemen a chance to learn firsthand, so to speak, about life and service in the armies of various countries.

On this occasion, the division's guests were a delegation of leaders of Youth Union, the youth organization of the FRG's Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (the parties that make up the ruling coalition in West Germany). The delegation was in our country at the invitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League and the Committee for Youth Organizations.

The first few minutes of the tour, one was immediately struck by the genuine interest with which the guests surveyed the installation. Some of them had served in the Bundeswehr and now had a chance to compare. "That's just the thing for me," smiled Hans-Peter Bergner, a consultant on youth policy to the federal secretariat of the Christian Democratic Union, in response to an invitation to visit a regimental medical station. "Why? Because I used to serve in a medical supply column. First I was a clerk and kept patient records, and later I dispensed medicines in the pharmacy."

The former medic was immediately bombarded with questions, which he gladly answered.

"How long did my training last? Like all new Bundeswehr recruits, I spent the first six weeks studying weapons, firing weapons at a range facility, marching, and practicing methods of defending against weapons of mass destruction. Then I had four weeks of advanced medical training. I passed the driving exam and got my license, and then basic service began.

"Where did I live? In a barracks. Most barracks in our country are of a standard design, with a long common corridor and rooms in which the servicemen live—eight men to a room, as a rule. True, noncommissioned officers live four to a room, in some instances just two to a room. In addition, I've noticed that our barracks are different from yours in that they lack weapon storage rooms. On the other hand, they have recreation rooms of sorts where servicemen can rest after finishing the workday.

"How much did I earn, when did I serve? The pay for soldiers in the Bundeswehr has been raised since then. Today, as far as I know, enlisted men earn nine to 11 marks a day, depending on rank. In addition, compulsory service personnel are provided with clothing and meals free of charge. Medical care is also free. On completing service, every serviceman is given 2,800 marks, so that the young man has something to live on while he looks for work."

The guests from the FRG were invited to the gymnasium, where they saw a demonstration of hand-to-hand combat techniques. "No, I didn't have to learn anything like that," said Mr. Bergner. "Of course, I can't speak for the entire Bundeswehr. Maybe some units do get such training—intelligence units, for example." An even greater impression was made on the guests by the training technique of rolling tanks over soldiers to get them to overcome their fear of tanks, which the guests saw in a film about the Taman Division that was shown to them. The unanimous view of the Youth Union delegation's members was that such "life-threatening" combat training, as they put it, is quite absent in the Bundeswehr. The feelings of the largely civilian group were understandable. At any rate, however, rolling tanks over soldiers is no more dangerous than the low-altitude aircraft flights with which the Bundeswehr trains.

There always exists the danger that encounters like this one might degenerate into relatively meaningless exchanges of protocol courtesies. That did not happen on this occasion. The openness spawned a reciprocal openness. Both the West German and Soviet participants in the meeting discussed with interest urgent issues of army discipline and young people's attitudes toward service.

"Are young West Germans eager to join the army? I wouldn't say so," said Mr. Bergner. "There are several reasons, among them a fear of losing one's job while in the army and a reluctance to go very far away from home, though soldiers do their service in garrisons

located no more than 100 kilometers from their native areas, as a rule. Many social problems that confront young servicemen are also unsolved."

There was no end to the guests' questions as well. How is restructuring proceeding in the Soviet Army? What is service like for our soldiers? Do our soldiers and sergeants have difficulty finding jobs after discharge? How are their rights protected? And so on.

The meeting was coming to an end. An animated exchange of impressions took place. It was noteworthy that the guests from the FRG especially liked the view expressed by a Soviet soldier to the effect that direct contacts need to be established between our countries' servicemen. "On our return home, we're going to send a letter containing such proposals to Federal Chancellor H. Kohl," one delegation member said. Well then, perhaps we can expect further meetings.

#### **Subunits From Leningrad MD, MVD Exercise Together**

*18010456a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Mar 89 First Edition p 1*

[Letter to the editor signed by L. Belyaeva, K. Lukyanov and 21 others; "Instead of a Pasture, a Waste-land".]

[Text] We, the residents of the village of Vaskalovo in the Leningrad oblast, have already appealed to you a year ago. The fact is that during military training exercises of two subunits, one from the Leningrad Military District and the other from the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal security forces, a pasture located not far from our village was turned into into something completely worthless. Trenches were dug and the grass was destroyed.

The editorial office sent our letter to the Leningrad Military District political administration for steps to be taken. There they confirmed that land use procedures had been violated and in October they promised to re-cultivate the pasture. But, obviously, as they say, we have not been waiting in vain for what has been promised for three years. Very soon we will begin putting the cattle out to pasture and nothing has yet been done.

We ask the whole world to help us re-cultivate the pasture. It is our only one. With its destruction, we will be forced to sell our last cows and will have to buy our meat and milk at the store.

#### **Avoid Mistakes of 60's in Cutting Officers**

*18010470 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
25 Mar 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Capt O. Pochinyuk, Air Defense Forces: "'Let Him Serve Out His Pension!...'"]

[Text] Officer Yu. Osipov was demoted and sent to another unit for serious shortcomings in his work and behavior: Perhaps there, in a new situation he might

shape up. He didn't. He carried out his duties carelessly, and he behaved unworthily. And he responded to reprimands with:

"I'll make it through to my pension somehow!"

After discussing his behavior yet another time, the unit command decided to submit documents for his discharge into the reserves. However, on receiving the documents, higher headquarters returned them with these instructions: "Let him serve out his 25 years!"

Osipov is finishing off his time in service even more carelessly than before.

The case which Major V. Maksul described to me deserves, I think, the most persistent attention. It involves a "disease" that can grow extremely acute, and spread. As we know, the army's reduction in forces is proceeding in such a way that no officer or warrant officer would be left materially or spiritually destitute. This is just, of course, and humane. But it is my conviction that this principle should not dampen anyone's ardor. If the command meets you half way, then please work honorably until the last day.

Most officers of this particular formation of the Air Defense Forces do in fact act this way. For example Major V. Tolmachev was called up from the reserves. Then came the time for him to be discharged, but he was provided an opportunity to work off the time required for a pension. And Tolmachev is now serving with even greater enthusiasm. He has sensibly planned repair of the equipment for which he is responsible, he delves into the tiniest details of its operation, and he shares his experience and knowledge with fellow servicemen. And what is even more important is that the officer has not lowered his principles at all: He attacks shortcomings directly, concretely, proposing dependable ways to improve things.

Officers N. Kolesnikov and V. Sokhomovich also deserve kind words in this respect. But at the same time, there are others like Osipov.

Guards Captain V. Arsoyev was the chief of the officers club. He showed his worth primarily in solving business problems. Then he reduced his diligence, he began violating discipline and drinking to excess. Understandably it was risky to keep him any longer in such a publicly visible position. But where was he to be assigned? To the position of engineer of an integrated trainer, they decided, even though he had neither the experience for this nor sufficient knowledge. Moreover Arsoyev comes off as quite a respectable person in letter of introduction signed by Lieutenant Colonel V. Loemaa. And on the day he received his new orders he took to drinking and committed one of the grossest violations. It was only after this that he was expelled from the party and discharged from the armed forces.

Yes, our army is undergoing reduction. And one of the noteworthy characteristics of this reduction is concern for those who fall in its net. There is confidence that what happened in the 1960s, when officers were often discharged with but two or even one year left until their pension, will not be repeated. Such a thing will not happen now. But there should not be people who abuse this principle at the expense of the interests of the service and combat readiness either.

**Dep Chair of USSR Education Committee: New Higher Education Deferments for Spring 1989**  
*18010499 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
30 Mar 89 p 1

[Interview with G.F. Kutsev, deputy chairman of the State Committee of the USSR for Public Education, under the rubric "Fact and Commentary": "And the Parade Ground Will Wait"]

[Text] It has been discussed for 5 years. The military deferment for students has now been instituted!

**We asked G.F. Kutsev, deputy chairman of the State Committee of the USSR for Public Education, to comment on the long-awaited decision.**

[Kutsev] It has now become apparent to everyone that the break of 2 or 3 years spent by students in the military results in a significant lowering of their educational level and substantially affects the quality of their professional training. Moreover, the nation's defense capability depends to a significant degree upon the kind of cadres and intelligentsia it has and the kind of specialists it turns out.

This is why, beginning with the spring of 1989, a deferment from active military duty goes into effect for the entire term of study at a VUZ for all students in the daytime programs. I stress the fact that it is for all students. This means that the deferment applies to both VUZs which have military departments and those which do not.

The former system of training reserve officers will essentially be retained at VUZs with military departments. After the required course of training has been completed, assemblies will be held at which ranks will be conferred upon the students.

I believe that in the new situation it will be possible to establish inter-VUZ training centers for training reserve officers. Is it advantageous to confine a system to a single VUZ? Those students whose institute does not have a military department could train at such a center, after all. Furthermore, their training at such a center would be absolutely voluntary. If they wanted to, they could continue studying and receive a reserve officer's rank in the 5th year. If not, they could serve a year after leaving the institute.

The main stress must be on the intensive training methods. Knowledge acquired in the military department should help them to master a civilian specialty, and vice versa. The existing system must be thoroughly reassessed, and certain VUZs might have to give up their military departments. And they might have to be set up at other VUZs, particularly universities. It is apparent, after all, that we need in the reserve highly skilled officers: mathematicians, chemists, electronic specialists....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is it planned to reconsider the expediency of providing military training for female students?

[Kutsev] It will be retained only at medical institutes.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Following several of our articles on student boycotts of the military departments, we received many letters from students containing approximately the following: "...boycotts will not solve all of the problems. Just how..."? How can we effect change, cut the programs and carry the military training over from one year to another?

[Kutsev] It is actually very simple. All of these organizational matters have now been turned over to the institute academic council. At certain institutes all of the training has now been switched to the 4th year; it has been spread out over several years at others; at yet others it has been decided to provide the students with the course of military training during summer camp assemblies. Incidentally, new training programs will be started at all VUZs with the beginning of the new academic year. They will be considerably altered and abridged.

**Changes in Law on Compulsory Service**  
*18010565 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
13 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Amending the USSR Law 'On Universal Compulsory Military Service'"]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To make the following amendments in the 12 October 1967 USSR Law "On Universal Compulsory Military Service" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, No 42, Article 552, 1967; No 52, Article 1121, 1980):

1) Article 13 is to be set forth as follows:

"Article 13. The terms of active military service are established as follows:

"1) for privates and NCOs of the Soviet Army and of naval shore-based units and aviation—2 years;

"2) for seamen and petty officers serving on naval ships and vessels and in shore-based combat support units—3 years;

"3) for privates, seamen, NCOs and petty officers possessing a higher education—1 year.

"The order of serving out active compulsory military service by privates, seamen, NCOs and petty officers is determined by the USSR minister of defense in accordance with this Law";

2) Paragraph 1, Article 35 is to be set forth as follows:

"1) Students of day (resident) institutions of higher education. Persons dismissed from VUZes for poor academic performance, for a reluctance to study or for lack of discipline lose their right to a subsequent educational deferment";

3) Article 44 is to be set forth as follows:

"Article 44. Privates, seamen, NCOs and petty officers who possess a higher or secondary education and who

attended training courses and passed the required tests prior to completing active military service are awarded the rank of officer upon discharge into the reserves. Test deadlines and procedures are established by the USSR minister of defense.

"Persons who are not awarded the rank of officer upon being discharged into the reserves may be required to attend military reservist training courses for reserve officer training."

2. To direct the USSR Council of Ministers to examine issues created by this Ukase and, when necessary, submit proposals to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet  
M. Gorbachev

Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet  
T. Menteshashvili

Moscow, The Kremlin, 10 April 1989

**New Model Trainer for ATGM Operators**  
*18010423 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*5 Mar 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Major A. Dolgikh: "To An Exercise With The "Diplomat"]

[Text] [Editorial Introduction] The first models of a new trainer for operators of antitank missile complexes (PTRK) are reaching the units]

"We never had this type of trainer before", commented the chief of one of the administrative departments of the Ground Forces, Col. V. Yaroshenko. "This is a fundamentally new model. Imagine a small suitcase like the "Diplomat", weighing around 10 kg. We set it up on any surface, open the lid, and consider the trainer ready for operations.

The control organs are detachable and depend on what you intend to teach the ATGM operators. Inside the trainer is a movable platform on which is assembled a labyrinth of paths with twenty different configurations, on which a metal ball "runs". The paths simulate the flight trajectories of a missile, and the ball, the missile.

The point of the training sessions is that the operator uses the control organs to tilt the platform in different directions, keeps the ball on the necessary path and moves it to a given point.

This requires the corresponding reaction of the trainee, and skills in control. The operator should sense the control organs as a virtuoso pianist the keys of his instrument. Here the complexity of the tasks to be performed are gradually increased by selecting a more complex trajectory of ball movement and reducing the time to perform the task. I note that specialists who have gone through the training course on our trainers have almost never committed flagrant errors in launches of live missiles.

[Question] But surely there are already trainers in the units that have already proven themselves in training of ATGM operators. What brought about the need to develop a new one?

[Answer] The trainers of which you speak were developed back in the sixties. Of course this does not mean that they are outmoded. They can still be used to train specialists for some time to come. The problem is that they are very bulky and cost a lot. A whole truck is needed for one of them, for example. Incidentally, you won't find them in the field—they are too expensive a pleasure. The new trainer may be set up under any conditions and used effectively. In addition, our innovation is no worse than a slot machine and I think will help to resolve the problem of how to efficiently and beneficially utilize free time.

Recently the officers of the military commissariats learned of the new trainer. They believe that this device can be used for professional selection of future officers.

[Question] And to what extent have their wishes been realized?

[Answer] For the time being there's no reason to rejoice. Only 300 units of the trainers have been produced and already sent to the units.

[Question] This is simply a trifling number. How do you explain it?

[Answer] You have touched on our most painful question. At times years pass between the development of an item and its production. And this at a time when there is a catastrophic shortage of good trainers. There are many reasons. For example, our difficult relations with the Central Finance Administration of the USSR Defense Ministry. Of course, we need the funds, and these questions are not solved easily.

**Computerized Trainer for ATGM Operators**  
*18010476 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*27 Mar 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Maj Dolgikh: "The Computer Evaluates"]

[Text] The young soldiers passed an examination and became specialists two weeks earlier than the time period established by the training program.

Beginning this year, anti-tank missile unit operators are being trained on a new trainer equipped with special electronic computer equipment.

"This training equipment permits servicemen to form solid sensory-motor skills," says Col B. Yurlov, deputy chief of the Ground Forces command section. "It is a specialized computer with a software package and it is connected to an ordinary television and a control panel."

After the instructor inputs certain parameters into the instrument panel on carrying out the mission, a target flashes onto the television screen which, depending on the complexity of the mission, may be fixed, move frontally, to the flank, or on a complex trajectory. The student is 5 meters from the television screen and sees what is occurring on the screen through a view-finder. This adds a feeling of reality to what is occurring.

Electronic computer equipment monitors the operator's work. It not only ascertains the result, "hit or did not hit the target" but analyzes the whole process of guiding the missile to the target. Besides this, the equipment may actually assess the student's capability. For example, if it "sees" that he cannot cope with a complex task, it can give him a simpler version. This interaction with the equipment excludes subjectivity in evaluations and increases interest in learning.



"What criteria does the computer use to assess the quality of the completed task?"

"Several such criteria exist. First of all, there is the so-called 'control coefficient.' It shows the relationship of the time the target is maintained in the crosshairs to total target flight time. The next criterion is 'finishing.' Here it is important that the tracer does not leave the target during the last one and a half to two seconds. The 'detail' criterion is characterized by how solidly the operator carries out certain tasks."

A method of training is also generally being introduced into the forces along with the trainer. There everything is described in detail.

"Is everyone satisfied with your trainer? Is it reliable during operation?"

"The computer operates reliably. We have only received complaints about televisions which frequently do not even work until the end of their warranty period.

Not everyone is satisfied with the quality of the software programs. Many consider them to be somewhat primitive. They say that terrain relief is not shown, the target is unrecognizable, and a [real] target will not move that way. And this lowers the quality of specialist training and forces them to think in an oversimplified manner. By the way, I think so, too. The fact is that everything depends on the computer's capabilities, that is, the size of its memory and its speed. Our computer is far from state of the art. And I agree that this is quite critical.

We hope that we will get color monitors and reliable computers made in the USSR some day... Meanwhile, we will work with what we have."

**Problem of Coordination Between PVO Ground,  
Air Units Continues**

*18010380 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Feb 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col S. Levitskiy under the rubric "New Weapons and Tactics": "Why Are the 'Invisibles' Flying?"]

[Text] This happened one day at an exercise of an anti-aircraft missile unit. Division commander Maj B. Khuako set the detection equipment to full power, but the indicators of the radar stations were blank. Suddenly the duty observer, Jr Sgt V. Zvyagintsev, reported by telephone: some aircraft was coming in at low altitude! Maj Khuako understood—the target had been detected too late.

That is how the pilots and ground forces of the PVO, having successfully destroyed the supersonic aircraft of the "enemy," let slip a YaK-52. (It had been detached by the local DOSAAF sport-aviation club at the request of the commander). The small plane, in short, revealed a large weakness in the operations of some crews.

Reader mail talks about the acuity of the problem of intercepting small low-altitude targets. Chief of staff of a squadron and combat pilot 1st class Maj A. Khudoyas writes, by way of example, that the fighters in an exercise were unable to go up and intercept the "enemy" aircraft due to the slipshod operations of the radar crews.

All right, the problem has been called urgent. For certain important types of combat training, everything has not yet been set up in well-defined fashion in the joint training of pilots and specialists of the ground equipment of anti-aircraft defense. But before digging into the reasons for this, we will unfortunately have to make an excursion into history. "Unfortunately" because it is far from being the first time the issue has come up. The newspaper has written repeatedly about various types of inter-departmental differences, but the problem is being resolved too slowly.

Recall that on 4 Feb 87, PVO officers Col Yu. Pavlov and Maj V. Novoselov appeared in the newspaper with the article "A Departmental Approach Still Impedes the Precise Organization of Combat Training." The proper links, they wrote, are sometimes not achieved in joint combat-training work among the air force, naval aviation and the PVO troops. Officials, by way of example, coordinate the execution of a mass raid by the air force or naval aviation at an exercise so that the PVO troops learn how to repel it, but there is no raid—the air force and the navy found reasons to limit flights... Or the allotted planes follow customary routings (thus already known "inside and out" by the anti-aircraft gunners and missile troops). Can the specialists of the PVO learn much here? The officials had no time for seeing that all

means for defending the sky, including helicopters, were involved in the joint exercises. "Invisibles" were flying around under extreme circumstances at complex exercises as a result.

Now let's try to give the floor to the authors of the article themselves and those they were criticizing. Yu. Pavlov, today a major general, related that after the feature they began to pay more steadfast attention to coordinating questions of support in joint combat training both in the air force and in the PVO. Exercises and training are now being planned against a complex tactical background. An all-services thrust will be imparted to them. The mutual exchange of information on the performance of complex types of combat training is underway, especially in confrontation with targets from the arsenal of a probable adversary: with low-reflecting surfaces, highly maneuverable and at low altitude. The widespread integration of exercises with the performance of complex types of combat training is envisaged through the maximum utilization of the planned flights of the air force of the district. The aim of true confrontation of the two sides is being sought more often in exercises and training.

The air force officials criticized in the article seem to continue this idea. But Lt Gen Avn A. Arkharov brought forth such complaints as "It seems to me that the authors of the article are not quite fairly criticizing the aviation support for the district exercises and PVO training and are wrongly reproaching the air force command for a narrow departmental approach to the accomplishment of the tasks of supporting the combat training of structural elements of the PVO troops."

So the fliers, in his words, received several requests for aviation support for district tactical exercises and verifications of the combat-alert duty of the PVO. Only one of those was not fulfilled, since at the time no flights were being made at all by order of a superior officer. There was a disruption as well: the combat procedure of the aircraft was altered in the performance of one of the training runs—due to thunderstorms in the flight area—for the purpose of ensuring safety. In the remaining instances, the assignments were carried out in accordance with the requests. There are, moreover, unlimited opportunities for working out questions of interaction with the PVO troops in the tactical-flight exercises of air force subunits.

And so we see that the concrete forms and methods for overcoming provincialism have been defined more clearly. But as for mutual complaints, the discussion here, judging from everything, is not yet finished...

Listen to PVO staff officer Col K. Khovanov, one of the practitioners in organizing the interaction. He candidly related a sore spot: "There can't be any 'invisibles' in the sky whatsoever if the equipment does not lag the times and the people have mastered it. That can't be achieved

without training. And just try and train if we order the needed amount of flights from the air force to train the PVO troops but the pilots 'chop' the order by half."

It was thus proposed to the naval aviators that they use more airspace for flights in joint training. They understandably refused. But matters got stuck there. The conviction that such contacts needed orders from above proved unshakeable. Meanwhile, air force representative Col V. Tsvetov was successfully able to overcome departmental barriers in combat training "on the scene," for example...

Now we turn to the fliers' headquarters. Lt Gen Avn I. Kalugin, whom I asked to relate this progressive experience, was extremely brief: "Col Tsvetov heads the interaction group. There have been changes in this work as a result. All requests for joint combat training are composed realistically and fulfilled precisely. Every air force unit has clear-cut contact with a specific PVO unit."

But the conversation turned out differently on the problems of combat training.

Yes, flights are needed by the PVO troops for the purpose of training the crews of ground-based detection equipment. After all, the air force is the party that is trying to make an aircraft invisible to PVO with every possible means. We could proceed from that, but...

"'Differences of opinion' arise in the work in the air even on the ground. I have in mind departmentalism in the attitude toward each other in the very basing of air force and PVO troops. It is obvious that the whole airfield network should be maximally adapted both for operations against violators of our air borders and for the operations of, for example, a long-range aviation regiment..."

Infamous departmental barriers again? How many of them we have seen at exercises where interaction is being worked out, and every time we were surprised by the absence of clear-cut criteria for combat training. On the contrary, in the PVO they evaluate the flight of their fighters for interception or covering bombers, as a rule, without any permanent contact with air force subunits—the main thing, they say, is that we helped them. And as a result, high marks here and there, although a true verification of the skills has not occurred: both "adversaries" become the victors. And are instances of oversimplification really so rare in the joint training exercises of PVO ground crews and aircraft under conditions of interference and surprise flights of bombers outside of the customary routes?

Readers write to the editors about cases where common tasks obscure "their own" for departments. Col V. Yefremov reports that departmentalism at airfield X led to disruptions of planned flights and the inactivity of the search-and-rescue service. After all, many issues of rear-services support for the PVO subunit he mentioned are

charged to air force officials, who sometimes are not in the mood to be concerned about that subunit. "The amount and quality of support for the combat training of PVO air units sometimes depends on the individual decisions of air force commanders, who are simply unchecked in the manifestation of their own departmental 'feelings,'" says Viktor Petrovich with alarm.

The mutual and exceedingly well-founded complaints of the departments and organizations in joint combat training, the lack of clear-cut evaluation criteria as such, oversimplification, indifference in relation to the matters of comrades-in-arms... This is an incomplete list, of course, of issues still unresolved.

I spoke with the air force deputy chief of staff, Lt Gen Avn A. Pozdnyakov, on this score.

"Undoubtedly far from complete," he said. "Behind the flight of the target with impunity are problems that cannot be enumerated..."

Yes, a YaK slipped through. That means there is not the proper concern for the quality of the radar field for target detection or new technical methods in such matters. Some ground specialists sometimes have a hard time telling an aircraft from a flock of birds.

Why are they turning on the equipment in the PVO units, but there are none of the promised mass flights? On this day the weather conditions did not conform, and there could be other reasons as well that are being neglected for some reason. The incompetence of commanders in other branches of the armed forces in the application of such combat equipment as aircraft—this is an indisputable fact, proven by events that are sometimes tragic.

"How to find clear-cut departmental contact?" reflected Lt Gen Avn Pozdnyakov. "Many documents have been published on the matter. But how are they being fulfilled in practice?"

The readers suggest its solution. I will cite some of their proposals. "It cannot be that requests from the PVO troops for the use of aircraft for joint training are made only during the daytime. The exclusion of night training for the troops is an oversimplification." "Create special monitoring and mediation groups at the headquarters for organizing joint combat training by the aircraft of the branches of service and the PVO troops."

I won't undertake to evaluate these suggestions, this is undoubtedly a matter for specialists and the general staffs of the branches of the armed forces. But the proposal expressed by Lt Gen Avn Kalugin seems more practical and is reckoned for operational work: "We must devise, in conjunction with the PVO, a unified ideology, as they say. Assemble an academic conference

as a first step, discuss what is new in tactics and operational training and the new requirements for interaction. And purposeful practices are topical first and foremost."

It is obvious that it is not mutual recriminations that we must be engaged in. The time has come for the incorporation of contemporary models for battle against enemy breakthroughs of PVO, serious "gaming" at exercises without giveaways.

### **Cost Vs. Risk in Combat Aircraft Repair**

18010414 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Feb 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Vinogradov, Southern Group of Forces: "'The Rook' is a Serious Bird, or A Story About How Pilots and Aircraft Maintenance Specialists Functioned in an Extreme Situation"]

[Text] I read with interest an essay by Lt Col A. Oliynik entitled "Coming in for a Landing!" in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 5 December 1987. It told about Lt P. Golubtsov, who managed to land an aircraft that had been damaged by a Stinger surface-to-air missile in the sky of Afghanistan. This story was continued unexpectedly when I arrived relatively recently to continue service in the Southern Group of Forces.

My neighbor in the hotel room turned out to be a very thick-set lieutenant colonel with blue collar tabs and an excellent tan.

"Up from the south from leave?" I asked.

"Uh-huh, from the south," responded my neighbor, "from Afghanistan."

It turned out that Lt Col V. Lobanov was an aircraft maintenance engineer. He had been decorated with the Order of Red Star and the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Class for courage in performing international duty. That was when I asked Vyacheslav Grigoryevich whether or not he knew Golubtsov.

"Petr? I know him well. Oh, did he give us ground specialists a lot of trouble! But he still is a good lad. In that situation even an experienced pilot would have lost his head, but he had graduated from school just a year before the incident. He was still able to land the crippled attack aircraft!"

"What kind of trouble?"

"Well, you know." My companion even seemed to take offense. "The aircraft had to be repaired. Was it for nothing that the lieutenant saved it and made it to the airfield with his last efforts?"

The damaged attack aircraft stood in the hangar and it seemed small and defenseless there in the hollow emptiness. Like at the bedside of someone seriously ill, a person felt compelled to shift to a whisper automatically with one glance at the torn wounds in the fuselage. The Stinger had struck the tail section and burst near the left engine. The edges of the hole had been partially fused and there were localized burn-throughs from fragments similar to pock marks on the tatters of skin demolished from the 25th to the 32d rib. The ribs and stringers (longitudinal framing) themselves were fractured and twisted like the bars of a cage in which a ferocious beast had held sway. It had held sway, but had been unable to down the "Rook," which is what our soldiers in Afghanistan had nicknamed the attack aircraft.

"Rooks" differ from other aircraft in the fact that they are always next to the infantry. Salty with sweat, the infantry would turn to the sky at a difficult moment: "Get to work, Rooks! Make it hot." And the "Rooks" did. They would squeeze into gorges, fall in a steep dive at the rocks behind which the irreconcilables were taking cover, and unload pods of rockets on them. But fiery tracers also would fly toward them and sheafs of fire from flash suppressors of mountain-version rocket launchers seemed to scorch the wings. Such was the destiny of the battlefield aircraft known as the "Rook."

The fleet silhouette of a perky bird on the fuselage and small red stars imprinted next to it (the number of combat sorties) told Lt Col Lobanov that this specific "Rook," which had now become separated from the flock and was hidden in the hangar, had fought well. Vyacheslav Grigoryevich also learned the details of the last battle from Lt Golubtsov. A team of airborne personnel was waging an unequal skirmish near Kandahar against bands which were attempting to fire on the city with rockets. Helicopters could not penetrate to assist because of extremely dense anti-aircraft fire. Capt Sergey Gorokhov and Lt Petr Golubtsov were able to penetrate and helped the airborne personnel out. Golubtsov was hit by a Stinger as he came out of a dive, almost at the border of the kill zone.

The air navigation system failed and electrical equipment was disabled, but one radio was working, which meant Golubtsov was not alone in the cockpit. Capt Gorokhov led his wingman to the airfield, accompanying him on the landing and giving speed and altitude prompts.

The landing gear could not be lowered by the primary method, so Golubtsov lowered it by the emergency method. The trim tab which facilitated control was not functioning and Golubtsov had to lean all his weight on the control stick. The landing strip was unwinding toward the aircraft at a speed of over 250 km/hr, although here it was a question only of seconds. That was all the pilot and aircraft had to spare.

Lt Col Lobanov saw the strip of ground where the "Rook" finished its landing run 50 m from the minefield. The aircraft plowed along it, strewing brake disks and landing gear (which burned up in cutting speed) all around. "It is also good that the brake parachute did not come out," thought Vyacheslav Grigoryevich, using his hand to rock the aircraft tail, which now was linked with the fuselage only by a narrow connecting strip of skin of about 40 cm. "It would not have held and the tail unit of course would have flown off."

The lieutenant colonel's gaze slid once more over the little red stars on the fuselage nose. Yes, the "Rook" is a bird of character, character infused in the aircraft by design thinking. Character, conditioned by working hands, helped it get to the airfield and not fall apart either in the air or on meeting the ground. It was a firm character with a safety margin, and reliable, but Vyacheslav Grigoryevich knew something else: this character would also reveal itself during repair, and it would be necessary to scratch one's head more than once in search of the necessary solution.

The canopy glass flashed coldly as if confirming that this is how it would be.

On the following morning Lt Col Lobanov was aroused by explosions of mortar shells. Their trajectory passed right over the hangar roof. Some kind of Toyota hung with trinkets dashed from the road at full speed and disappeared in clouds of dust. It was not the first attempt and, one had to assume, not the last.

"The hangar is a prominent target," Lobanov thought anxiously at that moment. But the rising sun was calming and time was hurrying and urging him to the airfield to meet perhaps guests, perhaps higher-ups—at any rate, very important people. The enlisted mechanics had been speculating the day before: "Probably professors, since a special aircraft is being sent for them."

The guess was near the truth. When Lobanov drew up the flaw detection certificate and determined the scope of work after crawling over the crippled attack aircraft, it became clear that the mobile aircraft repair shop personnel would not cope: a special team was necessary. A messenger had been sent to the aircraft plant for spare parts, but that morning it was not the messenger Lobanov was awaiting. When the An-26 froze on the strip after a short landing run, Lobanov went up to the ladder:

"Hello, Yevgeniy Ivanovich! How was your flight, Aleksandr Nikolayevich?"

"How are you, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel?" the "professors," warrant officers Kozlovskiy and Besedin, responded simultaneously. "Everything is fine and we're ready for work."

These were experts, clever hands, who fortunately are always in abundance in aviation. They could fix a watch or gun at odd moments or even shoe a flea if they had the material. There is an abundance for now, but not a surplus, otherwise they would not have sent a plane to the other end of Afghanistan after them. This is something to think about.

But then Lobanov's thoughts were occupied only by the victimized "Rook." When they had removed the damaged section of skin, shattered stringers and splintered ribs and cleaned the remnants of burnt electric harness, only two-thirds of the aircraft remained, no more. The entire middle and tail section and all electric wiring had to be restored. It essentially had to be made from scratch.

Warrant officers Kozlovskiy and Besedin performed the metal work and mechanical work under the direction of Sr Lt Strelyanny. Capt Brusnikin was responsible for armament and Sr Lt Aleksin for electronics. They did not leave the hangar from six in the morning until sunset. There would be times where they would work around the clock in turn so as not to interfere with each other.

Lt Col Lobanov was at the attack aircraft's side from "umpteenth hundred until umpteenth hundred hours" He was the general designer, chief process engineer and state acceptance at the same time. In showing its character, the "Rook" would toss out problems with many unknowns hourly for the specialists bustling around it, and Lobanov, who had assumed responsibility, was supposed to provide an answer to them.

At first the stringers drove them into an impasse. Angle duralumin of the necessary section was not to be found at the depot to make new ones. A solution, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel, a solution!

Vyacheslav Grigoryevich set about his calculations right in the hangar on the aircraft wing. This was customary for him. Lobanov had spent all his career around aircraft. After completing the Vasilkov Military Aviation-Technical School he had been an aircraft technician. Five years later he hit the books again in the Kiev Higher Military Aviation Engineering School. The next step was the Air Engineering Academy imeni Professor N. Ye. Zhukovskiy.

Everything he knew and that he had learned in the auditoriums and in working with equipment and people Lobanov now gave to the "Rook." He looked for (and found!) alternative solutions, including in the case of the angle duralumin. New stringers took their places in the fuselage framing. The full-strength analysis showed that they would serve no worse than plant stringers.

Lobanov had no tables which could suggest how many more hours and days of such strenuous work the people could stand. No tables, no analogs. There was nothing with which to compare it.



Lt Golubtsov looked in at the hangar frequently. He asked no questions, simply looked. And the specialists answered him with the very same silent glances in which one could read: You should get as far away as possible now, Lieutenant. You have done your job, now don't interfere with others.

But one evening the vow of silence was broken. The group had just completed levelling—checking the mutual position of all parts of the aircraft. The "Rook" stood with wings widespread, the new duralumin of the tail section gleaming and the air intake openings ready to receive the incident flow.

"Tomorrow," said Lt Col Lobanov.

His troubled sleep was cut short by explosions of mortar rounds. Lobanov threw off the blanket: the "Rook"! Trousers, boots, jacket—the lieutenant colonel dressed himself like a young private at the first practice alert. At the bus he met the entire group of people and realized from their faces that "professors" Kozlovskiy and Besedin, armorer Brusnikin and electronics wizard Aleksin were thinking the same thing he was.

"If necessary we will begin anew. We are old birds now," said Sr Lt Strelyanny, and everyone involuntarily smiled.

A slight odor of burnt TNT hung over the runup pad and fresh craters from mortar bursts showed dark in the soil beyond the strip, where a month ago the crippled "Rook" had ended its landing run. The aircraft itself already was looking at the sky with its folded-back canopy cover like a small boy chasing pigeons. The deputy squadron commander took his place in the cockpit.

Forty minutes later he was already descending the steps after making a post-maintenance check flight of the attack aircraft. Lt Col Lobanov strode to meet the pilot, recalling his first aircraft and all the aircraft which had passed through his hands, and all pilots whom he had sent off into the sky and whom later he met with the very same words as now:

"Permit me to take adverse comments!"

"No adverse comments."

I end the story of one attack aircraft here. I will anticipate the question: Was the game worth the candle? Is it not better to put the aircraft under the cutting torch and give the pilot a new one? This is seemingly simpler, there is no risk, and our country is rich.

Unfortunately I cannot fully quote all calculations which Vyacheslav Grigoryevich performed at my request. Deducting the cost of materials and specialists' pay (true

to his fine point of accuracy in everything, Lt Col Lobanov also managed this), the team saved the state a very, very considerable sum. I ask the readers to take the author at his word.

Now about the risk. Today there are few who recall a ditty that was popular with us in the war and postwar years. It went approximately as follows: "The tank is punctured, the tail is burning, but the aircraft is flying on an honest word and one wing." A perky tune and mischievous words, and they did not come to mind for nothing.

With respect to the wings, everything is in order with them on the "Rook." And one can believe the honest word of Lt Col Lobanov and his comrades-in-arms even without any additional calculations.

Editor's note: When the article already had been prepared for press it was learned that Lt Col V. Lobanov had been awarded one more Order of Red Star.

#### **Flight Subunits Sacrifice Combat Training to Economic Work**

18010614 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Letter to editors from Capt S. Prokopenko, Far East Military District, under the rubric "Letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: The Reader Criticizes, Reflects, Proposes": "Both Pilot and... Trackman"]

[Text] I recall the satirical newspaper of the squadron in which Maj V. Moroz serves. It depicted various scenes from the life of the subunit airmen. Some of them were digging ditches, some building a fence; others were sorting and loading scrap metal, while yet others were polishing up the barracks....

The episodes depicted in the squadron satirical newspaper were not the product of the artist's imagination. To use a cliché, "they really happened." And it should be mentioned right off that these were not isolated incidents. I could name specific air subunits in which the airmen are frequently enlisted to perform "vitally important economic jobs" instead of preparing for flights, to the detriment of their personal combat training. One can understand the anger of the military airmen when they are taken more strictly to account for a poorly repaired fence around the unit headquarters than for a near-miss in the air. Does this not explain why certain pilots decide to exchange the sword for a plow, to pursue their calling in civilian work instead of in the military? But is it acceptable to squander so generously a natural treasure such as a trained pilot?

Ultimately, however, the commander of any rank, be it a squadron or a regimental commander, is held accountable not for the number of repaired fences but for the quality of the combat training. And so some of them have resorted to the padding of figures and various kinds

of stratagems to fill in all the columns in the schedule. Reports above all! The training level of the unit airmen has frequently been evaluated by higher headquarters precisely from the commander's ability audaciously to compile reports. And this has resulted in just one thing: formalism and attempts by commanders to meet the targets specified in the plan at any cost, without considering the actual situation which develops during the year.

An inspection by higher headquarters in the unit in which Lt Col V. Yugalov serves, for example, revealed that the combat training program had not been adequately mastered by the young pilots. Instructions were therefore sent down for the flight commanders to work with the young airmen and bring them up to standard. That would seem to be the intelligent thing to do, if not for one "but." In the given subunit the flight commanders themselves were not yet adequately prepared to instruct, and their methods skills were poor. Who, it would appear, but the squadron commander and the unit command element, who know the situation and their own capabilities best, could best resolve these issues? The thinking was done for them "from above," however. And not every commander is bold enough to stand up for his opinion. They have to be careful not to end up among the "recalcitrant." And even during the restructuring no pity is yet being shown for them. So we have a situation in which good intentions, veiled in administrative methods, frequently become the opposite.

Various kinds of instructions pour down upon the airmen as though from the horn of plenty. And the number of these "incoming" documents has been reduced practically none at all for now. This means that the bureaucratic machine is continuing its "productive" work. What is the value of plans sent down to the air regiment for delivering scrap metal, for example? This is the same as requiring a scientific institute dealing with electronics, let us say, to raise bananas in our Far East. I do not know about tropical crops, but potatoes are harvested in these parts not just by students, but even by scholarly men. It is the same with the military airmen. It is not enough that they have to find a specified number of pieces of iron; they also have to sort them, cut them up, load and deliver them. Just who all does this sort of thing? Pilots, flight and squadron commanders, who have to master the "related" specialties on the run, frequently to the detriment of their main one. Our common cause suffers from this.

...While I was talking with Maj V. Moroz, one of the airmen entered the classroom and summoned him: "It's time to go. The vehicle is here." My conversation partner smiled guiltily and threw up his hands by way of saying that there was no escaping it; he had to go. As I left the training building, I looked at the truck rolling away down the road. It was hauling 1st- and 2nd-class military pilots to load scrap metal. According to the schedule they were supposed to have classes that day....

**Defense Plant Director on Conversion Process**  
*18010458 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian*  
*11 Feb 89 p 3*

[Interview with A.M. Malashin, General Director of the Kiev Aviation Production Association by Ya. Zhukovskiy, PRAVDA UKRAINY Special Correspondent: "Not Only Aircraft... How the Output of Civilian Production Is Expanding at Defense Branch Enterprises". The first two paragraphs are an editorial introduction.]

[Text] We set up this meeting at a very opportune time. I arrived at the factory in the morning after the staff meeting at which the results of the last week were discussed. The person I was talking to, General Director A.M. Malashin, was concerned. Suppliers are letting them down again, and once again there are delays due to this. Perhaps this is not the time to conduct our conversation? But after I had posed the first questions, Anatoliy Maksimovich was drawn into the conversation.

The production of goods is increasing, the goods have conquered the market, and the output of technological equipment is being set right, which in turn will increase the output of goods required by the population.

[Zhukovskiy] Is it very complicated to squeeze new developments into the finely tuned rhythm of production and reshape a number of sectors?

[Malashin] Of course this is not a simple matter. Although it may even be because the specific gravity of machine processing is so great and, as you know, it is in the most intense sectors. Production, formed over the years, had developed and precise output proportions were established and to wedge in here those things which are not connected with the basic production is difficult. We have had to do a lot of redistributing and planning in other ways. We have good equipment and many numerically controlled machine tools, but, nevertheless, we are experiencing quite a shortage of experienced milling machine operators and lathe operators. Incidentally, it is not only at our factory. Assembly is easier now: in 1988, we built a new 7,000 square meter facility through our own efforts, we transferred the output of goods there, and we are now increasing production. We have set a good production rate. We already exceeded the five-year-plan marks last year and earned more than 19 million rubles. This year, [we are experiencing] a new spurt: 23.3 million [rubles]. And we began several years ago with 7 million rubles altogether. If you consider, as is customary, the output of goods per ruble of wages, then we also want to reduce it to a ruble. We still have not achieved this mark, but that is precisely our task: a ruble [of output] per ruble [of wages].

However, I'll talk about all of this later. Right now, we have new, more complex tasks facing us.

[Zhukovskiy] They are connected with what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev talked about, to force "the defense industry," as he expressed it, to work in the light industry and food industry?

[Malashin] Yes, and if you recall, at the Moscow City Party Conference he emphasized that now defense industry workers are working a bit more strongly on orders for these branches, than on the manufacture of modern aircraft. This has also been openly said about us, but we really are aircraft manufacturers. And, obviously keeping the level of production in mind, we have also been tasked with involving ourselves in equipping technically obsolete branches "to force them to be single minded" as Mikhail Sergeyevich said. This is what we are busy doing. [We are also occupied with manufacturing] highly productive, modern equipment and automated equipment, which in the overwhelming majority of cases no one had ever made before, for example, an equipment complex for processing, packing, and packaging frozen potatoes. Here we are really going to have to "sweat." This system is the most complicated portion of the plant and is made up of several lines. This is very complicated work for us. And we have to produce two units this year and increase output in the future.

These systems and a series of others are also being transferred to the next five-year-plan, so we need to produce them in substantial numbers. Our efforts are now directed at preparing equipment and organizing production. There are obvious difficulties understood by all, but there is no time to spare.

New automated equipment for packing meat and fruit dumplings is in the same state. It will also operate in a system with other equipment at agro-industrial enterprises. We will deliver the first 8 systems to them this year. Twenty different automated equipment systems for the Ministry of Bread Products obviously require less effort since they are already perfected. These are devices for the bulk packaging of flour: six 2-kilogram packages constitute a block, which is immediately glued together with a paper [outer wrapper]. They are suitable for transport, storage, yes and even for sale. These systems are being manufactured in our factory. By the way, we are producing them faster than they can be installed at the milling factories.

[Zhukovskiy] But all of that is for the food industry. Did you not say that you are working on light [industry]?

[Malashin] We are perfecting a new system for light industry, too. Fur skins, stretched on racks, are placed into a drying chamber which automatically maintains the preset conditions. It is a solid piece of equipment. We are currently tasked with producing 8 of these dryers.

All of this equipment for the food and light industries was developed by Soviet designers and is being perfected, in essence, for the first time. This is what is new

and what distinguishes our current year. But the collective's concern about increasing the output of civilian products is not being limited by this and we are doing many other things that serve the people.

At this point, I turned off the dictaphone, the telephone began to ring, a coworker dropped by, then another, Malashin signed some papers and he asked that others be left with him. As if a casual observer, I watched the director occupied with business. He worked calmly, spoke quietly. They understood him and it seemed that they understood him immediately and no one had to ask him a second time: He knows everything that goes on in his business, down to the smallest detail. And suddenly it turned out: no, not everything. Somewhat surprisingly, even I had to admit: they have 2,000 suppliers and the general director had not suspected that suddenly, right now, today, it turned out that there was a shortage of some sort of assembly.

He has been at the factory for thirty-two years. His father brought him here after school. A lathe operator's apprentice and after that work on his own at the lathe, later the institute, an engineer's diploma and, at that very same plant, foreman, deputy chief, and later on shop chief, too. Later on, they elected him secretary of the party committee. And two years ago—general director of the association.

It was precisely at that time that they were tasked with a sharp increase in the production of consumer goods. And it was precisely at that time that the most complicated of them was awarded the highest category of quality (not the Mark of Quality but actually a higher category). These are "Lybed" compact washing machines, which are in extremely short supply, and "Malvina" baby carriages, which one could say are famous everywhere, (selling them while they are in stock, they are three times as expensive). Nineteen types of items will be produced from the recently constructed facility which, as Malashin hopes, will mark the beginning of a new factory within a factory since there is one more facility planned, which is to be larger than this one.

[Malashin] It is quite clear to us that output of civilian products will grow. However, in no way due to the goods themselves, washing machines, baby carriages, window sills, toys, and even frames for slides. On the contrary, growth is also planned here: baby carriages—immediately up a third to 175,000 units already this year and washing machines, up to 100,000. But here, unfortunately, output is limited by our supplier's capabilities. We need electric motors for the washers, although just slightly more, approximately ten thousand. The factory where we get the motors also provides them to other enterprises which are also [a part] of our ministry, incidentally. I understand how logical specialization is, but in running into these difficulties, you unconsciously think: would it not be better to have a factory within our own ministry which produced small electric motors?

[Zhukovskiy] Electric motors are the only stumbling block?

[Malashin] If only they were! We need AVS, a special plastic for the "Lybedas" which also limits their [production]. We also obtain assembled timers. We are now getting two-way relays which allow you to set the activator in either direction. This is better: It washes clothes faster and they do not become twisted into a ball. But we are not paying a 1 ruble 45 kopeks for this relay as [we did for the other] but 5 rubles 80 kopeks.

[Zhukovskiy] I understand that there are quite a few of these complications. Moreover, you also manufacture equipment for medical institutions.

[Malashin] We manufacture quite a few dental chairs, 2,000 units for adults and another 350 units for children. What is more, [we manufacture] decompression chambers for clinics. It is true that we only assemble the chambers themselves along with all of their devices and that other enterprises provide the oxygen equipment.

[Zhukovskiy] This conversation has gone on for a long time and many problems have arisen. Not only with deliveries of materials, sub-assemblies, and parts, and not only with the large and ever-growing volume of components manufactured, but even purely human and psychological, if I can call them that, problems. In answer to the question, how are they relating to the new tasks within the collective, since people really are accustomed to another type of production, and does the work not seem less interesting and less prestigious to them, Malashin said:

[Malashin] They understand. However, we do not get by without explanations. If there are reserves in equipment assembly production but things are tight in machine [production], then we have to maneuver, rotate, and transfer people. This does not always occur smoothly.

[Zhukovskiy] But nevertheless... ?

[Malashin] Nevertheless, many are mastering related professions. We have a very good training center and whenever possible strive not to offend people who are retraining into a specialty we need. It is simpler with young people and we are recruiting them with the aim of [placing them] in needed sectors. It is more complicated with those who have skills and experience. It is harder on both them and us. Well, we try to convince them—we cannot simply ignore their desires and aspirations.

[Zhukovskiy] The process you are carrying on is natural. Much is changing both in the aim of production, in its organization, and in the peoples' consciousness. This is occurring everywhere. And the Kiev Aviation Production Association is not an exception.

### Military Ration Allowances Discussed

18010526 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Maj A. Plotnikov interviews Lt Gen N. Kozlov, Director of the Central Provisions Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "The Soldier's Table"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the year, the military unit commanded by Lt Col Yu. Usanov has been fully self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs.

"There are quite a few such military units in the armed forces," said Lt Gen N. Kozlov, director of the Central Provisions Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, commenting on this fact in a conversation with our correspondent. "Twenty to 25 and more kilograms of meat per soldier annually is being produced by the auxiliary farming operations of military collectives headed, for example, by officers G. Baldykov and N. Cherkasov in the Moscow Military District; by officers B. Kutuzov and N. Shatin in the Leningrad Military District; by officer I. Berkevich in the Baltic Military District; and by officer L. Popravka in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. On the whole, military sovkhozes and military units' auxiliary farming operations supply the army with enough potatoes and vegetables for up to three months, enough milk for a year, enough meat for two months, and enough eggs for more than six months."

[Plotnikov] And where do military units get the rest of their food?

[Kozlov] Food is received both centrally and from agricultural enterprises, sovkhozes, and kolkhozes located in the areas in which military units are stationed. For example, civilian bakeries supply the army with bread.

[Plotnikov] I see. But soldiers' mothers often write us that they worry about the nutrition their children are getting in the army. Please tell us: What do you feed soldiers?

[Kozlov] The soldier's ration allowance includes 450 grams of rye bread and 400 grams of grade one wheat flour; 175 grams of meat; 100 grams of fish; 20 grams of vegetable oil; 30 grams of butter; 70 grams of sugar; 820 grams of potatoes and vegetables; as well as various cereals, macaroni products, dried fruits, and spices. In addition, soldiers in compulsory service get two hen's eggs on holidays and nonworking days. I should add that the food and energy value of the food products included in the soldier's ration is substantiated, including from a medical standpoint, and amounts to 4,154 calories—4,284 calories when eggs are included. Let me say by way of comparison that U.S. Army servicemen get 4,000 calories, and that the figure for Great Britain is 3,000

calories; the FRG, 4000 calories; and the CSSR, 3,970 calories. However, personnel in those countries' armies get more foods containing protein.

[Plotnikov] On the basis of what considerations has the Ministry of Defense set these ration allowances?

[Kozlov] The Ministry of Defense doesn't set the allowances. They are confirmed by corresponding resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Last year, for example, the daily allowance for butter was increased from 20 to 30 grams, meat from 150 to 175 grams, and sugar from 65 to 70 grams. The decision to that effect was taken by the USSR Council of Ministers.

This work is performed according to the following procedure. The Central Provisions Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in conjunction with other main and central administrations and scientific-research institutes of the State Agro-Industrial Committee, formulates an allowance, say, for a soldier's ration. The allowance is then tested in a military unit. After a certain period of time, a report is drawn up and presented to the Minister of Defense, who, in turn, petitions the USSR Council of Ministers to confirm it.

[Plotnikov] How often are changes made in food allowances?

[Kozlov] Take the sugar allowance, for example. In 1941 it was 25 grams. In 1967 the allowance became 65 grams, and in 1988 it was set at 70 grams.

[Plotnikov] And a final question, Nikolay Borisovich. What is currently being done to expand the assortment of courses served?

[Kozlov] Recently, for example, as a result of an experiment conducted among soldiers of the Moscow Military District, new second course garnishes were confirmed.

In addition, a decision has been taken to hold ethnic cooking days in military units at least once a month. Auxiliary farm plots and hothouses are growing aromatic greens, onions, garlic, and other seasonings for this purpose. Needed foods that are lacking are purchased with military units' cash funds.

Of course, food problems have yet to be solved completely, and the Central Provisions Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense is working on them.



### Guidance Needed in Defense Industries Conversion

18010472 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
25 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "An Innovation Requires Assistance"]

[Text] I never thought that in one of those places identified simply by a "mailbox"—in this case at an enterprise producing defense equipment—I would see children's toys coming off a conveyor. They make a somewhat strange impression when you know that next door, behind a wall, modern military equipment is being assembled. What can you say? I suppose this is one more typical sign of our times.

"We manufacture various kinds of magnetic figures, mathematical games for first-graders and other toys in high demand," shop chief D. Panarin explains, "and we are in a position to increase their manufacture by a time and a half in the immediate future."

The decision of the USSR Council of Ministers to increase production of consumer goods at defense enterprises elicited more than an empty echo from the labor collectives of these enterprises, including those located in Leningrad. Workers, engineers and technicians themselves experience the emptiness of store shelves every day. And they are ready to put their shoulder to the wheel, as they say.

"While previously our enterprises sometimes looked at the manufacture of such goods as not a very desirable necessity, today the reverse is true: They are even initiating such production on their own," A. Ivanov, an instructor of the defense industry department of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee shared his observations.

"The uninformed have the impression that the defense industry supposedly was nothing but a burden to the people," added V. Zolkin, the director of this department. "But in reality, even in former times it produced up to 50 percent of the total volume of consumer goods produced in the country. From the most complex computer technology and household television and radio equipment to children's toys. Possessing a high scientific and production potential, today the enterprises can use up to 80 percent of their technical developments for these purposes. This will be a substantial supplement to the quality and quantity of goods for the people."

Children's toys are not the sole form of consumer goods manufactured by the production association, and in general they are not the main form of such goods. Its main national economic specialty is production of electronic musical instruments. The army and navy are well familiar with these products. Last year the Ministry of

Defense purchased 500 such instruments from the association. The enterprise is now producing an industrial lot of medical instruments—portable electric stimulators intended for the treatment of neuromuscular afflictions, for therapeutic use against illnesses and in the presence of injuries of the locomotor-bearing apparatus, and in other situations. The stimulator can also be used at home.

The successes the production association has enjoyed in producing consumer goods are associated in the collective, and beyond it as well, with the general director of the association, a candidate of economic sciences and the chairman of the council of this sector's enterprise directors in Leningrad. Valentin Petrovich's constant and interested attention to production of consumer goods encourages creative enquiry by the association's specialists. The best ideas and technical concepts are not only being introduced into production but are being rewarded quite well. The association is presently conducting a contest for the best models of future consumer goods. The first prize has been set at 3,000 rubles. And a total of 11,000 rubles have been set aside to reward the contest participants.

A long-term program for production of consumer goods by defense enterprises which accounts for consumer demand has been drawn up in Leningrad. A coordinating council for production of video apparatus exclusively out of Soviet components has been formed. A home video camera is being developed in one of the enterprises. Another enterprise has organized production of equipment for electronic hobbyists that can be used to adjust and repair color televisions in the home.

In a word, the existing realities provide the basis for optimism, but at the same time there are grounds for concern as well. In particular, the mechanism for tapping the resources of defense industry in favor of consumer goods production has not yet been debugged.

Consider at least the toys manufactured by the production association of which Valentin Petrovich is the general director. The marketing system is prepared to acquire them in quantities several times larger. The association is prepared to meet the demand for these toys. But there is a sole and all-limiting "but" that has to do with a shortage of raw materials: thin sheet steel and polystyrene. Some in the association point the finger at their own ministry, which is not providing raw materials in the needed quantities. And apparently they are right in this case. But I think the habit of never experiencing a need for anything, always having everything done for oneself, is having its effect here. The new economic conditions—the association switched to cost accounting and self-financing as of the present year—require that we ourselves be more resourceful, that we free ourselves faster of the fat of an indigent existence.

"We attempted to organize production of medical instruments for electropuncture treatment of patients," said V. Paur, chief of the consumer goods design department. "Interesting technical concepts making it possible to attain a higher level of quality than that of existing models were proposed. But the USSR Ministry of Public Health, as represented by T. Noskovaya, chairman of the council of the commission for new technology, showed no interest in our proposal."

I have no intention of passing judgment over the real reasons for rejecting production of the electropuncture instrument. But there can be no doubt that the fate of medical equipment manufactured by defense industry enterprises is not a simple one. That same production association recently began manufacturing apparatus for ultraviolet irradiation of blood. This is truly unique apparatus with enormous possibilities. It is intended for isolated (outside the body) dosed irradiation of blood for therapeutic and preventive purposes, and it is used against furunculosis and suppuration of postoperative wounds, and in the treatment of burns, acute pneumonia, bronchial asthma, gastric ulcers and suppurative-inflammatory diseases in children. These are not all of the capabilities of the apparatus—there are many more of them. The demand for the apparatus is estimated at thousands upon thousands of units. But for the time being the association has only produced its first lot (around 200 units). Moreover 20 of them were sent to Armenia without compensation. Nor has military medicine been forgotten.

"Our apparatus is not inferior in its properties to the best world models," feels I. Sorokin, lead engineer of the department for series-production design. "And it is much cheaper than, for example, the West German models that are held in the highest respect. Given the existing production volume, in 2 years we will be able to satisfy the demand for the apparatus only in Leningrad and the oblast."

But is the association in a position to significantly increase production of the apparatus? Yes, all the more so because its specialists have significantly simplified the procedures for manufacturing many of the parts of the apparatus. What is holding things back?

The enterprise is simply not interested in increasing production of the innovation, inasmuch as medical equipment is not included in the consumer goods group. It is classified along with all of the rest of the basic products. And being such a miserly part of overall production, it does not warrant attention.

"There is no benefit to us from increasing production of such apparatus," said Sorokin. "If we do produce it at all, it is only out of our own enthusiasm, out of our own consciousness, since we know that the people need this apparatus."

Enthusiasm is a good thing, of course, but the solution to the problem should have an economic basis. In particular, medical apparatus is important to our health. And if owing to certain of its parameters medical equipment cannot get through the door marked "consumer goods," what does this have to do with us? And why not put it in this classification, in view of its importance to man? All the more so because we now have many items of medical equipment which are consumer goods even on the basis of formal characteristics. This problem has been discussed for a long time, but the situation does not change.

"Probably the comrades upon whom solution of the problem depends do not go to ordinary polyclinics, they do not experience the absence of modern medical apparatus," said the association's general director, offering a rather severe assessment of the situation.

The range of problems associated with consumer goods production was widened significantly by Candidate of Technical Sciences V. Makarov, a member of the party committee of a scientific research institute working for defense.

"One of the innovations our designers are working on now has to do with video technology. An experimental model is already ready. This year several working models will be made, based on new technology not inferior to Japanese. But what we don't have is production space for series production of such video equipment that is so popular today. With luck, some unfinished production building or unprofitable plant could be acquired. The inconsistency between the poorly developed production base and our scientific potential means that some original ideas associated with consumer goods just remain on paper. Something should also be said about how development is financed in this sphere. We develop new goods exclusively with our own internal resources. Why not encourage our principal clients to finance development of the production of consumer goods?"

V. Zolkin, director of the department of defense industry of the Leningrad Oblast CPSU Committee made an interesting point in summarizing the discussion of the problems of producing consumer goods:

"The great scientific and technical potential of our enterprises should not be dispersed, but used purposefully to carry out priority socioeconomic programs, including production of consumer goods. And this must be done centrally, in a planned manner, so that the design office would not be left without work, so that people would not leave for other jobs. At the oblast level, such a task is beyond means. We need to create at least a regional structure of mutual relations between enterprises of defense industry. In addition I feel it necessary to form a center for communication between defense enterprises and national economic enterprises. As long as such strong ties do not exist, we'll be forced to

introduce our scientific and design developments ourselves, which is rarely suitable and advantageous. Moreover if we make our preparations to manufacture furniture, we find that we have no wood, and if we prepare to produce television sets, we find we lack capacitors. In other words the problem of providing raw and other materials is rather acute, and we cannot solve it on our own."

Of course, it would be naive to expect that store shelves will begin to groan under the weight of goods manufactured by defense industry enterprises in just a month or so. According to popular wisdom: "A tale is soon told, but a deed is not soon done." But without a doubt active inclusion of defense industry in the effort to satisfy the demand for consumer goods will have a great positive impact, and the sooner it does, the faster the obstacles will be cleared from this path.

#### **Use of Military Air Transports For Civilian Economy**

18010618 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
9 Apr 89 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Maj Gen Avn L.M. Chervyakov, chief of the Central Air Force Command Post, by Lt Col S. Kalinayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "News: Facts, Events, Commentary": "Without Empty Runs"]

[Text] **Our Military Transport Aviation is increasingly active in the performance of national economic jobs. M.S. Gorbachev spoke about converting a significant part of this aviation to serve national economic traffic in his speech at the London City Council.**

**How is all of this to be carried out in practice? Military fliers tell our correspondent about it.**

[Kalinayev] Maj Gen Avn L. Chervyakov, chief of the Central Air Force Command Post, led me to an impressive map of the USSR.

[Chervyakov] At any given time there are dozens, even hundreds of various kinds of aircraft in the air over our nation. The specialists have analyzed the situation and arrived at the definite conclusion that empty runs, so to speak, are far from a rarity for both the civil aviation and our Military Transport Aviation. Our common task is one of coordinating operations of the Soviet national aviation globally.

[Kalinayev] Leonid Mikhaylovich, tell me the number and types of aircraft of the Military Transport Aviation which will be involved in national economic hauls.

[Chervyakov] According to our calculations, as many as 60 transport aircraft could be activated for this purpose this very year, including heavy Ruslans and Anteys.

[Kalinayev] What cargo volume could this equipment handle?

[Chervyakov] A rough figure is 50,000 tons annually. And the value of the shipments would amount to more than 45 million rubles. would that be, and what would be the main routes?

[Chervyakov] First of all, our aviation would contribute to the food supply for the population. Military aircraft would be loaded with fresh vegetables, fruit and other farm produce. These food lines, one might call them, would mainly run to areas of the Far North, Siberia and the Far East.

Another job would be that of hauling oversize items. In addition, beginning this year, we shall work with the Ministry of Civil Aviation to haul military personnel, particularly during the heavy fall/summer season, which will free part of Aeroflot's passenger planes and save aviation fuel.

[Kalinayev] Leonid Mikhaylovich, a few words about the mechanics, so to speak, involved in organizing these hauls.

[Chervyakov] It is planned to carry out the flights under direct agreements with enterprises and organizations of ministries, departments and executive committees of local soviets based on rates in effect in the civil aviation.

[Kalinayev] Does this mean that the client will have to pay the freight charges in cash?

[Chervyakov] Such are the times. We all have to reckon, calculate and move things toward the common economic goal, both for the nation and for each specific individual. How will it be apportioned? A total of 70% of the earnings from the operation of this equipment will be transferred to the state budget. The Ministry of Defense will use the rest to cover the additional costs of these hauls. Also for social development and as material incentives for servicemen, blue-and white-collar workers performing and supporting these air hauls.

[Kalinayev] There will apparently have to be a special agency, a mechanism, making it possible to regulate these new Air Force operations?

[Chervyakov] Yes. A special subdivision will be set up at the headquarters of the Air Force High Command, which will decide on organizational, financial, legal and other issues pertaining to the hauling of national economic cargo, including the conclusion of agreements and the coordination of interaction with shippers and recipients.

**Favorable Credits for Defense Conversion**  
*18010631z Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in*  
*Russian No 16, 22-28 Apr 89 p 8*

[Response to reader's inquiry by V. Bukato, chairman of the board of the Zhilsotsbank [Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development]]

[Text] **Some enterprises of the defense industry that are part of the conversion process are switching to the production of consumer commodities.**

**Won't the conversion end up in another campaign without any perceptible effect on the population? Won't it lead to another rise in the price spiral in the consumer goods market? [signed] V. Kuzmin, economist, Moscow**

The measures that have been outlined, of course, will make it possible to obtain a definite economic effect as a result of the reduction of expenditures of material resources in the defense industries. But more important is the maximal effective use of the freed-up productive capacity, which is technically highly equipped and which has highly qualified personnel.

The fear of a possible rise in prices is in part correct. There is sad experience in this. When the manufacture of technological equipment for light industry was shifted to the defense industries, its cost rose sharply.

It is difficult to give universal prescriptions for resolving the conversion problem. But one of them concerns possible granting of credits for conversion projects.

In particular, we are ready, under conditions of a sharp increase in the shortage of credit resources, to assure priority channeling of credits to highly efficient enterprises associated with changing the product line of defense production. Moreover, taking their social importance into account, we believe that it is possible to significantly lower the interest rates on such credits.

This question has already been worked on in a number of our establishments, and their collectives for the resolution of such an important problem believe that it is possible to give up part of their income because of lowered interest rates. There where it is not beneficial for a bank establishment to lower interest rates (this also cannot be excluded, because the average salary of a bank employee up to the present time is 30-40 percent lower than in the national economy as a whole), the USSR Zhilsotsbank will assume the compensation for loss of their income at the expense of a central fund.

We guarantee favorable credits for all economically efficient projects associated with conversions. In these projects, enterprises and organizations can also count on getting free economic and financial consultation and our assistance in conducting expert examinations.

### Role of Labor, Defense Council in 20's Military Reform Considered

18010538 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 4, Feb 89 pp 18-20

[Article by Lt. Col. V.Maltsev: "Defense and Labor Council" under the "Pages of Military History" rubric; first paragraph is italicized letter from reader, Pvt. L.Ivanov, Moscow Military District; second paragraph boldfaced response]

[Text] I know that during the Civil War a Defense and Labor Council was established, and it continued to function until 1937. Yet, textbooks mention almost nothing about its activities.

Unfortunately, it should be admitted that this is true. For decades entire pages have been missing from the history of our country. This was the fate of that unique body created by the revolution, the Labor and Defense Council, which was first headed by V.I.Lenin and 2 years after his death by A.I.Rykov.

#### Coordinating Center

In the summer of 1918 the situation in the country became very grave. Foreign intervention troops held the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic lands, Moldavia, Northern Caucasus, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. The country was a besieged fortress, cut off from its most important food, raw materials and fuel supply regions. A coordinating center was needed to solve problems ranging from providing food to recruiting men for the Red Army. On V.I.Lenin's initiative, such organ was created on November 30, 1918, the Workers and Peasants' Defense Council.

At that crucial for the revolution moment the council dealt with issues that were extremely important for the young republic.

On March 31, 1920, at the 9th Bolshevik party congress, V.I.Lenin announced that the Workers and Peasants' Defense Council was renamed Labor and Defense Council (STO). The decree of the 8th all-Russia congress of the workers, peasants and cossacks' deputies stated: "The military situation in April 1920 allowed the Soviet Republic to turn to economic activities and the Defense Council was faced with the task of closely coordinating the activity at the labor front, as a result of which the Defense Council has been renamed Labor and Defense Council."

The STO was headed by V.I.Lenin until 1924 and carried out the enormous task of rebuilding the economy, starting the building of socialism, building up the defense industry and strengthening the Red Army and Navy. Under V.I.Lenin, the council held 118 meetings and reviewed more than 2,500 issues in three and a half years. M.F.Frunze described the STO's activities with great economy and precision: "The experience of the

Civil War suggests that if we had not had an organ such as the Labor and Defense Council dealing with all aspects of our Soviet life, it is doubtful that we would have come out victorious in the fight into which we were plunged by the course of our revolution."

#### In the Thick of Things

In 1926, Aleksey Ivanovich Rykov was appointed STO chairman. He was also the head of the RSFSR government.

A.I.Rykov's promotion to those important and responsible office was due to his reputation as a talented organizer and manager. In the spring of 1918 he was appointed chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, the central economic management body in the country. A year later, on July 8, 1919, the Central Executive Committee appointed A.I.Rykov to the newly created post of Extraordinary Commissioner of the Workers and Peasants' Defense Council responsible for supplying the Red Army and Navy. He organized the supply of food to military units and achieved the resumption of production at the Tula, Izhevsk and other war factories. His efforts were praised by V.I.Lenin.

In May 1921, A.I.Rykov was appointed deputy chairman of the STO. He was responsible for the People's Commissariats of Finance, Foreign Trade, Social Welfare, Food, Military Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Health Care, as well as the Gosplan, Central Statistics Administration, Committee on State Concessions, Domestic Trade Commission, Central Supply Administration and oblast economic councils. In that position he proved himself a major organizer of the building of socialism.

After the Civil War, A.I.Rykov worked to restore the economy, improve the financial system and strengthen the alliance of working class and peasantry. The people's respect for him grew steadily. It is not an accident that V.Mayakovskiy wrote in his poem "The Voice of Red Square": "Listen to Rykov's voice/The people has forged his voice..."

Vladimir Mayakovskiy was not mistaken. When required, iron strength could be heard in A.I.Rykov's voice. Speaking out at the 14th party congress against the tyranny of certain individuals in a certain party line, Rykov stated that "the party has never been forced on its knees by anybody—be it Stalin, Kamenev or anybody else—and never will be."

As is well-known, Stalin never forgot such things.

#### Military Activity

The STO under A.I.Rykov played an enormous role in the country's industrialization, with priority given to heavy industry, machine building, transportation and the accelerated construction of electric plants as the basis for a drastic rise in labor productivity. The STO's



attention was also focused on agriculture and the problems of cultural revolution. At the STO meeting on November 16, 1927, the first 5-year plan of economic development was discussed, which was presented by A.I.Rykov to the 15th party congress.

Defense issues had a special place in the STO's activity. On March 12, 1924, the STO and the USSR Revolutionary Military Council submitted to the party's Central Committee a plan for military reform for 1924-25, which the Central Committee approved. The STO's attention was focused on developing the defense industry, creating new branches of the army, establishing territorial troops, setting up military schools and preparing officer corps. In addition, the STO at its meetings considered such issues as the defense ministry's budget and material, medical, housing and cultural benefits for servicemen. Rykov saw great potential for radical improvement of the army and navy in the development of military technical sciences. On his initiative, spending on research was raised in 1927, and the salaries of army and navy officers were increased.

The STO initiated and drafted that first 5-year plan of military buildup for 1929-33. On this issue, A.I.Rykov was twice heard by the party's Politburo.

Thus, the STO, the country's military, political and economic body, dealt with virtually every problem of economic and military development. Its chairman A.I.Rykov made a major contribution to their resolution. In 1928, being aware of the true economic situation, he joined with N.I.Bukharin and M.P.Tomskiy in opposing the economically erroneous rates of industrialization and collectivization. In essence, the criticism was directed against Stalin's policies. Stalin could not tolerate that. In December 1930, A.I.Rykov was expelled from the Politburo and simultaneously relieved of his duties as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO. He was made people's commissar of communications, which he remained until 1936.

In March 1938 A.I.Rykov was put on trial as a member of the so-called rightist Trotskyite block and sentenced to death by firing squad.

On February 4, 1988, truth was restored: the plenum of the USSR Supreme Court reversed A.I.Rykov's conviction. His name was given back to the Soviet people as that of a revolutionary, a comrade of V.I.Lenin and a skillful economic manager in a difficult period of the building of socialism.

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### 'Political' Aspect of Stalin's Military Leadership Criticized

18010518 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Mar 89 p 11

[Article by Georgiy Klyucharev under the rubric "History": "Outside the Boundaries of the Stalingrad 'Ring'"]

[Text] In re-interpreting our military history from the perspectives of today, we are looking especially attentively at key points in it. The battle of Stalingrad is one of those points.

The author of this material could be reproached for the fact that he sees some of the events of the Stalingrad battle from his own trench, as it were. And his trench seems to him the most important one. But this circumstance apparently allowed the former Stalingrader to free himself from the accustomed stereotypes in interpreting what he experienced and look at the battle map with a fresh eye.

The careful work of Georgiy Klyucharev with documents and memoirs, which significantly supplemented his picture of what transpired, is also deserving of respect.

I would like to add that the events in the region of the village of Verkhne-Kumskiy in December of 1942 will be subjected to expanded analysis and their role in the course of the battle for the Volga stronghold will be shown in the corresponding chapters of one of the volumes of the "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People."

Doctor of Economic Sciences Professor Lt Gen M. Kiryan.

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Historical stereotypes have great inertia over time. That is namely why the general military-historical conception of the Stalingrad battle has remained unchanged since the times of Stalin. Narrowing the scope of the battle to the limits of the "cauldron," it was dictated at one time by the Supreme Commander personally and has essentially remained untouched since that time. Its influence has over the forty-plus years extended to the greater portion of military prose. It is embodied in the exposition of the State Panoramic Museum "The Battle of Stalingrad," in the Mamayev Kurgan memorial complex, in encyclopedias and textbooks.

Even now anyone wanting to can get the red booklet "The Battle of Stalingrad" at the entrance to the panoramic museum in Volgograd, which asserts that the most important combat operations relate just to the periods from September 13 through November 18 of 1942 and from January 10 through February 2 of 1943. That is, just two stages of the battle are encompassed—the defense of the city and the destruction of the

"cauldron." It maintains that if anything did happen in the interval between these periods, it could not have in any way influenced the outcome of the battle. Even the "Uranus" operation to encircle the Stalingrad group of Hitlerites and the December offensive of the Southwest Front are not mentioned.

I have grounds to talk this way: I follow all publications, both domestic and foreign, associated with the battle for Stalingrad, and my personal bibliography now exceeds 30 basic sources. And now, after many years, I am for the first time since that snow-driven December of 1942 once more in the little village of Verkhne-Kumskiy, not designated in any way on the map of Volgograd Oblast. I walked the steppes where death took my comrades at one time. I thought about how the legendary heroics of the Brest hero-fortress known to the whole world were suddenly discovered. They remained unknown for many years, ruins of fortress walls and the remains of buildings, tattered from bombs and shells, overgrown with tall weeds, until a great memorial with an eternal flame appeared. The name of the stronghold on the Bug became a common one.

Verkhne-Kumskiy and what Soviet soldiers did there in December of 1942 is unfortunately known only to a limited circle of specialists. It is not part of the historical concept, and accordingly no one has taken a serious interest. But I assert that it was namely there on December 24 that the outcome of the Stalingrad battle was decided.

Just how, you'll say, could we have been silent for so long about an inestimable and at the same time disregarded contribution of soldiers, the heroic deed of those who stood to the death in the windswept open steppe?! After all, almost all of them gave their lives for the Motherland!

In considering the causes for the silence and the premeditated distortions in the academic historiography and artistic literature regarding events from which few emerged alive, I understood that it is not easy to rehabilitate the truth. But it would be dishonest to leave everything as it is. No few years were spent in order to prepare the book "The End of 'Winter Storm'" from Molodaya Gvardiya Publishing House in 1983, which re-interpreted fragments of the Stalingrad battle for the first time. The next novel, "The Steel Flame," relied on a even greater amount of facts not mentioned in the official historiography or that were grossly distorted in it.

I do not consider the results of my work to be exhaustive, but I am glad that a memorial has been opened in the village of Verkhne-Kumskiy, until now not known to anyone—a nine-meter steel torch at the foot of which is inscribed a list of the formations and units that perished in the unequal combat. These units withstood the onslaught of Hoth's tanks, aimed at the rear of the Stalingrad Front with the mission of saving the Paulus

group locked up in the "cauldron." But it is not just obelisks that bring heroic deeds back from the dead, it is the force of words that do so as well.

Just what happened at Verkhne-Kumskiy? This. Paulus in the trap. Thinking like a politician rather than like a professional soldier, which is natural in principle but has certain limits, Stalin was seized by the desire to destroy the "cauldron" at any price. And he thus ignored the persistent warnings of the experienced military commanders, first and foremost G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilyevskiy, who felt that the enemy would inevitably soon try to break the encirclement. It is well known that these generals were insisting on creating a solid outer defensive perimeter that would be able to repel any such attempts by the Germans. But the Stavka [Supreme Headquarters], headed by the Supreme Commander, ignored the outer perimeter and resolved not to expend manpower, resources or time on it. On November 27 Stalin confirmed this in a direct-line conversation with A.M. Vasilyevskiy and N.F. Vatutin at the Stalingrad Front.

The plans for the "Saturn" offensive operation were being considered at just that time. It was proposed to put it into effect only after the destruction of the "cauldron," since the Supreme Commander doggedly continued to consider the prestige and political significance of a Stalingrad victory more important than the strategic. And only for that reason was the offensive of the Southwest Front along the Don and its tributary the Chir postponed.

"On November 28," writes N. Yakovlev in his sketch "Zhukov. Pages from the Life of a Legendary Marshal," "Zhukov, at the headquarters of the Kalinin Front... was called by Stalin and asked his opinion how best to destroy the German troops surrounded at Stalingrad.

"Zhukov answered Stalin that 'The encircled German troops in the existing situation will not risk a breakthrough and escape from encirclement without an auxiliary enemy strike from the Nizhne-Chirskaya—Kotelnikovo areas... It is essential, to prevent the unification of the Nizhne-Chirskaya and Kotelnikovo enemy forces with Stalingrad and the formation of a corridor, to throw back the groups as soon as possible and create a tight battle formation along the line Oblivskaya—Tormosin—Kotelnikovo. Keep two tank groups with no fewer than 100 tanks each as a reserve in the Nizhne-Chirskaya region.' Only after the defeat of the inevitable strike from the outside... could they set about the destruction of the surrounded Germans at Stalingrad..."

Recall the date: this document was sent to Stalin on November 29, 1942.

The Supreme Commander ignored the repeated appeals to the Stavka by the commander of the Stalingrad Front, A.I. Yeremenko, who was demanding the closing of an almost 200-kilometer breach in the outer perimeter.

Using almost all of his resources, Yeremenko closed just one of what he considered the two most likely directions for a strike to break the blockade—from the beachhead at Nizhne-Chirskaya. The new 5th Shock Army was assembled there from the front's reserves. South of its left flank remained a yawning breach extending, it is reputed, some 170 kilometers.

Stalin cut short any appeals regarding the danger of breaking the blockade with a single argument: destroy the "cauldron" and the danger would pass in and of itself! He felt that in posing the question in namely that fashion, he would stimulate the fastest possible destruction of those surrounded. He declared the Saturn operation to be a strategic goal diverting forces from the chief (in his opinion) mission, and ordered Vasilyevskiy to present immediately a new plan for the elimination of the Paulus group. The "Ring" plan—to destroy the "cauldron" immediately, in a week's time—was approved by Stalin on December 11, and that same day he directed Vasilyevskiy to execute it.

But then the inevitable happened: on December 12 the battering ram of the 4th Tank Army of General Hoth fell upon our positions to break the blockade. Having concentrated up to 600 tanks and 300 self-propelled guns in advance in the area of the Kotelnikovo railroad station, they dashed into the seemingly inviting breach in the outer perimeter of the Stalingrad encirclement. They were to be followed by divisions from Army Group Don. The turn of events, in short, completely confirmed the foresight of Zhukov. It was as if Manstein had read the thoughts of the Soviet commander.

The Germans called the operation "Winter Storm." And not in three days, as is asserted in official documents, but after only one full day the lead units of their armored ram had traversed 45 kilometers, forced the Don tributary of Aksay-Yesaulovskiy and at dawn on December 13 occupied the village of Verkhne-Kumskiy without a fight.

This river and village played an incomparable role in the Stalingrad battle, which was acknowledged and emphasized in the postwar years. But not for long. Soon the December events of 1942 fell into silence, and their participants lost their hero status to please the Stalin version and the ambitious interests of some distinguished commanders.

It is just 20 kilometers from the village of Verkhne-Kumskiy to the Myshkova River, not much of a distance for tanks. Our troops were not at the river, the last natural line before the close-in rear units of the Stalingrad Front, and soon Manstein signed an order to convert the Winter Storm operation into the operation Thunderclap, an answering strike from the "cauldron." It was to take place on December 19. But it did not, and not at all for the reasons that have settled in peoples' minds for so many years.

Everything was different. The armored avalanche of Hoth had run up against ferocious resistance by Soviet troops that had appeared unexpectedly before the Germans. But not the 2nd Guards Army, as is commonly felt. It was far away, over 180 kilometers from Myshkova. It still had to advance along the river across the winter steppe, and not by the shortest route, but on a narrow curved corridor between the Don and the rear units of the Don Front under the most unfavorable of conditions.

I have on many occasions read works on the battle of Stalingrad that were brilliantly and artistically written in which different versions of the supposed farsightedness of our Stavka in relation to the blockade-breaking strike on the part of Manstein are modified. It is also encountered that the army of Manilovskiy and the tank divisions of Manstein advanced doggedly toward the river Myshkova in an identical manner and that the outcome of the battle depended on who reached it first. But what use is this postulate when we take into account that the Germans had to cover the 20 kilometers left to the Myshkova on wheels, while our units, basically on foot, had 180 kilometers. The question of "Who will get there first?" sounds rhetorical and is called upon to cover up the fact of the strategic bankruptcy of the Stavka and the "Great Military Leader" himself. And it turns out that the heroics of the soldiers who did not permit the Germans to reach the Myshkova before the formations of the 2nd Guards Army seem not to have existed at all.

Only under the pressure of circumstances did Stalin postpone the immediate destruction of the "cauldron" and begin the offensive of the Southwest Front according to the Little Saturn plan of December 16, since it had become clear to all that the 2nd Guards Army would not reach the Myshkova. That is what happened. It only deployed its formations along it on December 19.

The group hastily assembled by Vasilyevskiy and Yeremenko that gave the 2nd Guards Army the vitally necessary six days is called the 51st Army in official sources. We elaborate that only nominally was it called the 51st. The units on Hoth's path were autonomously commanded and were not even half an army in numbers of personnel and arms. Yeremenko's deputy, Gen G.F. Zakharov, was at the headquarters of the 4th Mechanized Corps, the lead unit of the group, for the whole six days of battle, which unit had only a third of its personnel and equipment by the start of the battles with Hoth's tanks, and that also defined the autonomy of the group.

The command felt that with the six-fold superiority of the enemy in tanks and absolute superiority in the air, the group would not bear up for more than 3-4 days. Awash in blood, its soldiers stood for 6 days. Without sleep and sometimes without food, they rose to the enemy time after time. The wounded did not want to quit the battle formations for evacuation to field hospitals. There were cases where they threatened the medics with weapons while resisting.

The battles at Verkhne-Kumskiy were exceptional in intensity even in the evaluation of our former enemies. I cite in confirmation the opinion of German tank general F. Mellenthin. I cite it in its entirety, since it is well known from the middle to our books and films as well, in which it is unscrupulously used in relation to Myshkova. This is all the same lie that prosecutes the aim of concealing the unprotected nature of the rear areas of the Stalingrad Front, presenting matters as if the strike by Hoth's battering ram of tanks was taken on just by the 2nd Guards Army.

"...The Aksay-Yesaulovskiy River—along which the battles developed—was twenty-five meters wide and had a deep bed. There was little snow, but it was very cold. During this period occurred all of tragic elements of events whose historical significance is difficult to overestimate. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the battle on the banks of this unknown river led to the crisis of the Third Reich, put an end to Hitler's hopes of creating an empire and was the decisive link in the chain of events pre-ordaining the defeat of Germany."

Note well: "put an end" on the banks of the Aksay-Yesaulovskiy, and not around the basement of the Universmag in Stalingrad! It was the commander of the corps that had been placed on this "unknown river," Gen V.T. Volskiy of the 3rd Guards, forgotten by history, who threw part of his scant forces onto the enemy's left bank at dawn on December 14, created a beachhead there and brought to a standstill the dash of Hoth's tanks to the Myshkova. He crossed as the enemy occupied Verkhne-Kumskiy behind the corps' back! This desperate and risky tactical step, it would seem, doomed the general and his soldiers to a certain death. But sometimes the desperate step is the sole correct one.

Here is what Verkhne-Kumskiy—changing hands many times, around which raged a most fierce six-day battle, pre-ordaining, in the words of Marshal A.M. Vasilevskiy, the victorious outcome of the battle of Stalingrad—was:

Before the approach of the 2nd Guards Army to the Myshkova River line, the advancing enemy was to be restrained by the 51st Army, additionally reinforced by order of the commander of the Stalingrad Front with the 4th Mechanized Corps, a rifle regiment and a detached tank brigade. Units of the 13th Tank Corps were also brought in here. Even though both the tank and the mechanized corps were in an extremely weakened state, as they had been waging fierce battles for a long time, they were to play an exceptional role in this cause, so important for us... The battles before December 19 took place between the Aksay and Myshkova rivers. Their center remained the Verkhne-Kumskiy region as before. This populated area changed hands several times. Our troops, notwithstanding great losses, displayed staunchness and heroism. The unexpected counter-strikes of units of the 4th Mechanized and 13th Tank Corps played an especial role herein.

To this Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Yeremenko added the following: "The battles in the Verkhne-Kumskiy region were a shining model of the valor of the soldiers of the Soviet Army, holding their line to the death." They are worthy of 'being written in letters of gold' in the history of the battle of Stalingrad."

Alas, it has yet to be written...

The advance guard of the 2nd Guards Army finally reached the Myshkova on December 17 and, as writes R.Ya. Malinovskiy, "on December 19 deployed all of its formations along the bank of the river." Only in the evening of that memorable day, when the defending units of the Volskiy-Zakharov group had almost run out of ammunition, did those that remained alive receive the order from their commander to withdraw to the Myshkova. I testify to the fact that my own 45th Tank Regiment had all of ten men left alive, including myself. The steel roller of Hoth covered those 20 kilometers that separated the Germans from the river on our heels. They passed only on the seventh day. And the battle was conclusively decided in another four days.

The victorious finale of the Stalingrad battle, and I am not alone in feeling this way, is clearly defined by two almost simultaneous events that occurred on the evening of December 24. The first was the rout of the airfield of the 8th Air Attack Corps of the 4th Air Force of Richthofen at Tatsinskaya, in the rear of Hoth's tank divisions on the Myshkova, by the tank corps of V.M. Badanov. The Tatsinskaya slap left Manstein no illusions whatsoever, and showed him with terrible clarity that tarrying in retreat was like death: the offensive of the troops of the Southwest Front according to the Little Saturn plan had been developing successfully for eight days. Then, and only then, did Hitler's field marshal feel the Stalingrad battle to be lost. Lost because supplies to the "cauldron" had been halted. A dispatch was sent to Hitler: "...the airfields of Morozovskaya and Tatsinskaya have been subjected to the fiercest devastation, as a result of which materiel and fuel have been destroyed and the personnel half slaughtered, while the other half have scattered to who knows where. We cannot provide Paulus' surrounded army with anything more..."

Hitler reacted to this by transferring the 6th Division of Raus, which had inflicted the main blow, from Myshkova to Tatsinskaya. But it was also unable to alter the situation... With its departure began the withdrawal of the two remaining German tank divisions, the 17th and the 23rd. This second event occurred the same night, several hours later. I remind you that the battle was always felt to be lost namely when the enemy withdrew.

True, the "cauldron" still remained in the rear of our troops. Yes, it remained, but after December 24 it became, in the expression of Manilovskiy, "a camp of armed prisoners of war." Their lot was pre-ordained. The destruction of "cauldrons" was neither before nor after considered a victory.

And so the chronicle of events corrects the long-held opinion that ascribes victory over Manstein to Manilovskiy's army. The principal forces of the German Army Group Don were also unable to enter into battle. The 2nd Guards Army opposed just Hoth's divisions, inferior to our army in numbers of tanks. This, of course, pushed Manstein to decide to pull back from the Myshkova. But I repeat that this pullback nonetheless cannot be considered the rout of Manstein. It can still be understood, by the way, when writers, in the expression of Dumas, "hang the camisole of their novel on the nail of history." But it can hardly be permitted that the authors of the Myshkova diorama in the State Panoramic Museum of the Battle of Stalingrad depict, to the detriment of the facts, a close order of self-propelled guns rushing in an avalanche to Myshkova, guns the Red Army was not even equipped with yet. An outright steel wall is depicted, which is hardly what awaited the tank battering ram of Hoth on his way to the "cauldron."

Let us sum up. The legend and the myth of Myshkova have concealed the phenomenon of a breach in the outer perimeter of the Stalingrad encirclement into which the divisions of Hoth poured as if through open gates. The myth allows many to assert still that the "Stavka took the necessary steps in timely fashion." It is noteworthy that the command of the 2nd Guards Army is not affiliated with creating the legend. The commander of the army himself described the events on the Myshkova quite truthfully:

"An amusing incident occurred; aerial reconnaissance reported that the enemy had deployed a mass of tanks—six rows of 60—for an attack. There was danger of a breakthrough. What opposed the enemy? We had, perhaps, more tanks than the enemy, we had more than six hundred of them, but there was no fuel—the tanks were only a quarter full. I issued the order to remove the camouflage from the tanks, and if they were in ravines, for them to come up onto knolls, let the enemy see what he was up against. Urgent dispatches went back to Hitler's headquarters: 'The whole steppe is covered with Soviet tanks.' Thus was disrupted this enemy plan."

What happened is what happened. Manilovskiy is correct in testifying to the fear of the Germans. This was not the same enemy who had struck several days earlier in the Verkhne-Kumskiy region. Hoth's former determination had been undermined by the losses inflicted on him by the group of Volskiy and Zakharov, as well as the shift of the 6th Tank Division to Tatsinskaya.

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Recall in conclusion that all of the Stalingrad prisoners of war from the "cauldron" were without belts. They had made "bouillon" from them. They had eaten the horses earlier. Only six percent of the soldiers captured in the "cauldron" escaped death from dystrophy. And it is difficult not to agree with those foreign authors who assert that the enormous casualties associated with the

rushed elimination of the "cauldron" need not have been. Is it the capture of Paulus with soldiers dying of hunger, of whom less than a third of the original complement remained, that must be considered the Stalingrad victory, strictly speaking? But there is a paradox: it was namely the "cauldron" that was the inspiring affirmation of the right of Stalin to wear the uniform of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

I hope that objective analysis of the December events of the battle of Stalingrad will make it possible to judge how dearly that marshal's uniform cost the Soviet people. This research will inevitably uncover the inferiority of Stalin's strategy, when he jeopardized the outcome of a huge battle, at the time without analogues in the human and technical resources committed to it, for the sake of personal ambitions. At the time when certain units were tightening the inner ring around the doggedly resisting troops of Paulus and bearing large losses therein (as in any offensive), other of our units, without even enough antitank weapons, were pulverized by Hoth's tanks and also bore enormous losses. This could have been avoided had the Supreme Commander listened to the advice of professional soldiers and been concerned with the threat of a timely breaking of the encirclement of the "cauldron" on the part of Manstein...

What happened is what happened. You cannot bring back the fallen. Let us at least bring back the truth.

**Access to Classified Archive Documents Widened**  
*18010540 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
27 Mar 89 p 2

[Interview with Maj.Gen. N.Lutsev, Director of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Central Archive, by Col. V.Gavrilenko: "Designation 'Secret' Removed from Many Great Patriotic War Documents"; first paragraph is a boldface introduction]

[Text] Our correspondent Colonel V.Gavrilenko met with Major General N.Lutsev, Director of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Central Archive.

[Lutsev] Indeed, opportunities for studying wartime documents have widened greatly. Documents from individual units up through the army level is now freely available.

[Gavrilenko] With no restrictions?

[Lutsev] None whatsoever. And not only at our Podolsk archive but at the Central Navy Archive and the Military Medicine Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Museum of Military Medicine.

[Gavrilenko] What are the procedures for obtaining the permission to study these documents? How did they change?



[Lutsev] The director of the archive now has the right to issue such permissions.

[Gavrilenko] Nikolay Ivanovich, let us say for the sake of argument that I needed to consult the documents.

[Lutsev] Fine. But to make it more useful for the average reader, let us suppose that you do not live in Moscow or near the Moscow Oblast town of Podolsk, and not near the town of Gatchina, Leningrad Oblast, where the Navy and Military Medicine Archives are located. Before setting out for either of these towns you should visit your local military commissariat where you will get an application form for the permission to do archival research. If your project is work-related, your organization will apply for you and there is one application form; if it is not work-related, there is another form, a request addressed personally to the director of the archive.

But do not go yet; you must wait for the answer from the archive. The reason for this is not the usual bureaucratic tarrying. We are asking you to wait because it is better for you. The problem is that no archive has limitless ability to accommodate researchers. When they get your application, archive employees must decide when they can accommodate the visitor and schedule the most convenient date for his visit.

As far as our archive is concerned, delays in the construction of the new 150-seat reading room limit our resources considerably.

[Gavrilenko] What new forms of working with visitors are you planning to adopt?

[Lutsev] First of all, we will make archival research schedules more orderly. Some researchers spend a full year in the reading room even though there is no special need for this. We will be looking at the purpose of our visitors' research more closely and based on this set a

realistic time limit for their projects, informing them of it in advance. This will help us increase the number of people who will have access to the archive. In addition, we will tighten controls over document handling.

[Gavrilenko] Is it possible that documents have disappeared?

[Lutsev] Yes, and it is extremely sad. Once I remember we discovered that some papers were missing and started to investigate who could have been responsible for it. To our great surprise, we found out that one very respectable person was involved. I asked my employees to check their information several times over: there could be no mistake. I called that man and told him that I was very sorry but the documents would have to be returned. At first, he was very indignant. Only after I had produced sound proof, comparing times, showing him log entries, etc., was the dishonest client forced to return the document. Yet, if he had been able to make copies, I doubt he would have resorted to this dishonest action.

There are opposite situations, too, when a visitor attempts to make additions in archival materials which could impact on his present life. We have encountered several such situations. For instance, one trickster entered his name into a number of documents in order to be included into the glorious ranks of Great Patriotic War veterans. Then, some time later, he innocently sent us an official request to confirm his participation in military actions.

I would like to note that our employees working with documents are highly trained professionals. So if someone has the idea of obtaining benefits and gaining glory in this manner, I would advise them to forget it. As to honest people moved by the lofty purpose of writing new pages into the history of the people's heroic deed, I want to welcome them on behalf of our entire staff. For them, the doors of the archive are always open.

**Growing French Involvement in NATO Deplored**

52000025 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
7 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by Andrey Balebanov under "Opinion of a Commentator" rubric: "In Harness With NATO"]

[Text] In March 1966, when Gen Charles de Gaulle declared France's intention to withdraw from the NATO military organization, this resolute step by Paris evoked fierce attacks from the United States and other NATO allies who clearly had not counted on losing control of such an important bridgehead in Western Europe. All of the top leaders of the Fifth Republic who followed de Gaulle affirmed their dedication to keeping France outside the military structure of NATO. And the current President F. Mitterrand has repeatedly declared that there can be no talk of returning the country to the NATO military organization.

As early as 1983, however, the French Government agreed for the first time to hold the next session of the NATO Council at the foreign minister level in Paris. But quite recently, according to the London TIMES, the French Government approved the plans for the greatest expansion of its military ties with NATO in more than 20 years. The newspaper points out that President Mitterrand approved the intention of the French Ministry of Defense to begin negotiations with the alliance on French participation in the costly contemporary air defense system. British experts justifiably noted that this decision actually "obligates France to strengthen its ties with NATO," which "will do even more to draw the country into West European military strategy."

Still another step by France toward strengthening its military ties with NATO was its participation in the largest naval maneuvers last month with the United States, the main partner in the bloc. And although in the last decade Paris has repeatedly participated in NATO "military games" in Western Europe, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, the present exercises were much more significant. As the French television company Antenne-2 stressed, the French-American maneuvers "indicated a certain drawing together of France militarily with the United States," and consequently, with NATO as well.

Especially close relations in the military area developed between Paris and Bonn. The noticeable expansion of military cooperation with another member of NATO—Great Britain—is shown by the results of the French-British summit meeting with the participation of the defense ministers at the end of February of this year.

"There are many ties between France and NATO and I am striving to develop them further," said F. Mitterrand in a speech last fall at the Institute of Higher National Defense Studies. Well, the French head of state is keeping his word with his specific actions in this area. In my view, such vigorous development of French-Atlantic

military ties, which essentially is leading to the renunciation of the course proclaimed by Charles de Gaulle, hardly goes along with the growing tendency toward a reduction of military activity and an increase in trust in the relations between East and West.

**US Military Historian Interviewed on Visit**

18010426a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Mar 89 First Edition P 3

[Interview with U.S. Navy Captain A.J. Booth, deputy director of the Naval Historical Center, by Capt 2nd Class V. Kocherov: "Each Day Was Full of Impressions,"]

[Text] "Each day was full of impressions," said Captain A.J. Booth, deputy director of the Naval Historical Center and head of the delegation of American military museum workers, appraising the results of a return visit to the USSR which took place from 26 February through 5 March.

[Booth] While becoming acquainted with your military museum work methods, we discovered that we have one and the same problems. Just as our Soviet colleagues, we are preoccupied with the renewal, restoration, and storage of various relics, the lack of sufficient floor space for displaying all of the exhibits that we have available. Speaking of the future, we would like to get an exchange of exhibits going, for example, paintings, posters, and models of weapons (maybe even traveling [exhibitions]).

We are experiencing profound satisfaction from getting to know Moscow and Leningrad. Literally hours after our arrival, we had already enjoyed a performance at the Bolshoy Theater. Each day thereafter we managed to see something fully comparable in beauty to the Bolshoy Theater. I would personally like to continue the contacts we succeeded in establishing with many people in your country.

[Kocherov] At the end of last year, a group of American scholars and historians visited our country. I remember that, during a conversation at the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History, one of them said with resentment that he saw only one small exposition in the USSR Armed Forces Central Museum dedicated to the Allies and their participation in the Second World War. In this regard, it would be interesting to find out how much space U.S. military museums allot to the display of Soviet Army operations during the Second World War years?

[Booth] Unfortunately, I cannot answer precisely that question. There are several paintings dedicated to the meeting at the Elbe in the Army Museum at Ft. Meade near Washington, D.C. I know that the Naval Museum maintains several exhibits describing our joint space exploration and the joint polar expeditions. As to those exhibits which you are talking about, I simply do not remember.

[Kocherov] Perhaps you tell your visitors about the Soviet Army's main operations during the Great Patriotic War?

[Booth] No. Basically, the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces are mentioned in our museums only in connection with joint operations in Europe and I do not remember if there are any illustrations dedicated to Soviet Army operations before the opening of the second front.

[Kocherov] In your view, what can military museums do in the area of confidence-building measures between the U.S. and USSR?

[Booth] Our ties and contacts should undoubtedly broaden. What contacts have started is also appropriate between representatives of our armed forces and the current exchange of delegations of military museum workers confirms this. Thus, we are leading the movement for all other groups. And we are already attaining positive results in this way.

#### **Increased British SSN Patrols in Barents Sea Reported**

18010426b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Mar 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by E. Babenko, political correspondent: "The Logic of 'Everything the Wrong Way Around'"]

[Text] We have a London Press Association news agency dispatch in front of us: "As it turns out, British Navy nuclear-powered submarines are increasing the number of patrol cruises in the strategically important Barents Sea area near the Soviet Union."

Those who gave this information to the Press Agency explain this increase by a "sharp decrease" in the number of Soviet patrol submarines sailing outside their territorial waters. The press agency cites the opinion of one well-known Western strategist: "If they do not come to us, then we will have to go to them."

We have not begun to confirm if this "patrol reduction" of our submarines is true or not. In our view, the main thing here is something else: the logic or, more precisely, the lack of logic in the information stated by the authors.

Let us provide official information from the Soviet side. For the purpose of lowering the level of military confrontation between the blocs and for insuring stability in accordance with the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense, states, which are part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO], are presently taking steps to unilaterally reduce armed forces and equipment, defense budgets, and the output of military manufacturing. This process is beginning in all Warsaw Treaty countries immediately, is not tied to forthcoming talks, and is not

dependent on their outcome. For the USSR, this means a 12 percent numerical reduction in the armed forces, including 240,000 men in the European portion.

Let us apply the logic of Western strategists stated above to all of this: "Since the Russians are moving away from us, we will close in on them." In this case, hundreds of thousands of NATO officers and men and their corresponding equipment must additionally appear on the territory of the Western states contiguous to the European countries of the socialist community in answer to the East's unilateral disarmament measures?!

For almost 40 years, the North Atlantic Alliance has justified its existence and the constant build-up of military potential by the presence of a "military peril from the East." How do they suddenly explain that the "Red threat" not only does not exist, but moreover, the Warsaw Treaty, without any conditions, is voluntarily and unilaterally reducing its armed forces and equipment.

The really feasible peace-loving initiatives of the WTO countries are having a positive effect on Western public opinion. The notorious "enemy image" is being eroded. It appears from a recent poll of the FRG population that the West Germans place the issue of defense from an external threat as 17th, that is, in last place among the issues listed by the poll's organizers. In other words, they no longer believe that a "communist attack" is on the verge of being unleashed.

We are not extreme optimists and we will not succumb to the euphoria from practical steps already taken toward the beneficial and necessary process of lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe for both sides. But we are justified in counting on answering steps. All the more so since the logic of "everything the wrong way around" under the conditions created today are hardly capable of bringing success to its proponents.

#### **Western Optically Guided, Submarine-Launched Missile Noted**

18010607 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
17 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by Staff Correspondent Ye. Grishin: "A New 'Miracle-Weapon'?"]

[Text] Bonn—To all appearances, military concerns of the FRG and France are developing a new "miracle-weapon."

The influential West German newspaper FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE reports that the project involves a "highly advanced system for launching missiles from submarines." The new weapon, known as the Polykheme-SM [Transliteration], is designed to strike enemy aircraft and helicopters. For the first time in military history, the newspaper writes, a submarine equipped with the system will be able to deliver aimed

fire against airborne targets from a depth of up to 300 meters and for a distance of up to 5,000 meters in altitude. This is made possible by a special homing head that uses infrared radiation and is guided from the submarine by means of a thin glass fiber cable.

In military specialists' view, such a cable has an important characteristic: It transmits signals of an optical, not electrical, nature. As a result, the enemy will not be able to create interference with the missile's guidance system. In addition, the missile is to be equipped with sensors that will enable it to search for its target independently within a scope with a one-kilometer radius.

The job of carrying out the prestigious project has been assigned to the aircraft and missile concern Messerschmidt-Boelkow Blohm (FRG) and the French firm

Aerospatiale. Paris believes that "development of the Polykhome-SM will mark a genuine leap forward that will enable it to become a world leader in the development of military technology."

Just how much that "leap" will cost is not being reported, however. But in view of the outlays involved in developing other militaristic innovations, rest assured that the figure will have many zeroes. Something else is disturbing as well: A broad discussion of disarmament problems is under way throughout the world, and the talks on conventional weapons and on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe have gotten under way in Vienna, talks that Bonn and Paris have officially welcomed. What, then, are the men on the banks of the Rhein and the Seine really in favor of? A reduction or a buildup of military might on the European continent?

**Status of MIAs, POWs Discussed**

*18010511 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian  
No 8, 25 Feb-3 Mar 89 p 5*

[Interview with V. Mariy, of the Coordination Committee for the Release of Soviet Servicemen Taken Prisoner in Afghanistan, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, in the column: "There is Hope - 313 Missing in Action in Afghanistan"; date, place, and occasion not given]

**[Text] The USSR complied with the agreements reached in Geneva by pulling its troops out of Afghanistan by 15 February. However, all of them did not return home—those who were taken prisoner and those who are missing in action remained behind.**

Below we print our correspondent's interview of V. Mariy, Responsible Secretary, Coordination Committee for the Release of Soviet Servicemen Taken Prisoner in Afghanistan.

[Mariy] We have a list of 313 names of men missing in action. I would like to think that they are all alive and in status as prisoners of war, of course. There are difficulties due to the fact that opposition units that may be holding our boys prisoners move around from place to place. On top of that, many prisoners of war do not always give their true name, for understandable reasons.

We receive information from various sources, but I would not like to name them. Many private persons and organizations are offering us their services in the search for the prisoners of war on the condition of absolute confidentiality, since various attitudes exist relative to this problem.

Our job is to ascertain the exact location of prisoners of war, do what we can to ensure that they are treated normally, and consider and resolve problems associated with their return home. We already have all necessary means at our disposal. I take this opportunity to express my thanks to all those who have offered us material assistance, but we have no need for that as yet. We are receiving material assistance from the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] and the Soviet Peace Fund. We are constantly broadcasting to Pakistan and other countries located in the area appeals for a humane resolution of the prisoner problem. The Coordination Committee is also in contact with social and state organizations that are involved with this problem. I would like to emphasize here the intensive effort being made by the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and mention once more the direct contacts between Soviet diplomats and representatives of the opposition.

The change in Pakistan's position is also important for us. We have been promised cooperation on the highest level relative to return of the servicemen. We were previously told that there are no Soviet military personnel on Pakistani soil.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Why do you think that there was no mention of prisoners of war in the Geneva talks?

[Mariy] In my opinion, in the preparation of the agreement the major emphasis was on resolving the problem of Afghanistan on a global basis.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] The statement is made that there are purely legal ramifications associated with the term "prisoner of war", since its use would require clarification of the nature of actions in Afghanistan.

[Mariy] That is not excluded. My personal opinion is that, had social organizations participated in working out the agreement, we would have insisted on including these provisions into the text of any version. As it is, the social organizations do not have the advantage of a framework in which to deal with humane initiatives.

We are prepared, with common humanity as a basis, to work with any organizations to reunite families. We have recently established contact with Amnesty International, an organization of which some circles until recently had a negative opinion. This organization has exhibited understanding and readiness to cooperate with us. We have also established contact with the Bundestag Greens.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Have you made any contact with Ludmilla Thorne—the one who sent some of our boys to the USA?

[Mariy] She represents the Freedom House organization. Representatives of the International Committee for Rescuing Soviet Prisoners of War in Afghanistan have spoken in favor of such contacts, but we have not as yet received any information in that regard. I believe that much will depend on the situation that will obtain after 15 February.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] According to the information in your possession, how many Soviet prisoners of war have been sent to the West?

[Mariy] About 20 men are now in the USA or Canada, according to our information. We are attempting to make contact with them, but there are difficulties. Much depends on local authorities. If they were to demonstrate the good will to permit at least consular access to the boys, I believe that this could be done more easily.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Would it be a good idea to publish the list of those missing in action?

[Mariy] If we were to publish the list, this would spark a hope in many people that their son or brother is alive. What if they are disappointed a second time?

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What is the total number of men that has been returned? What have they said about the condition under which they were confined?



[Mariy] Twenty-seven men were returned while combat actions were taking place. They had been confined under various conditions. One of them had been kept with a family; he was sold several times, being used as a piece of currency. Another man was confined in a hole, where he was victimized by other prisoners in the hole who had been forced to do so.

Some of them returned via the auspices of the International Red Cross, while others were taken to the West by a number of organizations to carry out propaganda. They were able to establish contact with Soviet representatives and make their way to the Motherland.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Do you have occasion to assist former prisoners of war?

[Mariy] We have not turned down a single request made either by a returnee or family of a serviceman missing in action. For example, in the case of I. Ryzhkov, who had been given a sentence of 12 years and released after USSR General Procurator A. Sukharev made an appeal in the press, our committee helped pay his legal expenses. We are frequently asked to intercede to obtain housing and render assistance with other problems. Many returnees from Afghanistan unfortunately develop problems. I have no intention of comparing heroes with those who for some reason were taken prisoner. All these people deserve special and careful attention. However, there still are intolerable occurrences. Officers visit the parents of men missing in action to tell them that their sons are traitors. First, only a court can determine whether a person is a criminal or not, and second, the General Procurator in his speech stressed that returning prisoners of war will not be subjected to any punishment.

The problem of the return of Soviet prisoners of war is extremely delicate. Bearing in mind the anxiety felt by Soviet people over the fate of their countrymen, at this time we are of the opinion that there is no advantage to be gained by discussing specifics of our work. I believe that no one will hold anything against us because of this, since we are acting with a single purpose in mind—not doing anything that may harm those who have not returned to the Motherland.

#### **BSSR Benefits for Afghan Vets Described**

18010521 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
14 Mar 89 p 1

[Interview with V.A. Pechennikov, secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee by V. Bogdanovich, TASS correspondent; date, place not given: "To Surround Each With Care"]

[Text] This month Minsk resident Nikolay Matskevich, a former soldier-internationalist, received a 150 ruble pension instead of 40. He and 433 lads who became invalids during the Afghan War were granted republic

personal pensions by a BSSR [Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers resolution. This resolution is only one aspect of a major program directed at improving the living conditions of servicemen who suffered in Afghanistan. Besides the benefits provided for by the All-Union Legislative Acts, the Belorussian "Afghantsy" obtained a number of other privileges. A TASS correspondent asked V.A. Pechennikov, secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, to talk about them.

[Bogdanovich] Valeriy Andreyevich, Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan, the weapons have been covered [with tarpaulins], and we have settled our accounts with the war.... But often, upon returning home, our young boys find themselves battling red-tapists and bureaucrats and they have to repeatedly knock on the doors of various offices....

[Pechennikov] Yes, the attitude toward internationalists is not always and not everywhere what they deserve. Of course, this does not mean that we are not doing anything for them. In Belorussia, for example, we have provided more than 1,000 apartments to invalids and families of deceased servicemen on a priority basis and we are handing out sanatorium vouchers and higher college scholarships. However, the Central Committee and other party committees have received many letters from Afghan veterans describing callous and heartless treatment. An investigation conducted last year substantiated many complaints. The Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee decided to conduct a meeting with the soldier-internationalists to discuss pressing issues. A Central Committee Buro special resolution also resulted from that meeting.

[Bogdanovich] What are its main provisions?

[Pechennikov] We recommended the establishment of a commission, under the local Councils of Peoples Deputies, for a detailed investigation of living conditions and implementation of benefits established for internationalists and the families of deceased servicemen. We hope that specific decisions will be adopted over the next two months based on the results of their work. The appropriate committee under the BSSR Presidium of the Supreme Soviet will examine issues which are within the jurisdiction of republic agencies. We have also tasked ispolkoms of local Councils to provide a one-family apartment or house to all invalids and families of servicemen who died in Afghanistan by the end of the five-year plan. We recommended that trade-union committees and councils of workers collectives provide benefits in collective agreements which facilitate placement of soldier-internationalists on an apartment waiting list.

[Bogdanovich] But there is a nuance here. In accordance with a system established in the republic, only those people having two or even five year registrations are placed on housing lists and it is done differently in each oblast. Will this not interfere with implementing what has been planned?

[Pechennikov] No. We proposed to the BSSR Sovmin [Council of Ministers] that they not apply the length of residence requirement to Afghan vets and the families of deceased servicemen. Besides, we are granting them the right to free public transportation in municipal and rural areas and priority telephone installation. Children, whose fathers perished on Afghan soil, will be provided free pre-school and boarding school educations, will receive grants of no less than 60 rubles a month, and a 50 percent discount on the cost of medicine.

[Bogdanovich] No war occurs without losses. Hundreds of Belorussian lads did not return from Afghanistan. They have only one real benefit left—to live in our memories....

[Pechennikov] In the republic, 760 families are in mourning for lost sons, brothers, and husbands. Soon the

names and achievements of our fallen heroes will become known to all of the republic. The "Belorusskaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya Publishing House" imeni Petrus Brovka is preparing a book for publication on servicemen who did not return from the war. Photographs, letters, memories of relatives, dear ones, and colleagues will make up this chronicle of bravery and pain from the "Remembrance" series. Public organizations, the mass media, and soldier-internationalist councils have taken part in this noble act. The newspaper VECHERNIY MINSK named each resident of Minsk who gave his life on Afghan soil. Such publications are being prepared in all oblast newspapers.

None of the fallen or living Afghan veterans will be left out of our care.

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